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PREFACE
Men and women who agree about a wide range of moral issues can still disagree about the
status of the rules to which they appeal. Some hold that they are mere rules of thumb, some hold
that they are exceptionless norms, some that their position is somewhere in between (say strongly
entrenched prima facie rules or virtual absolutes). People who believe in exceptionless norms
disagree about the spheres of morality in which they are to be found: some find them primarily in
sexual ethics; others in political principles such as that protecting freedom of speech; others in rules
protecting human life. Adherents of absolute rules also differ about the source of such rules: some
of them regard such rules as divine commands, but others seem them as requirements of practical
reason, direct intuitions of conscience, or perhaps even deeply entrenched social conventions. It is
with the existence of exceptionless norms, not their content or source should they exist, that I am
here centrally concerned. A cognate issue is whether we can ever have infallible moral knowledge:
whether we might be required to revise, in the light of further insights, our belief that it is wrong for
parents to kill their children because they find their continued existence inconvenient.
The issue received its most intensive discussion around 1978, when, as it happens, the
author's Ethics of Homicide was published. But it continues to be of importance, as may be gleaned
from the recent Papal Encyclical on moral issues (John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 1993), and from
the recent anthology edited by Joram Graf Haber (Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics,
1994). It is my hope that this book will at least move the argument forward, though not that it will
resolve the many moral problems around which the debate has turned.
In addressing questions of moral theory, I shall make the minimum teleological assumption that
ethics is concerned with happiness -- whether the happiness at issue is the agent's own or that of
others, whether happiness is thought of in welfarism or perfectionist terms, and whether it is to be

found in this world or the next. A moral position, I shall assume, is unacceptable if its observance
means misery without compensation (here or elsewhere) for all concerned. Hence moral rules,
including any absolutes we may discover, must in some wide sense be justified by their utility. But
I take into account the utility of rules as well as that of acts; and, in judging questions of utility,
invoke goods such as knowledge and friendship as well as pleasure and desire-satisfaction. Hence
my argument will escape consequentialism, at least in its simplest forms.
My conclusion is that there are exceptionless moral norms, but it is not possible, at least for
a philosopher, to formulate them with any precision. (A possible exception: One ought never to
intend that another do wrong, either by his own lights or by one's own, though it is legitimate to
persuade him to change his mind or attempt to overcome a merely emotional resistance to some
proposed action.) The most one can do on philosophical premises is to identify danger zones, in
which agents and moralists must proceed with caution. And we may hope to formulate principles
that, though we do not know them to be absolutes in the strict sense, still may be treated as absolute
for all practical purposes. As ordinary people put it, "There are limits," "We have to draw the line
somewhere," and "Some things are sacred and not to be treated lightly."
The need for, and the difficulty in formulating, moral absolutes arises from the same
consideration -- namely the complexity of situations and the multiple sources of moral judgment.
Against the powerful consequentialist influences that bear on our moral judgments, two sorts of
argument that might support moral absolutes are available, but these arguments do not altogether
converge. One emphasizes the bad consequences, e.g., of conventional rules authorizing the police
to kill citizens whenever it seems on the whole best to do so. The other emphasizes the
incommensurability between, e.g., life itself and its various possibilities. A world without me is a
radically different place from a world in which my life prospects are in some way diminished.
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Another source of incommensurability arises from the fact that we create ourselves by our actions - though this is true also of the consequences we accept and of the risks we take. In short, the need
for absolutes, and the difficulty in believing in them, arise from the same source -- the complexity
of human moral experience.
Such crosscurrents produce considerable turbulence in our moral consciousness.
Sometimes I think my conclusion is mere common sense. Sometimes I think it so paradoxical that
I cannot hope that others will take it seriously. Such is the fate of a philosopher in these times -and especially of one who attempts to honor the complexity of human experience without
succumbing to postmodern despair, and in the process to remain in dialogue with as wide a class of
persons as possible.
My argument for moral absolutes is a transcendental one. Given the open texture of moral
language, the diversity and messiness of moral situations, and the twistiness of the human mind, a
morality without absolute limits would be unable ever to reach the firm conclusions we need,
especially in a world in which the adherents of any morality are likely to find themselves
beleaguered. There is an analogous position on the cognate issue of infallibility: there may be
standards about which a moral community could not be in error and still claim to provide a reliable
guide to life; but it is not possible, except perhaps very tentatively, to distinguish these teachings
from those about which the community claims only to be right.
A longer version of the argument to come follows. In Chapter 1 I address the fact that
moral issues, particularly those thought to engage moral absolutes, are largely debated within
religious communities, and attempt to sort out philosophical from theological arguments. Chapter
2 displays the multi-dimensional complexity of the situations moralists and morally responsible
persons face, and Chapters 3 to 5 consider the various strategies employed to resolve them,
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including the claim that the incommensurability of goods means that we have no way of
challenging or overriding moral rules such as that against contraception. Chapter 6 argues that the
case for moral absolutes, and the case against them, can be made to converge in a way suggested by
Kant's solution to his antinomies: there are moral absolutes, but we do not know what they are.
Chapter 7 attempts to locate moral absolutes, with the help of the concept of the sacred, and
suggests that there are virtual absolutes that may serve for practical purposes.
One limitation on my argument is a relative neglect of virtue, with the important exception of
prudence, to which I devote Chapter 4. As Christina Sommers among others has emphasized,
discussion of virtue is of great importance, particularly in pedagogy, because it avoids the
impression, that emphasis on controversial issues and moral dilemmas is likely to create, that
morality is primarily concerned with conflict, whether among human beings or within a given
human being. On the contrary, the range of actions about which moralists of every school agree is
quite large, and the issue frequently is not discovering one's duty, but finding the strength to
perform it. And overemphasis on social policy undermines individual responsibility, and obscures
the fact that even the best policies require officials gifted with integrity as well as prudence to carry
them out.
Nonetheless, even the most virtuous people face situations in which it is difficult to discern
the right course, and it is worthwhile asking how much guidance a defensible moral code is able to
give them -- in particular whether a moral code can contain exceptionless rules. We may ask, for
example, whether a just judge or sheriff will ever, whatever the circumstances, frame an innocent
man. I regard principles and virtue not as rivals, but as complementary approaches to moral and
ethical issues.
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One outcome of my argument is that people of faith are entitled to hold more stringent
moral views than is common, and cannot be convicted of unreasonableness for so doing. Nor can
they be rightfully kept, say on grounds of "public reason," from acting on their views as citizens.
But I do not have an answer to the problem of Abraham -- of a person who, for reasons of faith, is
led not to stiffen the requirements of common morality, but to breach them.
It has become the custom for authors of scholarly works to declare their interests. The
author is a Roman Catholic, though not of the "ultra" sort, committed to the project of harmonizing
faith and reason -- however difficult this project may seem in practice. My indebtedness to the
tradition of Catholic Christianity extends to influences refracted through persons, at least from the
time being, alienated from it. My work may be of interest to those who exercise pastoral and
magisterial functions within the Church, as well as to those who advise them, but I have no desire
to usurp pastoral or magisterial authority. In any case -- though I presume generally Christian
moral intuitions -- this is a philosophical work addressed to reasonable men and women, rather than
an in-house argument addressed only to Catholics. (Like many serious Jews, I dislike the
expression "Judeo-Christian tradition." But Jewish and Christian approaches to morality do have
important similarities.)
A sketch of the argument of this book is forthcoming in Argumentation. An NEH Summer
Institute under the directorship of Ralph McInerny, held at Notre Dame in 1985, did much to
advance my thought on the issues considered here. I am indebted to James O'Rourke of St. Anselm
College for suggesting that I focus my work on ethical theory on the question of absolutes, to
Joseph Boyle of the University of Toronto for help in understanding the positions of Finnis and
Grisez, and to Patrick Walker of Scranton, Pennsylvania and Michael Wreen of Marquette
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University for many relevant discussions. (Patrick also helped with the proofreading.) My debt to
Celia Wolf-Devine of Stonehill College is as always immeasurable.
I use he in the sense of he or she, except where the context requires a male individual. Recent
examples of the use of he or she (and she or he), not to mention him or herself (and her or himself),
convince me that the attempt to be sexually egalitarian in this way only increases the gap between
author and reader a difficult argument creates in any case. The capital He for God is also to be read
generically.
Philip E. Devine
Bath, Maine
Providence, Rhode Island
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1
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LAW
The subject of this book is moral absolutes, i.e., kinds of action forbidden or required by
morality whatever the circumstances or consequences. i Positive moral absolutes (e.g., Provide for
your family, no matter how) swallow up all other moral requirements, and are for that reason hard
to defend. And even negative absolutes must be few in number; otherwise we should be paralyzed.
Nonetheless, moral absolutes, should we be able to discover them, would have considerable
strategic importance, since they place limits on how moral judgments can diverge and thus allow
moral reasoning to proceed without having to evaluate an endlessly widening range of options
(usually on consequentialist grounds). If I do not have to consider killing my wife when she is in a
bad mood, I will find moral judgment quite a bit simpler.
1.1. Ethics and Morals
I have become skeptical of the philosophical casuistry attempted in my Ethics of Homicide ii
-- which is not the same as withdrawing the conclusions reached there. Philosophers who address
social issues find themselves in the thick of political conflicts and messy personal situations to
which the somewhat abstract forms of reasoning they favor are less than adequate. Contemporary
practices need to be judged in the light of the expectations and understandings of those who take
part in or are affected by them, which will supply premises that narrow the range of philosophical
disagreement on issues of special ethics. The question of affirmative action, for example, makes
sense only against the background of what one of the more astute writers on the issue frankly refers
to as "the American Dream" -- i.e., the understanding of justice at which many citizens of the

United States have arrived in the Twentieth Century. iii What is of greatest importance in
discussions of applied ethics is not the conclusions reached by this or that writer, but what issues
are taken as open for discussion. We take the wrongness of slavery for granted when we discuss
surrogate mothering, but in fact the issue was only settled in America by a bloody Civil War.
Casuistry, carried out in independence of religious belief on the one hand, and settled laws and
mores on the other, quickly turns into a merely rhetorical exercise, in which one manipulates
concepts to reach a foreordained conclusion. A philosopher cannot count on enough agreement, in
advance of argument, to make possible a persuasive argument concerning controversial issues.
One can always choose a narrower subset of one's contemporaries for one's audience, but -- except
for some religious communities -- one is left to define that subset essentially for oneself.
It is necessary to distinguish morals, or the inherited principles of conduct to which we with
varying degrees adhere, from ethics, or philosophical reflection on such principles. iv Some people
have strict morals; others have loose morals, and others no morals at all (and those who are strict on
one set of issues may be loose on another), well before anyone reflects systematically on moral
issues. There are many people who have moral codes but have never reflected on their
philosophical justifications or implications, whereas ethics without morals is impossible (though
some professional ethicists are reputed to approximate this condition). Morals were taught long
before ethics arose, both in the life of the species and the life of the individual. Philosophical ethics
is organized according to principles, whereas morals are organized by topic: communication, life
and death issues, sexual morals, and so forth.
The experience of diversity of morals suggested a conclusion that Socrates and Plato strove
to combat, that the moral code of any society is a conspiracy of the weak to keep the strong in line,
which the superior person will happily disregard. But refuting sophistic egoism is not the same
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thing as deriving a code of conduct, and Plato's reasons for his striking practical proposals are
notoriously cryptic. Appeals to the privileged intuitions of the philosopher-king (or queen) only
raise the issue, who is to count as a genuine philosopher, and who as a counterfeit. Even if we
settle on some overarching moral theory and attempt relentlessly to apply it to concrete cases, we
will quickly discover a looseness of fit between ethics and morals that interferes with our endeavor.
Let us now suppose that we have somehow justified a moral code, and need only to apply it to the
messy circumstances in which we find ourselves. The language we use in formulating that code, be
it abstract like utility or concrete like adultery, is open-textured, and requires judgment in its
application. Philosophers are no better at making the prudential judgments involved in applying it
than are men and women of other sorts. And the same is true about the predictions about
consequences (including the consequences of changes in our laws and mores) that play a large role
in moral and political reasoning.

.

Sometimes concrete cases are invoked to test abstract theories. But philosophers have been
prepared to defend even the most repellent conclusions. The constraints on moral argument here
are social -- and for that reason historically conditioned -- rather than philosophical, though they
still may represent the ordinary person's grasp of moral truth rather than the de facto conventions of
a given group.
A recurrent skepticism about ethical theory has a significant effect on moral reasoning,
especially in the practical contexts (institutional review boards, for example) in which some
philosophers find themselves these days. No longer -- or so many philosophers argue -- should we
accept a top-down model of moral reasoning; on the contrary the interpretation of what has
happened so far in the group in which the problem arise, and what its possible futures may be, plays
an essential role in deliberation. In short the moralist needs to construct a description of the
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problem situation, place the conflicting views of the parties within it, and thus point the way toward
a resolution that will take into account the legitimate concerns of everyone involved. On this view,
the moralist is no longer an expert in applying some moral theory, but is one among other
participants in a process.
But even a perfect process may have a deficient, perhaps even a gravely unjust, result;
moral philosophers dare not renounce the transcendence of moral obligation lest they end up
sanctioning Nazism and the like. Still, no process is in fact perfect: those who believe a result to
be deficient can always point to a deficiency in the process: either some interest has been
systematically neglected, or one or more parties are ideologically closed to dialogue with the
others, or indulge in systematic irrationalism. And examination of the issues that arise in
contemporary society discloses that not only our particular understandings, but also the larger metanarratives in which these narratives are embedded, are contested. For this reason moral disputes
are as interminable on the process view as on any other.
Saints and martyrs are more important to the moral life than are philosophers. Even a
philosopher like Socrates can find himself bound in conscience to oppose the dominant forces of
his society, even if his reasons for so doing transcend the capacities of philosophical argument.
One does not stop being a citizen or a moral agent, with an obligation to take a stand against evil,
just by reading Wittgenstein. But we need somehow to distinguish saints and martyrs, even saints
and martyrs with whom we disagree, from crackpots. One way of attempting to do so is their
ability to appeal to a moral rule, for example that against the killing of innocent people, which we
ourselves accept although we may not apply it as stringently as they do.
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1.2. Philosophy and Theology
One philosophical tradition dismisses religion as morally irrelevant. v Such an approach has
some plausibility if we believe we can discover a fundamental moral principle, by which inherited
codes can be evaluated and, where necessary, revised. But those of us who have grown skeptical of
such a project have no alternative but to begin with the morality we have inherited from our
ancestors, will ourselves transmit, in improved or impoverished form, to our descendants. And this
morality is religiously entangled, so that those who wish to preserve something approximating
traditional morality, while rejecting its accompanying religion, face a somewhat difficult problem.
Belief in moral absolutes is particularly tied to the belief that moral requirements are divine
commands, which we dare not violate for any reason. But other widely held moral principles, such
as the inherent dignity of all persons, also have religious roots.
I here use Christian ethics as my example of religiously influenced moral reasoning, since I
know the Christian tradition best. It does not seem appropriate, however, in a philosophical essay,
to make acceptability to Christians a criterion for judging ethical theories vi . Though one never
escapes one's skin, a clear-headed Christian thinker still needs to distinguish between discourse
addressed to fellow believers, and discourse addressed to all reasonable people -- even when
reasonableness is understood as including a respectful attitude toward tradition.
Our moral tradition is a mixed affair, in which Christian elements exist alongside elements
drawn from many other sources, including the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement. A
believing Christian will hope that the Christian elements in our tradition will prevail in a fair
contest, but the contest still remains to be fought. Moreover, the implications of Christian belief for
ethics (and for many other branches of philosophy) are now contested among self-described
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Christians: what interpretations are acceptable is a matter for the Christian community (in exactly
what way is itself contested) rather than for a philosopher.
The intuitive case for accepting some moral absolutes is strong, even without appealing to
distinctively Christian notions. One critic of Joseph Fletcher's "new morality" cites "the rule
against rape or ... using violence against an invalid, or babies, or the aged ... or peddling dope to
children." vii Groups that question such examples, say on the ground that one can benefit children by
using drugs to liberate them from social convention, are nonetheless likely to hold moral absolutes
(or virtual absolutes) of their own, say against informing on one's comrades to the enemy (for
example, to the police). As Joram Graf Heber sums it up, "the appeal of absolutism lies in the
value of the convictions we hold and our obstinate unwillingness to give them up.” viii
«USIX»One argument for traditional morality (including traditional moral absolutes) has a highly
pragmatic character. One cannot invent a moral code even for oneself, and the constraints on doing
so for a society, many of whose members are not given to reflection, are even more severe. And
the evils that arise if we do not control our instincts and appetites are very grave. Hence we need to
accept strict moral rules from our cultural background, and accept whatever losses adherence to
them in difficult cases may entail. Nonetheless, many people, and not only philosophers, have
affirmed, on the basis of a reflective consideration of experience, that all moral rules have
exceptions. So the debate about moral absolutes is hardly over.
1.3. The Relevance of Moral Theology
Moral issues continue to be debated in relatively conventional religious contexts. And the
families and informal communities, in which they also arise, are in significant ways like religious
communities, though their lack of a formal doctrinal structure changes the character of the resulting
discussions. But many of our religious and informal communities, including those, which at one
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time had a reputation for solidarity of opinion, are now deeply divided. And the members of such
communities are in disagreement, not only about the merits of particular issues, but also about the
appropriate methods of moral reasoning and the range of legitimate opinion within the community.
They also disagree about the question addressed in this book, whether there are sorts of actions that
are wrong regardless of circumstances or consequences.
One should not expect theology to provide lucid solutions to problems left open by philosophy.
For legalists and antinomians -- to use the polemical terms each uses for the other -- both have their
favorite proof texts, ix and their favorite hermeneutical strategies. x The issue is not one that divides
Roman Catholics and Protestants, xi or corresponds to community boundaries of any other sort, but
one that afflicts all reflective men and women. Hence not only the Bible, but also subsequent
expressions of our various traditions, and "natural law" authorities such as Aristotle xii and the
common morality of the West xiii are all open to multiple interpretations. Moral theology is of
interest to philosophers in rather the way the law is, as the application of norms to actual human
problems within the context of some particular community. In the case of the law, we are
concerned with the settlement of disputes and the imposition of sanctions on transgressors. In the
case of moral theology we are concerned with moral exhortation and the counseling of persons of
troubled conscience -- all carried on within a community's whose self-understanding is expressed in
ritual and (in a non-derogatory sense) myth. And both law and moral theology bring out a feature
of moral discourse not always salient for ethical theory: the utility of clear and firm rules of
conduct, to help us avoid both endless scruples of conscience and unlimited rationalizing.
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1.3.01. Styles of Interpretation
An important methodological issues concerns interpretation, especially of authoritative texts
such as the Bible and the Constitution; or of vaguer traditions such as the American way of life.
Views on interpretation are to be understood as impulses and rhetorical strategies first, and as
doctrines and methods only second.
At one end of the spectrum, fundamentalism xiv responds to challenge by hardening doctrine
and drawing the lines between those within and those without the community with increased
sharpness. xv Fundamentalists hold that the interpretation and application of such texts is selfevident to any "right-thinking" person, xvi and that those who would adapt them to the felt
necessities of the time are in bad faith. (A typical bit of fundamentalist reasoning, frequently cited
in the literature, is as follows: Psalm 110 must have been written by David, since Jesus so quotes it
-- ignoring the possibility that Jesus was simply using the customary name of the book of Psalms.)
Usually the fundamentalist appeal is to some earlier, supposedly pristine, state of their tradition, but
one sort of Catholic fundamentalism responds to challenge by making extreme claims for the
authority of the (present) Pope.
Taken seriously (or, if you will, literally), fundamentalism leaves a community without
capacity to adapt to changed circumstances, including advances in knowledge. But in fact
fundamentalists have shown considerable capacity for innovation; their common sense is -- as is
often the case with human beings -- better than their logic.
At the other end of the spectrum, deconstructionists hold that authoritative texts and
traditions can be made to mean whatever an individual or group wants to make of them (and
consequently are without effective authority). Deconstruction leaves a community without any
norms, especially for the guidance of the rising generation, and thus invites a fundamentalist
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response. Deconstruction and fundamentalism thus reinforce one another. For both assume that
once space has been created for what Richard John Neuhaus calls "hermeneutical legerdemain" xvii
there are no limits to its operation. xviii
1.3.02. Revealed Norms
Christians, like Jews and Moslems, traditionally hold that God has set forth certain moral
standards (the Ten Commandments, for example). And God is immune to the limitations that
afflict human legislators and those who formulate customary codes. Hence -- it might be thought -believers can quickly conclude that some moral norms, i.e., those revealed by God, are absolute.
Even in the most religious of moralities, moral absolutes must be the exception rather than the rule.
But there is no absurdity in God's having revealed certain prima facie duties. And although God is
immune to error and limitation, His human interpreters are not. Hence flexibility in the application
of norms -- in technical language, equity -- is not excluded by appeal to their divine origin. The
Ten Commandments do not recognize exceptions, but they do not include a no-exceptions clause
either.
1.3.03. Infallibility
Many believers hold, not only that God has revealed certain norms, but also that these
norms have been infallibly expressed in the documents of their tradition. The precise extent of this
infallibility is disputed: some Catholics affirm, xix whereas others deny, xx that the teaching against
contraception formulated in «MDUL»Humanae Vitae«MDNM» (1968), and other concrete
teachings of the same sort, are infallible. Some people hold that we can reach infallible judgments
about moral issues, without appeal to the collective judgment of some community, by examining
the actions themselves or our individual consciences -- possibly, but not necessarily, thought of as
the voice of God. xxi
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Questions of infallibility and exceptionlessness are not the same. We may have an infallible
source for prima facie duties, or for moral rules that become obsolete as a result of historical
changes. And exceptionless norms may rest on the authority of the individual's fallible conscience.
But the two issues manifest the same deeper question: whether (and if so how and to what extent)
it is possible to entrench our moral standards against the vicissitudes of historical and personal
circumstance.
1.3.04 Judging the Heart
A maxim of Christian ethics that has become part of our common moral consciousness is
Judge not, lest you be judged. This does not mean that we should cease to have moral standards,
nor that we should not apply them to one another's conduct. Nor does it mean that, in cases of
dispute, the more permissive interpretation of a rule is always to be favored. But it does bar any
inference that the more rigorous position is for that reason alone the more virtuous one, as well as
positions that exclude or minimize the possibility of good faith moral error.
The most important implication of the maxim against judging is that it requires a distinction
between a person's deepest intentions and dispositions -- which are known to God alone -- and the
behavioral and consequential features of his actions, which for social purposes may (and indeed
must) be subjected to scrutiny. And self-examination has an important social dimension. Hence an
approach to moral issues that neglects the behavioral and consequential features of our actions, and
focuses entirely on an agent's orientation of reason and will, either is socially useless or breaches
the precept against judging others.
Philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein will argue as follows. Intentions and
dispositions are meaningless unless somehow tied to behavior -- though necessary and sufficient
behavioral conditions for their presence are not required. It is nonsense to suppose that someone
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whose every visible act shows a deeply evil disposition is somehow good at heart, or that someone
whose every visible act is that of a saint is nonetheless a deep-dyed scoundrel. We may lack
knowledge of a person's circumstances and temptations, but when these are fully known, there is
nothing else to know.
But we are here dealing with a maxim of Christian morality, however secular the context in
which it may sometimes appear. Hence it is legitimate to point out that, according to the Christian
faith. God knows our deepest intentions and dispositions, and is entitled to judge us, as our fellow
human beings are not. And from a human point of view, we never know everything about a
person's circumstances and temptations. Moreover, in our understanding of the human personality,
a small detail may turn out to make a very large difference. Humility in judging others can
therefore be argued for, at least in part, on secular grounds.
1.3.05. Love and Law
The formulation, interpretation, and application of moral rules will be informed by one's outlook on
human beings and their world. If one is a Christian, one's moral understanding will be shaped by
the centrality of unselfish love. But the tempering of the Law in the interests of love is not to be
confused with a permissive interpretation of the Law. Questions about moral absolutes cannot be
resolved by invoking a desire to make life easier for troubled people. In fact, the denial of moral
absolutes may make life more difficult, in that it makes it more difficult to know what one ought to
do.«
1.3.06. Grace
No serious morality can long avoid the question of grace. For whether our morality is
customary, religious, philosophical, or personal in its origins, some people will find its
requirements too hard to keep. Peter Singer plausibly -- though not necessarily correctly xxii --
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derives from utilitarian premises an obligation to a\observe a vegetarian diet, and to live on next to
nothing and send one's surplus to people in Africa. But some people are as incapable of this way
of life as they are of celibacy. And the same sort of incapacity exists for standards resting on
individual self-interest, such as abstention from alcohol by recovering alcoholics.
In such a situation, there are two unappealing possibilities. One of them is to make a
compassionate exemption from the moral law in favor of those who find it too hard to keep -- a
strategy that quickly leaves us without any moral standards. For human beings can have an
orientation to any form of behavior whatever, including rape and murder. Or we can declare those
incapable of keeping the moral law ("hardened criminals," for example) moral outlaws -- exempt in
principle from all moral requirements, even those they do not find initially difficult. Respectable
people will protect themselves against such persons, both physically and psychologically, but will
not attempt to address them in moral terms. Only what Charles Taylor has called a "moral
source" xxiii a Power capable of overcoming moral impotence and empowering us to put into
practice the principles to which we adhere in theory -- can resolve the discrepancy we experience
between the demands of our conscience and the limitations of our nature.
1.3.07. Sin
The antitype of grace is sin, not in the sense of specific transgression, but of deeply ingrained
alienation from God (or -- more broadly -- whatever else one takes as one's moral source).
Theological liberals tend to deplore the influence of St. Augustine on the morality of the West, but
he identified a strain in human nature that it would be dangerous to forget. There is abundant
evidence for a perverse, even demonic, strain in the human make-up: perhaps the Saint located it
too much in the region of the pelvis, but it is there. (It may not even be malice, in the strict sense of
a desire to do evil for its own sake: a delight in the use of one's powers, and a corresponding
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impatience with any constraint however necessary, will have many of the same practical
consequences as malice.) This strain in our nature, and the need of any morality to control it,
means that the most superficially reasonable moral position is not always in fact the most
reasonable one. For a superficially reasonable moral argument make may dangerous concessions to
the dark side of human nature.
1.3.08. God's Friendship
When a religious moralist says that an action offends God, he does not mean only that,
unless the agent repents, he will be damned. He also means that it entails a present breach with
God which the agent -- as in the case of a tragic sinner -- may recognize and regret, although he is
unable to free himself form it. xxiv Such alienation differs from alienation from a friend or a human
community in that -- if theism is true -- it can never be justifiably incurred. But, for reasons I
explain later, never offend God does not count as a moral absolute in the sense employed in this
book.
1.3.09 Reward and Punishment
The possibility of divine reward and punishment, especially punishment after death, has often been
pictured in luridly hedonistic terms. It is difficult to integrate such rewards and punishments into
ordinary morality -- to avoid, for example, the conclusion that it is a good deed to kill a newly
baptized infant, whose salvation will thereby be assured. One cannot appeal to the threat of hell
fire to support the assertion that otherwise innocent actions are wrong. For a Power that punished
and rewarded human beings at random could not be believed when It purported to reveal Its
intentions.
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1.3.10. Dostoevsky's Maxim
The best-known claim that morality and religion are essentially linked is Dostoevsky's
maxim, If God does not exist, then everything is permitted. This maxim does not mean that atheists
are without moral principles, or even that moral discussion cannot proceed, at least for a while,
without appealing to theological considerations. In its most defensible sense, it means that morality
without God will reveal its incoherence under pressure.
More specifically, morality without God breaks down in the following ways. (1) The
morality discovered by examining our considered moral judgments is heterogeneous in character,
and includes both consequentialist and deontological elements. We must find some way of
avoiding the conclusion that this morality is inconsistent, for if we accept the doctrine of most
logicians, that from a contradiction everything follows, such a morality will enable us to justify
whatever we might desire to do. xxv The alternative is to wall off inconsistencies through a variety of
ad hoc devices.
(2) Moral standards need to be independent both of the mores of society and the inclinations
of individuals, even when both of these have been purged by reflection. Moreover, unlike
mathematics, the standards of morality have an imperative character that sometimes conflicts with
custom and inclination. Kant's Categorical Imperative, hanging in metaphysical midair, is not a
satisfactory articulation of this phenomenon. xxvi If moral standards derive from or express the
judgments or attitudes of human individuals or groups, there is no reason to expect them always to
be consistent. Nor is there any reason to expect them always to override, even in principle, the
preferences of individuals and the mores of society. But if they derive from a wise and benevolent
God, we can both exclude incoherence and account for the imperative character of moral judgment.
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1.4. Legal and Political Aspects
The civil law may seem to provide at least a partial answer to the questions of this book.
For its norms are relatively clear, and its sanctions, though not perfectly reliable, are less
mysterious than those which religion supplies. Moreover, there are serious arguments that some
legal norms, for example those protecting free expression, should be held as absolute, even when
observing them has significant costs. Free expression, it is argued, is so vital to the welfare of our
society that it is worthwhile accepting such costs rather than making exceptions to the rules
protecting it. And in general it may be highly useful to take certain matters off the political agenda,
even "for good and all," so that men and women can live together in the confidence that their rights
in such matters will be respected.
But, in some circumstances, a virtuous citizen will act outside the law and sensible officials
ignore his violations, regardless of any formal authorization to do so. xxvii And if this is true of
citizens, how much more will it be the case of officials sworn to preserve and protect the
institutions of their society in times of stress. Thus rules protecting free speech are by their very
nature subject to one exception, that when the survival of the society that sustains free expression is
at issue, all bets are off. (Though cautions against decisions taken in panic are always in order;
domestic Communists did not in fact pose a "clear and present danger" to America's survival during
the 1950s.) The subordination of free speech to the common good does not mean that it protects
only one's political friends, only that sufficiently extreme circumstances may require exceptions to
all merely political rules. xxviii Yet liberal theorists have never been happy with the pragmatic status
their principles must have on their larger assumptions. John Rawls, for example, begins his
Theory of Justice with a ringing declaration of faith:
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Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws
and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if
they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. xxix
But in subsequent writings he has based his views on justice on an appeal to "overlapping
consensus" that undercuts his invocation of the peremptory claims of truth. xxx Nonetheless, he
persistently attempts to protect liberal principles against revision or exceptions by ruling out
potentially disruptive sorts of considerations from reasoning about justice and political liberty. xxxi
Crucial to Rawls's finished argument for political absolutes is his conception of public
reason, i.e., of a constrained form of reason to which we are limited, at least when we discuss
central constitutional issues. This conception of reasonableness limits not only the deliberations of
legislators and judges, or the dialogue among citizens, but even the private reasons on which an
individual citizen votes. As Rawls puts it, "the ideal of public reason not only governs the public
discourse of elections insofar as the issues involve those fundamental questions, but also how
citizens are to cast their vote on those questions" (p. 215).
This sort of constraint disenfranchises many voters, for it denies their right to vote their
convictions. To ask Catholics, feminists, or Mormons to ignore their beliefs when voting, or to
refrain from joining with others like themselves to express shared concerns in the public arena, is
on its face both repressive and, in a generally open society, absurd.
Rawls defends his strategy by appealing to civic fairness (p. 217). But fair-mindedness
requires us to listen to men and women whose positions may require us to modify our conception
of public reason, at least as if they are expressed in a reasoned manner. Rawls in fact concedes that
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citizens like the abolitionists and Martin Luther King may appeal to their comprehensive views, so
long as the end result is to strengthen public reason (Lect. VI, § 8). Moved perhaps by piety, he is
even prepared defend Abraham Lincoln's "Second Inaugural with its prophetic (Old Testament)
interpretation of the Civil War as God's punishment for the sin [of] slavery, falling equally on
North and South" on the ground that "what he says has no implications bearing on constitutional
essentials or matters of basic justice [!]" (p. 254).
A sort of benign Machiavellianism is possible. Persons exercising authority are entitled not
to recite the exceptions to norms whenever they invoke them -- at least if there is no plausible
reason to suppose that such exceptions obtain in the case at hand. Imagining foreign invasion when
nothing of the kind is occurring, except perhaps in the overheated imaginations of partisans, is a
dangerous proceeding. But may we go further and deny exceptions that we in fact fully intend to
and expect to make (and regard ourselves as entirely justified in making)? I should say not, except
insofar as law xxxii is regarded as a mere array of rules, from which any reasonable person would
depart from upon occasion. For to introduce an element of deceit into the fundamentals of social
life has devastating implications. I have in mind the citation of moral considerations to warrant
one's own actions and criticize those of others. If one's morality is treated as a fact about one's self
like one's ancestry, lying about it, say to the Nazis, presents a different question.
I conclude by attempting to state in what sense this book represents a philosophical inquiry,
as opposed to a theological reflection or an explication of the «MDUL»mores«MDNM» of late
twentieth century America. While I presume the acceptance of at least vaguely Christian moral
views, believing Jews, agnostics, and atheists are among my intended readers. I am particularly
interested in addressing the sort of agnostic who wishes to maintain the broadly Christian character
of our moral tradition, on the ground that this is the only sort of morality a society such as ours can
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be brought to accept. On the other hand, the moral sensibility of my own time is too incoherent to
be susceptible of the sort of reconstruction I attempted in The Ethics of Homicide. Hence my
argument is intended to appeal to men and women of reflective conscience, who may frequently
find themselves required to take a critical attitude toward the mores.
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2
SITUATIONS
Human beings are diverse and complex; so our philosophy, and even more so our literature,
constantly inform us. Life was not simple in ancient and medieval times, but our awareness of its
complexity is in some ways a modern phenomenon -- though one recognized by many writers
before the coming of the modern age. Some writers would press this insight to the metaphysical
level, and assert with Sartre that man is that creature who lacks a nature or essence of any sort. But
such a move is self-destructive, since it makes a claim about human nature, i.e., that human beings
are entities who lack a nature. Thus we do best to retain our awareness of human complexity and
diversity without turning it into a metaphysical dogma.
Still, modern insight creates problems for moral thought -- problems that account in part for
the persistent strain of anti-modernism in our culture. Complex and diverse human beings create,
and find themselves in, complex and diverse situations, in which stock moral terms like adultery,
theft, and murder may not seem adequate to the needs of moral judgment. i Yet it is necessary to
make some firm moral judgments, say against killing human beings by reason of their ancestry, if
decent social life is to be possible. In this chapter I display the full complexity of moral situations,
before discussing the strategies employed to resolve moral questions.
Writing in a bioethical context, Carl Elliot has described the phenomenon to be analyzed
very well:
A person's moral judgment is reflected in what he chooses to include in a description:
whether he mentions that the patient's wife has visited her critically ill husband only twice
over the past three weeks, whether he reports a bed shortage in the I[ntensive] C[are] U[nit],
if he notes that the patient's children stand to inherit their dying man's estate, how he

describes the patient's prognosis, whether he brings up the option of palliative care, if he
notes that the nursing staff feels strongly that treatment should be stopped, whether he
mentions that the patient was an I[ntra]V[enous] drug abuser. One of the most interesting
and disturbing discoveries to be made in a medical ethics case conference is how one's
moral intuitions change as each player in the drama says his piece, as another perspective is
added to one's own. ii
2.1. The Varieties of Moral Judgment
The triad obligatory-permissible-forbidden is not adequate to the needs of moral judgment.
Theologians distinguish between mortal and venial sins, lawyers between felonies and
misdemeanors, secular moralists between serious offenses and peccadilloes. Less formally, there
are actions which are "within our rights," or for which no one would blame us, which are less than
admirable or heroic.
Nor does the evaluator always stand in the same relationship to the act or proposed act in
question. The most central form of evaluation concerns acts under consideration by the evaluator
himself: thus Kant imagines an unhappy man contemplating suicide, who asks first whether his
proposed action can be squared with the requirements of morality. At a remove from decision itself
is the role of the moral adviser, who usually can abstain from judgment, with the help of an
expression like Follow your conscience.
There are actions over and done with, such as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the evaluation of which lacks the practical urgency of the first two sorts. About such
actions the agent himself, a friend or spiritual counselor, and a third party all may make judgments.
And the culpability of the agent may be as important (or more so) than the legitimacy of his act.
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Our argument must also address the judgments moral teachers, including parents, moralists, and
religious leaders, must make. Such teachers need to combine honesty, responsibility, and concern
for the well being of those whom they are instructing. For those who are incompetently instructed
may rebel against the requirements of morality if too many demands are placed upon them, and
they may also regard with contempt a morality that is presented as pliant to their every felt need.
In such circumstances the most important distinction is that between justification and excuse -- a
distinction habitually neglected by those who would go easy on others. But some excuses are
agent-relative -- inexperience for example -- and others, such as duress, involve mitigating
circumstances that are sometimes almost as good as justifications.
2.2. Action Kinds
Sorting out relevant from irrelevant detail is the first task of the moral evaluator, and this
task is both challenging and has important implications for subsequent moral judgment. There is an
important gap between a messy real-life situation and a "case of conscience" in which the problems
of Titius and Bertha present themselves in neatly ordered fashion.
Most moral judgments use "thick" act-descriptions such as adultery, theft, and murder; as
well as more recent coinages such as racist and irresponsible. To condemn an act just as (morally)
wrong is quite rare. The precise range of thick moral concepts is open to dispute, but there are core
cases where users of such expressions concur in their judgments. That the Nazis murdered
millions of Jews and others is a correct description of their conduct, though it would be rhetorical
exaggeration to say that they murdered the soldiers the German army killed in combat. (On the
other hand, murder is sometimes used to describe the wanton killing of a brute animal.)
But such descriptions conceal a complex background. Adultery and theft are only possible within
institutions of marriage and property. These institutions vary from time to time and from place to
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place, and their present versions have been criticized, rightly or wrongly, on a number of grounds.
Nothing follows immediately for personal morality from such criticisms. An institution of "halfopen" marriage, in which the husband but not the wife is conventionally held at liberty to engage in
extramarital relations, is unfair to women. But this unfairness does not immediately imply that
husbands who take advantage of their liberty are guilty of adultery, or that women who respond in
kind are not so guilty. Nor do criticisms of existing property relations, however justified, imply a
license to steal. Yet to assert an absolute obligation to accept the definitions imposed by unjust
institutions is to help guarantee their permanence.
Murder is somewhat different from adultery and theft. The distinction between living and
dead, and between human beings and things (or brute animals) the concept of murder presupposes
are not socially constructed in the same way the institutions of marriage and property are. But the
concept of a person has a conventional aspect, while the institutions of marriage and property have
at least some basis in nature. All we can say at this point in the argument is that our moral world
has both natural and conventional aspects, that one aspect or the other may be more evident in a
given situation.
We must also address the question«of nominalism: whether human acts form natural kinds,
or whether descriptions such as murder, theft, and adultery are assigned to human behavior by
convention. For many subcultures describe what are in some sense the same actions in very
different terms, such as weeding out the unfit or eliminating the king's enemies, liberation (say, of a
book from a shop), and courtly love. The metaphysical perspective adopted here is "safety net
Platonism": the vagaries of our language and social practice are constrained by an objective
structure, but we have no reason to suppose that this structure corresponds to that recognized by
any natural language. On no account can an individual or a society by giving a previously
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forbidden form of activity a pleasing name, escape the bad consequences to which it or its
toleration may lead.
John Finnis objects to the ordinary language/phenomenological approach to these issues:«
Common speech [he writes], which is not systematically oriented toward precise moral
understanding and is impressed by behavioral and consequential similarities and by legal
categories is not a safe guide. It uses the action-related terms, including even act and
intention, with an ambiguity which can be overcome only by careful attention to the
importance of the end and means united in a proposal shaped by intelligent deliberation
(however rapid), and adopted by choice. iii
And in particular he insists that what behavior looks like has little or nothing to do with its moral
acceptability.
The physical behavior and causality and outcome can be exactly the same, when completely
different acts are done. ... Equally, acts can be identical in every way relevant to a moral
absolute's nonevaluative act-description, even though the physical behavior differs very
noticeably. iv
Against the behavioral and consequentialist emphases of common speech, even when it
identifies acts as of a certain kind, he insists on a tradition that identifies acts by their objects, i.e.,
by their intentions, including the subordinate intentions called "means to an end." v But God alone
knows a person’s deepest intentions: (§ 1.3.04): for purposes of social life, we need criteria of
intentionality that include, among other things, the look of an action and its expected
consequences. vi
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2.3. Consequences
Consequentialists hold that a favorable balance of consequences is the sole (or decisive)
criterion of right conduct; that traditional moral language embodies useful rules of thumb, but that
these rules should be neglected whenever one can calculate the consequences coolly, and finds that
they favor a forbidden action. Not only the advocates of moral absolutes reject consequentialism:
but also, from a different angle, by believers in what Samuel Scheffler has called, "an agentcentered prerogative" or "dispensation to devote more attention to one's own welfare than to the
welfare of other people." vii But one not need to be a consequentialist to take consequences into
account: most moral codes contain rules that can be overridden to avoid sufficiently bad
consequences (respect for civil law is a plausible example), and hold that it is wrong to incur (or
even seriously risk) very bad consequences except for a morally worthy end.
The consequences of our actions are complex and varied, and for some of our actions
extend indefinitely forward in time. Those who beget or give birth to children are causally
responsible for everything their remote descendants do. In the same way, those whose ideas gain
acceptance are causally responsible for the uses to which they are put, even when (as is common)
they would have regarded these uses with horror. And even more ordinary-seeming actions
sometimes have unexpected long-range consequences.
In moral judgment we invoke, not just any consequences, but those consequences that the
agent foresaw or ought to have foreseen. But what consequences we foresee, or believe that others
ought to have foreseen, depends on our worldview and in particular on the kinds of causal relations
we are likely to find probable. When we discuss the causes of war, crime, economic depression,
totalitarian government, or epidemic disease, our explanations reflect our differing conceptions of
people and their world. Nor are all consequences on the same moral level. Both law and morals
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understand consequences differently when the action of another person intervenes. viii A related
example is effects that depend on the emotional reactions of the agents or others, which are under
varying degrees of voluntary control.
I now consider six sorts of consequence of special importance for moral judgment. The first
are the consequences of proposing or accepting a moral rule (or principle, or ideal, or...), either for
oneself or for some community in which one has an authoritative role. Such rules, if accepted and
adhered to within a group, have effects different from those of their acceptance by a series of
individuals, and even more so from that of the behavior the rule would counsel if not embodied in
an accepted practice. Moreover, such rules have a certain independence from the considerations
that motivate their acceptance. For that reason, there can be a slippery slope, by which an
apparently minor departure from previous understandings has consequences, good or bad, far
exceeding the intentions or expectations of its proponents.
A second set of consequences has to do with the abandonment of a conventional principle
previously accepted, for example the tacit understandings that make a written constitution possible.
All conventional rules are sometimes violated, but if enough people, or enough important people,
violate them with impunity they cease to have conventional force. The customary principles of a
group form at least a rough system, though some social scientists have exaggerated their coherence.
Hence conventional rules tend to lose their force together. The violation of one conventional rule
provokes the violation of others -- whether in retaliation, in self-protection, or by virtue of the
maxim, If they can do that, we can do this. The resulting condition is remedied only by the
development of fresh conventions, variously related to the old ones. This development is always a
difficult process, and sometimes a highly painful one. It may be somewhat less so, however, if we
can believe that the norms established reflect something more than individual or collective will.
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If our conventions were entirely beneficent, their collapse would be an unmitigated disaster; if they
were entirely malignant, their collapse would be a good (and the fact that an act was in breach of
social convention a reason for doing it). In fact the conventions of all societies, our own included,
are in part beneficent and in part malignant: if they were entirely malignant, no one would support
them; if they were entirely beneficent, no one would challenge them -- except perhaps for
transparently base motives. Nonetheless, since our conventions are, whatever their merits, the only
conventions we have, considerable prudence is called for in dealing with proposals to displace or
revise them.
Let us suppose that we should accept the present system of conventions -- or reform them
only so far as the system of conventions itself makes reform possible. The issue then arises, how
great a burden may be placed on individuals to sustain a system of conventions, particularly when
these individuals have been unjustly disadvantaged by these conventions. In practice, there is no
clear correlation between social advantage and felt loyalty to a society and its practices. But where
such loyalty exists, it includes a devotion to the norms of a society greater than their
consequentialist basis alone would warrant.
Third, there are costs of deliberation. Deliberation that explores the full complexity of
moral situations risks paralysis -- the more so, the more appreciative of such complexity we are.
Even if we do not dither until the occasion for action has passed, expenditure of time and energy on
prolonged deliberation has significant costs. Certain sorts of deliberation also entail special costs:
a society in which politicians routinely deliberate about the elimination of their opponents suffers
significant harms independent on their acting on their deliberations. For those who engage in such
deliberations will assume that others are doing the same thing, and protect themselves accordingly.
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A climate of distrust will be the inevitable result. Hence there can be benefits to entrenching a
moral rule against possible revision of any sort.
Fourth, every decision we make has an effect on the sort of people we are. To respond to a
situation in a certain way, say to yield to a temptation, is to become the sort of person who responds
in that way. In part this is metaphysics: we define ourselves by our acts. But in part the
contingencies of habit-formation are involved. But this effect results not only from our intentions,
and but also, though to a lesser degree, from the risks and the foreseen bad consequences we
accept.
Fifth, there are consequences that arise, not from the facts as such, but from people's
opinion of the facts, including the conclusions they are likely, unless well schooled in "advanced"
mores, to draw from certain circumstances. For example, if a woman visits a man in his hotel room
after midnight, he is likely to conclude that she has consented to intercourse, although she may not
in fact have done so.
Sixth, consequences flow from people's opinions of what is good and right, even if this
opinion is in fact misguided. If I do something another person believes to be wrong, and he learns
of it, I may make it easier for him to follow suit -- perhaps by doing things that are wrong apart
from his opinions. The same is true of myself, insofar as my pre-reflective attitudes are not entirely
within my power. These considerations also operate on an abstract level, insofar as emphasis on
the complexity and ambiguity of human situations may make it easier for people to rationalize
actions that are in fact unambiguously wrong.
Hedonism evaluates consequences in terms of pain and pleasure; it supposes that all
pleasures and all pains can be assimilated for methodological purposes to the simplest items within
each class -- the pleasure of an infant playing with a glass of water in the one case, toothache pain
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in the other. A more adequate account of subjective vales shows that they are diverse,
incommensurable, and unstable. Something that pleases a person intensely may leave him with a
feeling of weariness and disgust. ix We may be drawn to an experience in one part of our souls,
while repelled by it in another. Other forms of welfarism -- say those that define the good as
desire-satisfaction -- are open to objections of the same sort.
"Perfectionist" moral philosophers have appealed to a plurality of objective goods, such as
knowledge and friendship, to escape these problems; the problem of comparing these goods for the
purposes of moral reasoning then becomes acute. And the shift from welfarism to perfectionism
complicates moral reasoning in many other ways as well. (For example, Rawls's "Maximin"
strategy makes no sense on perfectionist premises, though the claims of equality may be felt in
some other way.) x
2.4. Intention
The most popular distinction among non-consequentialist moralists is that between foreseen
and intended consequences, enshrined in the principle of double effect. This distinction makes it
possible to argue that it is legitimate for a physician to give a dying patient morphine that will
shorten his life, and to omit life-preserving measures judged extraordinary (say open-heart surgery
on someone suffering from Alzheimer's Disease); but not to do something with the specific
purposes of hastening a patient's death. These arguments are most naturally addressed to those
making decisions, who are presumed to be aware of their own intentions and plans of action. For
purposes of third-person morality, the distinction between acting and refraining provides a rough
guide to the deeper moral distinction. xi
But the intention/foresight distinction conceals a number of complexities. It is legitimate to
give morphine to a person dying in great pain, but not to remove his head to ease pains in it, not
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because (or not only because) death is more certain in the second case than in the first. Rather,
decapitation just is killing while giving medicine for pain has a different significance. Decisions
such as to cease giving water and nutrients through tubes require more discussion, but the examples
given are the reference points from which the relevant arguments can proceed.
Two theoretical questions arise from such discussions. First, whence arise the limitations
on redescription of actions necessary to the argument? Second, to what extent are such limitations
permanent features of human life, and to what extent do they change as history unfolds? Thus we
reach, by another route, a question crucial to this study: whether the conditions of human life can
be limitlessly re-described to advance our agendas; and if not what the limits are, how they are
grounded, and how they can be found.
I have said that human beings are presumed to be aware of their own intentions and plans of
action. This is not quite so: muddle and self-deception about one's intentions are as possible as are
muddle and self-deception about one's affections. Sometimes muddle of this sort is especially
pertinent to double-effect issues. If there is an effect I should welcome but which I cannot in good
conscience pursue, say the death of an elderly and troublesome relative from whom I expect an
inheritance, it will be easy for me to conceal from myself the extent to which my patterns of
behavior tend toward bringing it about, and even are shaped by a desire for it. There are people,
like King David, who have a knack for getting others to do their dirty work for them while avoiding
personal responsibility. Hence while a morality of consequences opens all the problems of an
uncertain future and of comparing incomparable goods, a morality of intentions opens all the
mysteries of the human heart.
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2.5. Symbols
One of the more frustrating features of moral and political debate is the persistence of issues
about which men and women feel strongly, but which the skeptical mind is likely to dismiss as
trivial or as a mask for something more serious. The American obsession with skin color, which in
some ways afflicts anti-racists more than it does racists, xii is one example; concern about hair
length in men, and skirt length in women, is another. Religion has generated many disputes about
details of observance -- precisely how one receives Communion, for example -- with which the
worldly are impatient. Scholarship, too, has its petty issues: whether footnotes belong at the
margin or at the end of the text (or in both places) for example.
A form of Marxism that has many conservative adherents holds that economic issues are
central, while other issues (styles of dress, for example) are peripheral. But attempts to find the
"real" issues behind apparently trivial questions encounter many difficulties. Economic motives,
such as the desire to support a family, economic institutions, such as money and property,
technologies, such as birth control pills, and economic phenomena, such as the behavior of the
stock market -- all have significant cultural and psychological dimensions.
Brecht said, Erst kommt das Fressen, but human eating (Essen as opposed to Fressen) has an
enduring cultural dimension: people have to be more than ordinarily hungry to eat dog-food, and
those whose diet is adequate and even healthy, but cannot afford a special meal to celebrate a
holiday, are importantly deprived. And eating other people's leavings is felt to be degrading, even
though it is neither immoral nor (necessarily) unhealthy. xiii
Considerations of sanitation apart, the disposal of human remains might seem a trivial issue.
But the way we deal with a person's corpse defines our relationship to him, which continues to be
morally important after his death. Creon and Antigone were fighting about something real, not just
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attempting to exert power over one another. Sex, too, has a powerful symbolic dimension, xiv not
reducible to the sensations experienced at orgasm (or anything else). One reason for this fact is that
men and women have the power to create new life -- a fact about human sexuality that affects our
feelings even when reproduction is unlikely or impossible. xv
Finally, controversy about the details of religious observance cannot be dismissed as minor.
A service is not merely entertainment for the laity while they wait to receive the desired
theological, moral, or political message (or are dispensed valid sacraments). A service may also
convey an undesired message of its own, e.g., that the doctrines preached are fantasies designed to
console the losers of this world but to be ignored in "real" life. xvi
2.6. Tradition, Convention, and Change
The social environment of action affects moral judgment in a number of ways. In the first
place, the language in which we frame moral issues -- not only the language of "Ten
Commandments" morality, but also philosophers' expressions such as duty and happiness -- is both
conventional and traditional. It carries with it a freight of conventional understandings that can be
canceled only with difficulty. Expounders of Aristotle have constantly to explain that for him
virtue does not mean chiefly sexual self-restraint, and prudence does not mean chiefly caution. Nor
is the word morality innocent: it carries with it a possibly undesired suggested that sexual issues
are the most important moral questions.
Second, the consequences of our actions depend in part on how others interpret them. An
otherwise innocent act may be wrong because another person will interpret it in a morally
corrupting way; this consequence is traditionally called scandal
Third, insofar as an action has a symbolic dimension, its moral acceptability depends on the
conventions of meaning prevalent within one's world. Whether it is a lie to describe a jolly
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heterosexual as "gay" depends on one's time, place, and audience. Likewise the symbolic
ramifications of sexual practices, and of ways of disposing of human remains, depend in part on
how the agent and others understand them. Conventions affect even what a person can intend: I
cannot say, "Jones is a depraved criminal who ought to be extirpated for the good of society," or
spit in his face, while intending to express my love and admiration for him.
Fourth, not everyone can do everything. Human beings have responded to this problem by
defining a number of social roles, including those of husband, mother, and social critic,
performance of which can be assessed according to common standards. What these roles are, and
what the requirements of the role morality attached to each of them is, depends largely on
convention.
Finally, our conventions and traditions may preserve moral insights. On any account sifting
is required, but to reject the wisdom of the ages altogether is to give oneself the impossible task of
creating the moral and social world afresh. In morality as in science we are sailors who must repair
our vessel on the open sea: there is no Archimedean point outside our practice from which our
morality can be re-evaluated. Hence methodological conservatism is the only alternative to a
paralyzing skepticism: criticism, however radical, must begin with an examination of the status
quo.
But people begin in very different places. And many people these days suggest that our
ship has sprung so many leaks that it is beyond the possibility of repair, indeed that it was unseaworthy from the beginning. Only an examination of the difficulties and of our resources
(personal as well as collective) for meeting them can begin to provide an answer to such critics. xvii I
have not so far distinguished between three different elements in our social norms. One is the
ephemeral domain of taste and fashion. The second consists longer-lived conventions such as
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political constitutions, which nonetheless have limited span of life. The third includes those even
longer-lasting traditions for which their adherents claim permanent validity. On any account,
identification of the third class requires selectivity; those who defend traditional sexual morality do
not mean to include the view that, since boys will be boys, it is just as well that there is a class of
loose women for them to be boys with. There is nothing wrong with this procedure, but it requires
principles of evaluation and not just the citation of authorities.
Not everyone is the beneficiary of the same tradition. The whole world is now Western, in a
trashy, least common denominator way, but beneath this surface a multitude of local, communal,
regional, and national traditions persist. Each agent must make the best of what is given him, but
what is given each of us varies from individual to individual.
All societies change, but one can imagine a society in which change took place so slowly
that human beings were unaware of it, or so quickly and decisively that memory of former ways of
life was lost. But we live in a world in which both change and the consciousness of change are all
pervasive. To examine other possibilities is merely to underline how different we are from people
in a highly traditional society, for example. We stand rather in an uncomfortable relationship to our
cultural and religious past, as witness our surfeit of translations of the Bible.
What is crucial for present purposes is the different ways people react to change. Some
embrace it with enthusiasm, and endeavor to drive others, sometimes brutally, "kicking and
screaming into the Twentieth Century." Others seek a refuge from the modern world, secured
among other things by stringent moral rules. Still others attempt a more discriminating response.
And such divergent responses lead to the classic situation of ideological deadlock, in which
considerations A finds persuasive B finds irrelevant, or even supportive of the opposite conclusion.
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An exchange between Finnis and his liberal opponents, on the cognate issue of infallible teachings
on moral issues, illuminates the considerations at work here. The liberals adduce the complexity of
modern moral problems to cast doubt upon the possibility of finding definitive answers to modern
moral problems by appeal to revelation. Finnis sees an argument from some to all here, or more
exactly an argument from
(1) Some moral issues are too complex for definitive judgment.

(2) All moral issues are too complex for definitive judgment.
And he concludes, "Glassanding non sequiturs which seem more at home in politics are to be
found, remarkably, in serious theological books, and they serve for a time" xviii -- an example, no
doubt, of the nonpolitical style he thinks appropriate for theological reflection.
But the liberals' point is not a mere non sequitur, though it is not as decisive as they perhaps
think. Modern problems are not only complex but interacting: the sort of family structure we have
(or ought to have) is in part a function of the sort of economic structure we have (or ought to have),
and vice versa. And education, government, and other aspects of our collective life also have an
impact on families. Under such circumstances, one might well doubt the capacity of human beings
to fix for all time moral requirements concerning marriage, or to discover that God has done so.
But one might also conclude that, without infallibly taught moral norms, moral judgment would be
impossible. And the same argument will apply to exceptionless norms.
2.7. The Heterogeneity of Morality
Charles E. Larmore argues "we do best to see morality, at its deepest level, as a motley of
ultimate commitments. As a result we should acknowledge that moral conflict can be ineliminable"
(xi). xix Hence the possibility of a moral blind alley, in which I can honor one of my ultimate
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commitments only by breaching another, haunts contemporary reflection on moral issues. xx
Larmore believes that his observation supports a self-consciously modern approach to moral and
political issues.
But in fact Larmore's recognition of complexity undermines his response to Alasdair
MacIntyre's anti-modernist arguments. Uncharitably attributing a foundationalist moral
epistemology to MacIntyre, Larmore maintains that "contextualism -- the view that a disputed
belief is sufficiently justified if justified by appeal to other beliefs not challenged by the particular
dispute" (29) -- is as reasonable an epistemology for morals as it is for science. This may be so, but
it does not answer MacIntyre.
For MacIntyre is contending that the context of modern morality has been shattered -- that
the rise of the officially neutral state and the sundering of morality from its religious setting, as well
as the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy, have created a world in which emotivism,
whatever its flaws as a philosophical theory, is a correct description of how moral argument
actually proceeds. When we find ourselves in disputes which threaten to widen until our entire
picture of the universe is at issue, standard liberals put an end to reflection by invoking a ban on
"imposing one's values" on other people.
Examination of our considered judgments reveals three sorts of standard: consequentialist
standards, which hold us responsible for how the world goes, so far as that is within our power;
deontological restrictions on action, such as the prohibition on lying; and partial commitments to
friends, family, and (for example) colleges and universities. These principles stand at a
considerable remove from the rules of "Ten Commandments" morality; two or three of them, and
possibly other considerations as well, may support a single commonsense rule. Conflicts between
each of these requirements and any of the others are possible (ch. 6). In the absence of a general
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theory of how to resolve such conflicts, or a belief about the world that limits their possibility, we
are faced with two unappealing prospects. One is a possibly unlimited assemblage of moral blind
alleys; the other is a morality composed entirely of situational judgments. xxi In either case the
deconstruction of the Western ethical tradition is well underway.
2.8. Individual Variation
A common attempt to defend actions other people think wrong goes as follows. Such
conduct would be wrong if ordinary people did it, but I -- and a few others like me -- are different
in ways that make it permissible (and perhaps sometimes even obligatory) for us. xxii This argument
will not do as it stands, since it means that any moral requirement whatever can be evaded by
pleading individual difference. And, while human beings differ enormously in temperament, they
do not group themselves into psychological types such that principles that apply to persons of one
type cannot be applied to persons of another.
Homosexuality, to use the most common example of radical human difference, is a highly
various phenomenon, associated with a variety of other personality traits, and in the production of
which differing mixtures of choice, genetic difference, and environmental influence combine. And
many of those who take part in homosexual relations, or are tempted to do so, will come to prefer
the opposite sex upon maturity or release from prison, or would have preferred the opposite sex but
for bitter personal experiences.
In addition to differences of desire of the sort just mentioned, people also differ in the sorts
of person they admire and want to become. These differences of ideal are at least partly moral in
character, though they lack the purity of Kant's reverence for the moral law. Some people are more
capable of sophisticated moral analysis than others, and of acting on conclusions that conflict with
their own inclinations or the mores of society. People also differ in decision-making styles: some
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people cut through difficulties on the way to their ends, whereas others multiply complications for
fear of having left out any relevant consideration. These differences extend also to the sphere of
morals: some people are temperamentally lax, whereas others are temperamentally scrupulous.
Finally, people stand in different relations to the conventions and traditions of society: they differ
in background, subsequent moral influences, and present situation of comfort or disadvantage. The
bad Catholic, the non-practicing, unbelieving Jew, and the agnostic Protestant are very different
sorts of people.
The simplest way in which we take differences among human beings into account in moral
judgment is in admitting excuses -- some of which almost, though not quite, count as justifications.
Some people, for reasons not their fault, find some rules of morality hard to recognize or, if they do
recognize them, hard to observe. If we think of moral requirements as analogous to penal laws, the
difference between excuse and justification will tend to disappear, since that many people find a
criminal law too hard to keep is a reason for repealing it (though of course not always a decisive
reason). But this analogy has distinct limitations; moral standards are not only methods of social
control, but also describe elements of a life worthy of a human being.
It is not, however, possible to limit the impact of human differences on morality to
questions of excuse. The advisability of self-improvement campaigns, diets for example, depends
in part on a person's capacity to follow through with them -- and thus on his (and his adviser's)
estimate of his probable future actions. One might well hesitate to end, or to urge another to end, a
monogamous though from a moral point of view less than ideal sexual relationship, if the result
were to be a life of promiscuity. A crucial issue is how far this line of thought can be pressed
without exempting some people, by reason of their peculiar personalities, from observing the
requirements of morality.
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2.9. Concluding Remarks
It is now possible to cut back the complexity of moral situations a little. xxiii It is not
necessary to formulate moral rules to cover naturally impossible situations, such as those involving
kittens injected to produce super-cats with human intelligence; xxiv or which presume knowledge
that human beings cannot have, such that if I have sexual intercourse now, my great-great-grandson
will be a mass murderer (and I will not have a great-great-granddaughter whose good deeds
outweigh his crimes).
There can be no practical need for rules covering such cases, and any result one reaches for
them will sound odd, if only because of the oddness of the situation envisaged. xxv Moreover
capacity for moral judgment arises in the world as it is, and there is no reason to suppose that it
extends to possible worlds other than our own. Hence a moral code will be sufficiently defended if
it applies satisfactorily to all naturally possible situations, including only those forms of knowledge
of which human beings are naturally capable.
It is possible to strengthen this conclusion, and exclude from consideration even some
naturally possible situations. Ursula K. LeGuin xxvi imagines a race of intelligent androgynies, each
of which is capable of both begetting and bearing a child. These beings undergo an estrus cycle,
and have no institution of marriage. (Their only important conventional rule about sexual behavior
requires "brothers" to separate after one of them has given birth to a child.) Such beings may be
naturally impossible, say for reasons involving hormones, but even if they are possible we need not
worry about them when we formulate our principles concerning sex, reproduction, and family life.
For we have no practical dealings with such creatures, and they are structurally discontinuous with
us in respects relevant to these domains of morality. The same would not be true, however, of our
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principles governing violence and deceit, procedural principles such as Accept traditional rules that
withstand scrutiny or general moral principles as such Never use a rational being as a mere means.
Actual situations are unsettling enough, without the help of science fiction. Hence we need
not be concerned here with a contention such as Kai Nielsen's, that “As the world goes, there are
good grounds for holding that judicial killings [of innocent people] are morally intolerable, though
... if the world (including human beings) were very different, such killings could be something that
ought to be done.” xxvii For our moral rules -- including those which traditional morality designates
as absolute -- are tied to a world similar, at least in its most important aspects, to our own.
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3
AXIOMS, CASUISTRY, ELITISM
In order to criticize some actual or proposed action, John cites a moral rule of the Ten
Commandments variety ("Thou shalt not commit adultery," for example). Mary can reply that her
act is not one of adultery, or that adultery in her books is not a sin. But she can also reply, "Life is
more complicated than you think: adultery, though ordinarily wrong, is acceptable under these
circumstances."
John has a choice of replies:
(J1) "Yes, life is complicated, and whether adultery is wrong is a matter for case by case
judgment. In this case, it is legitimate (or wrong, as the case may be)."
(J2) "No, life is not complicated, or not as complicated as you think. Adultery is always
adultery, and as such always wrong. Those who think otherwise, in G.E.M. Anscombe's
phrase, 'show a corrupt mind.'"
(J3) "Adultery is sometimes justified (and in fact is justified in this case). But those of us
who are intelligent enough to discern the cases where adultery is acceptable ought also to be
prudent enough to keep quiet in front of those whose control over their instincts, and whose
capacity to make moral distinctions, is weaker than ours."

(J4) "Yes, life is complicated, but its very complexity requires that some possibilities be
excluded from moral deliberation. Married life is complicated enough as it is, without
admitting adultery as a legitimate possibility." (Those who reject answer J1 or J4 for
adultery may still accept it for murder, rape, or selling dope to children.)
By examining John's replies we will be evaluating not only ways of resolving moral
questions, but also ways of sustaining or challenging moral absolutes. The argument of chapters 2
and 3 suffices to refute answer J2, which denies the complexity of human life. But it is not evident
what is the best way of dealing with life's complexity: answer J4 admits complexity while
preserving the norm. In this chapter and the two following, I survey the various moves made in
disputes about moral absolutes, beginning with appeal to some moral axiom.
3.1. Axioms
Consider the following propositions:
(A1) One ought always do good and avoid evil.
(A1a) One ought always to produce the greatest net good.
(A1aa) One ought always to produce the best possible balance of pleasure over pain.
(A2) One ought to act only on those maxims that one can will as universal laws (of nature).
(A3) One ought always treat humanity as an end in itself, never as a mere means.
(A4) One ought always observe the mean, as defined by the man (or woman) of practical
wisdom.
(A5) One ought always obey the conventions of one's society (so far as these can be
rationally defended).
(A6) One ought always to perform the duties of one's station.
(A7) One ought always to do the most loving thing possible (toward God and neighbor).
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(A8) One ought always act in accordance with the constant teaching of the Church or the
plain meaning of Scripture.
(A9) One ought never offend God.
Such propositions -- call them moral axioms -- purport to govern all of our conduct. All
are sometimes defended with the claim that they provide the sole alternative to "moral" judgments
that reflect nothing but the inclinations of the individual or the prejudices he has absorbed from his
group. Judgment is required in their application. Axiom A1aa -- the principle of utility interpreted
in a hedonistic sense -- comes closest to implying concrete rules for conduct. But it
can also be challenged by appeal to intuitions reflecting a deontological or partialist perspective.
Why should I kill, deceive, or inflict pain upon my wife or mother, just because the greatest net
happiness will be advanced, perhaps only slightly, by my doing so?
And all moral axioms can be challenged in a more fundamental way, by arguments
supporting an anti-theoretical approach to ethics. The first step in the argument for anti-theory is
the fact that -- whatever else it may be -- morality is a feature of human social life before it is a
matter of philosophical reflection. Unless we already had a conception of happiness and right
conduct, or of virtue and rights, at work in our moral language, moral philosophers would have
nothing to work with. It is perhaps possible to imagine a world in which no one ever asked whether
inherited conceptions of the good and the right were defensible, but hardly one that consisted only
of philosophers proceeding on principles that they had adopted after critical reflection. The latter
kind of society would contain no children.
Michael Oakeshott (ch. 8) i distinguishes between morality as a habit of affection and
conduct, and morality as the application of criteria (including the self-conscious pursuit of moral
ideals and the reflective observance of moral rules). And he concludes that, while the second sort
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of morality may be an appropriate endeavor for an individual, only the first sort is proper for a
society. In his own words, "human life is a gamble; but while each individual must be allowed to
bet according to his inclination, society should always back the field" (p. 186).
There is, however, something absurd about Oakeshott's undertaking. One cannot decide, in
advance of the situation, how much either an individual or a society should rely on habitual
responses, and how much on reasoned reflection, in making decisions. Oakeshott may be right in
complaining that “the predicament of Western morals ... is first that our moral life has come to be
dominated by the pursuit of ideals ... and secondly that we have come to think of this dominance as
... an achievement of which we should be proud“ (pp. 202-3). But he has not produced a
persuasive argument for this conclusion.
Nonetheless, some philosophers have regretted the fact that they exist as members of
society before they begin to criticize its practices. Descartes goes so far as to complain that
Given the fact that we were all children before being adults and that for a long time is our
lot to be governed by our appetites and our teachers... it is almost impossible for our
judgments to be as pure or solid as they would have been had we had the full use of reason
from the moment of our birth and never been led by anything but our reason. ii
To reject such a position is to advance the discussion a little.
The next step in the anti-theoretical argument is a critique of philosophical attempts to
define an extra-historical starting point from which inherited standards can be critically evaluated.
Here Wittgenstein's work is helpful. For he introduces the human element by way of an a priori
reflection on the nature of knowledge. He concludes that what is given in cognition is not sense
data but practices -- what he calls "forms of life" or "language games." Hence he rejects the
priority of the first person singular advocated by Descartes, in favor of a perspective that makes
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knowledge depend on a language that enables one to share one's conclusions with others, and
enables others to scrutinize and correct one's results. And the only languages available for this
purpose are those transmitted from past generations, though each generation modifies its
inheritance in some way. iii

Applied to ethics, Wittgenstein's argument supports an approach like

that of Hegel. As Hegel sums it up with uncharacteristic lucidity, "When a father inquired about
the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied, 'Make him a citizen
of a state with good laws.'" iv For only such a state -- or rather, only such a community, -- will
support the full array of concepts, practices, and motivational incentives needed for sound moral
reasoning and the putting of its conclusions into practice. But no more for Hegel than for
Wittgenstein is the essential argument about education. Hegel's contention is that a morality of
abstract principles is empty until filled out by the concrete morality of a community, transmitted
through its moral language. (Such a community need not, despite Hegel, be the nation-state, but
can range from a pair of friends or lovers to the human race as a whole.) Words like theft, murder,
and love make possible concrete moral and evaluative judgments.
The third and final step is an observation concerning the nature of inherited morality, one
that makes it resistant to restatement in axiomatic form. Human beings pursue a multitude of
goods, by way of a multitude of practices governed by a multitude of norms. (The phrase by way of
should not be allowed to conceal that many of the goods human beings pursue -- friendship for
example -- are internal to the practices by which they pursue them.) And they admire, and try to
practice, a multitude of virtues. That business, friendship, family life, politics, education, religion,
and art should all be governed by the same principle, or short list of principles, is credible only to
those committed, on a priori«MDUL»«MDNM» grounds, to the existence of such principles.
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There is a large gap between any proposed fundamental principle and the concrete decisions
that form the moral life. In order, for example, to establish contact between the consequentialist
axiom A1 and the moral life it is necessary to apply it not only to individual acts, but also to
attitudes, rules, institutions, and methods of moral education. And since the effects of any one of
these will depend largely on the character of the others, we will end up evaluating entire ways of
life. Or rather, since it is not possible to create a way of life out of nothing, we will need to
evaluate proposed changes in our way of life, taking into account the fact that both change and
failure to change may have unexpected and sometimes unwelcome effects. We have thus moved
very far from the prospect, originally presented by utilitarianism, of reconstructing our moral
tradition from without. The same argument will apply to any other moral axiom -- including those
I have listed at the head of this section -- that one might use for such a purpose.
The conventionalist axioms A5 and A6 might seem to yield a more determinate result, at
least if one ignores the possibility of radical critique of existing conventions. But we must
distinguish between conventionalism as a moral theory and the moral judgments of conventional
people, which are sometimes accompanied by a non-conventionalist moral theory or, more often,
by none at all. To apply conventionalist moral theories, one has to identify one's group and then
discern its conventions. Both operations present problems, the second as much as the first. Even
for the most conventional among us, public opinion polls are no way to settle moral issues; those
who attempt to settle them in that way are called "politicians" and held in little respect by the rest of
us.
Stuart Hampshire has pointed out the complex, even quirky, character of the inherited rules
and attitudes with which the reflective moralist must of necessity deal.«USSX»
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Every natural language [he writes] flaunts its idioms and inconsistencies, because they lend
the language, spoken and written, its distinctive flavor and spirit. In some important areas
of morality, which are least regulated by rational calculation, the rules that support a
particular way of life, and its determinate conception of the human good, will be
particularly stringent rules. (p. 152)
But the issue immediately arises, whether this defense is not available for the most blatantly
irrational institutions. In overtly racist societies like the Old South, intercourse between a black
man and a white woman, even in marriage, was strongly tabooed, whereas intercourse between a
white man and a black woman, though not in marriage, was regarded as a normal part of a young
man's education.
Some people attempt to step outside the mores of society and evaluate them is an essential
part of our moral tradition. When we undertake the critique of institutions and mores we find
irrational, we invoke principles that look very much like moral axioms. These have, to be sure, a
certain conventional standing, but those who employ them claim on their behalf a supraconventional force.
The anti-theoretical movement in ethics is sound so far as it cast doubt upon the project of
producing an axiom (or short list of axioms), standing outside the moral tradition of our culture,
from which moral conclusions can be drawn by applying it to "value-neutral" facts. But to go
further, and to reject moral theory as an enterprise, is to condemn oneself to one of two unpalatable
positions. Either one must accept the mores of one's society without question, however stupid or
brutal they appear; or else moral argument turns into a partisan enterprise, subordinate to
Polemarchus's principle: Help your friends and hurt your enemies. Another possibility is a
religious morality, in which one's personal relationship to God or Christ takes precedence over
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principles of every sort. But, even on such a view, reflection will be necessary to help us discern
what the requirements of this relationship may be. v

3.2. Casuistry
Casuistry attempts to apply received rules and principles to novel situations (and all
situations will in some respects be novel). Causistical reasoning consists in the expansion or
contraction of received norms in territories under dispute, in order to resolve contested moral
issues. It responds to motley of considerations.
First, each of our crucial moral terms has a descriptive core and at least vague descriptive
limits. This observation is consistent with the fact that they are defined with the help of valueladen terms such as marriage and property. A happily married man away from his wife on a
journey sleeps with a woman in order to relieve his boredom and frustration: to defend such
conduct means abandoning the concept of adultery in its modern, monogamous sense. And -however much someone may disapprove of such conduct -- cheating on one's income tax is not
adultery, gambling is not cruelty to animals, and contraception is not murder.
But moral terms have more flexibility than literal-minded people might think: St. Thomas
Aquinas argued that in cases of extremity all property is in common, so that one who takes what
appears to be another's goods to ward off starvation is not guilty of theft -- not that his theft is
excusable or even justifiable. And the possibility remains that the sense and reference of our moral
language is entirely a historically contingent matter. Some people might think that our moral rule
against murder requires massive revision under conditions of overpopulation.
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Second, outside the descriptive core, but within the descriptive limits, of the application of a moral
word every morally relevant consideration is pertinent. Even if we do not accept utilitarianism or
consequentialism, it remains the case that whether we consider a wide range of acts murder is in
part a function of whether we deem it advisable to do so. But in the case of murder the value we
place on human life and on the uniqueness of each individual will be an important part of the
relevant considerations. And there are powerful prudential reasons not to redefine
«MDUL»murder«MDNM» or other crucial moral terms to meet every passing moral or political
agenda.
Third, the casuist, as opposed to the ethical theorist, works within a framework of rules and
principles that he receives but does not create (though this distinction is one degree). The resulting
diversity of starting points means that casuistry will be, at least in a broad sense, a theological
activity, i.e., the interpretation and application of some authoritative tradition, if only the
humanistic tradition of the West.
Fourth, the coexistence of communities with differing moral and cultural traditions requires
two sorts of casuistry. On the one hand, the representatives of each community attempt to elaborate
its tradition in order to deal with novel situations. On the other hand, there must be rules of
coexistence -- what John Courtney Murray calls "articles of peace" -- among these groups, if their
relationship is not to be one of endless war. And these rules will require interpretation and
application, to questions of civil disobedience for example.
These two forms of casuistry cannot proceed in isolation from one another. The
representatives of a community must be concerned with the possibility that the surrounding social
world may become increasingly hostile or indifferent to its concerns, and engage in subtle or overt
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forms of persecution as a result. And those who elaborate the norms of a pluralistic society cannot
be indifferent to the possibility of communities at war with the rest of society.
One important causistical tool is the principle of double effect: vi A classic formulation of
this principle is that of J. -P. Gury, S.J.:
It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause from which will follow two
effects, one good and the other evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the
ultimate end of the agent is good, and the evil effect is not a means to the good effect. vii
Those who adhere to moral absolutes require such a principle. For there are circumstances
in which, whatever one does, an innocent person will die, someone will acquire a false belief as a
result of one's speech or silence, or some other result one is forbidden to produce directly will
follow. One needs to be able to say, in such cases, that one is not doing evil that good may come of
it, but rather doing good from which evil unfortunately follows. Hence a physician may prescribe
pain relievers that, as a regretted or at least an unintended side effect, shorten the patient's life.
But it is not necessary to believe in absolutes in the strict sense in order to accept the principle of
double effect. Some moralists, without believing in moral absolutes in the strict sense, believe in
virtual absolutes (see § 6.3.) or in acts intrinsically evil in the weak sense -- namely that, though
they may sometimes be justified, they always require a justification. viii Such moralists also can use
the principle of double effect. So long as it makes a difference whether one is doing evil or
accepting it as a side effect of one's action, the principle of double effect is a necessary causistical
tool.
The credible use of this tool of casuistry requires three conditions. First, there need to be
action-kinds resistant to elision into either desired or foreseen consequences. If one can say, "I am
not committing adultery, only securing my release from a concentration camp so that I can rejoin
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my family," the principle of double effect will be superfluous. And if one is required to admit that
one is killing those people whose suicide results from one's literacy campaign, the principle of
double effect will have no application.
Second, the fact that the bad consequences of one's acts are regretted or at least unintended
must have some effect on one's behavior. We must be prepared to take real care, and in the process
take real risks, to avoid killing noncombatants if we are to claim that we do not intend the deaths of
those who die as a result of our military actions. ix Likewise, if we decide not to try to prolong the
life of a dying person or a severely damaged infant, we must, in order to support our invocation of
the principle of double effect, show respect for the patient in other ways (including ways whose
importance is symbolic).
Third, the application of the principle of double effect requires a background ethics of "my
station and its duties," although this ethics need not be immune to overriding or revision, say on the
ground that it reflects a gravely unjust set of institutions (slavery, for example). Failure to do one's
conventionally defined duty, or acting in accordance with a defensible interpretation of that duty,
has a different intentionality than does the intervention of a stranger.
Two pairs of examples developed by Shelly Kagan make the crucial point: x
(SK1a) A philosopher expected to win a prize that cannot be awarded posthumously is
being kept alive on life-support systems. A rival disconnects him, he dies, and the rival
then wins the prize.
(SK1b) A severely injured boy is also being kept alive on life-support systems. His doctor
concludes that recovery is impossible, and after consultation with the boy's family,
disconnects him. The boy then dies.
(SK2a) Parents fail to feed their children, who then die of starvation.
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(SK2b) I fail to feed a homeless person, who then dies of starvation.
Most of us would say that in cases SK1a and b, the rival philosopher kills and the doctor
only allows death; and that in cases SK2a and b, the parents kill but I only allow death. And since
at least one criterion for imputing intention in difficult cases is the distinction between action and
inaction, xi we are also likely to say that the rival philosopher and the parents intend the deaths of
their victims, whereas doctor and I merely foresee them (at least in the absence of further reason for
imputing intention in these cases). But central to our judgments in these cases is the fact that the
doctor is fulfilling a conventionally defined role, and the parents are failing to do so. If all such
roles are presumptively illegitimate, then these moral distinctions will cease to make sense.

3.3. Elitism
One possible source of difficulty is the contemporary belief that all men and women,
including those who used to be called the "vulgar," are equally entitled to take part in moral
discussion. But a tradition represented by Plato, xii Sidgwick, xiii and Roger Scruton xiv suggests that
there is a significant difference between two classes of moral agents -- the common people and the
enlightened few.
One way of spelling out this difference is as follows. Moral judgments are matters of
convention, and these conventions rest ultimately on will and force, by which superior persons (or
the majority) impose their agendas on their inferiors (or the minority). We may add that the
element of force and will underlying our morality should be kept from the majority with the help of
pious lies. Some such position was attributed to a wide range of other writers by Leo Strauss, and
may have been in fact have been that of Strauss himself. xv In another form, this tradition allows a
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select class of morally sensitive person to make highly discriminating situational judgments, while
leaving the mass of mankind to strict deontological norms.
On such views, religion and conventional morality are fictions necessary to keep the masses
in line -- or, more politely, to maintain »social order. Meanwhile philosophers, who have seen
through the swindle, are entitled to pursue their ends without regard to inherited moral codes,
though they may have codes of their own which place some constraints upon their actions. This
strategy makes ample provision for Machiavellianism: philosophers can advise their rulers (and
those among their students who seem destined for rule) to depart from communal codes ruthlessly
when necessary to preserve the community that sustains them; they can also supply sophistical
arguments as necessary to refute indiscreet skeptics.
The hypocrisy required by this strategy renders it unacceptable. Moreover it ignores the
fact that there is now a substantial "trickle down" from elite to mass attitudes. Lastly, it supposes,
contrary to fact, that philosophers are immune to the physical, intellectual, and emotional
limitations that afflict ordinary people. Philosophers as much as ordinary folk are subject to social
pressures, including the various forms of "political correctness." Philosophers who undertake
propaganda for Machiavellian reasons are likely to end up believing their own lies for the same
reason ordinary people are. Philosophers as much as ordinary folk often fail to live up to their own
convictions; philosophers as well as ordinary folk must die.
Nonetheless, those who insist, as I would, on the public character of moral judgments, xvi
must admit one important qualification. There are strong social conventions against direct
expression of disapproval of other people's behavior. Disapproval is usually expressed obliquely,
often with qualifiers like "it's all right if that's what they want ...." Only when the person making
the judgment has a personal interest in the matter (including an interest such as raising his children
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"right"), or else has an institutional position, say as religious leader, which entitles him to speak out
on moral issues, is direct expression of moral disapproval considered appropriate. How far
politeness can qualify honesty in moral matters is itself a matter of casuistry, which nothing in the
present argument enables or requires me to resolve.
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4
ANTI-PROPORTIONALISM
Ethical theories can be roughly arranged along a spectrum, according to the extent to which
they admit moral reasoning in the form of a calculus, such as Bentham proposed. On the "Right"
end of this spectrum stands an important school of contemporary conservative Roman Catholic
moral thought led by John Finnis and Germain Grisez i which rejects calculative methods, or even
rougher comparisons of competing goods, except insofar as we are engaging in merely technical
reasoning. While we may call the doctrines of this school either "the new natural law theory” ii or
"the new rigorism," a more accurate expression for its position is "anti-proportionalism." But
while anti-proportionalism includes a polemic against utilitarianism and all its cousins, it is also an
affirmative contribution to the long-standing tradition which attempts to discover fundamental
ethical principles with whose aid it is possible to resolve disputed questions of morals,
The anti-proportionalist movement is not exclusively Catholic, however. The views of the
Methodist Paul Ramsey are in some respects similar to those of Finnis and Grisez, though not in the
same way reducible to a master argument. iii Nor is this way of thinking the exclusive preserve of
religious moralists. Phillipa Foot argues that "the concept of 'the best state of affairs' should
disappear from moral theory, though not ... from all talk in moral contexts,” iv where such talk can
be given definite meaning by appeal to some virtue. I shall argue below that the virtue of prudence
yields an acceptable meaning for this expression, though not one that warrants the generalized
overriding of inherited moral rules.
By "proportionalism" is meant the weighing and balancing of disparate goods in order to
resolve moral questions, and in particular to warrant departures from inherited moral rules (or
indeed to support adherence to them). v Proportionalism may be distinguished from

consequentialism (or utilitarianism minus hedonism), in that a proportionalist takes into account
considerations other than consequences in the usual sense, such as that each of us shapes his
character by his choices.
Finnis and Grisez vi reject proportionalism, not only as the sole or sovereign method of
moral reasoning, but even as one method of prudential judgment among others; in fact, they regard
it as meaningless, except as a way of rationalizing decisions made on other, and very likely
questionable, grounds. In doing so, they evade an argument that many writers on ethics have found
very powerful, one that has been formulated by Samuel Scheffler as follows: "Anyone who resists
consequentialism seems committed to the claim that morality tells us to do less good than we are in
a position to do, and to prevent less evil than we are in a position to prevent." vii For, they hold,
there is no such thing as "less good" and "less evil" in the relevant senses of the words.
The resulting approach to moral issues has now been embodied in an impressive body of
literature, including works of Thomistic scholarship, viii freestanding moral philosophy, ix legal and
constitutional theory, x and moral theology (FC, MLA, WLJ). Finnis and Grisez have also
discussed of a range of special moral issues: these discussions center on such traditional Catholic
concerns as sexual morals xi and medical ethics (A, LDLJ), but include also an argument rejecting
nuclear deterrence on the grounds that it requires a morally impermissible intention to take innocent
life (ND). Arguing against ("artificial") contraception has been a central preoccupation of Grisez at
least, ranging from the early Contraception and the Natural Law xii written before the controversial
encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), through the recent collaborative effort The Teaching of
Humanae Vitae and beyond.
Anti-proportionalism is of interest both to ethical theorists and to those interested in moral
controversies within particular communities. Two different impulses -- not altogether in harmony -
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- are at work in Finnis and Grisez's program. One impulse starts with a philosophical thesis, that
values are incommensurable and sound proportionalist reasoning therefore impossible, and turns to
the Christian (and especially to the Catholic) tradition, restrictively interpreted, to reinforce this
conclusion.
The other impulse undertakes the defense of traditional Catholic moral teachings against
external critics and internal dissidents (or "revisionists" as they are unfortunately called); and finds
in philosophical anti-proportionalism a welcome ally. Finnis especially represents that side of antiproportionalism whose primary appeal is to tradition. For treats what he calls the "high tradition"
(MA 32, 34) as a moral authority, and goes so far as to accord a privileged intellectual position to
the medieval Latin word homicidium (MA 37), in preference to the English word homicide and
murder. Presumably the ground of this distinction is that medieval people embodied the "high
tradition" in a way moderns do not. xiii I begin with Finnis and Grisez's master argument. After a
theological interlude, I then consider, first, their use of that argument to protect traditional moral
teachings against criticism; and, second, their use of that argument in deriving moral conclusions of
their own.

4.1 A Master Argument
Finnis and Grisez share two assumptions that for present purposes need not be defended or
elaborated further. We human beings are free, but the goods that shape our choices are independent
of our will. There are intelligible goods independent of human preference, though not of human
beings. Moral judgments are to be justified in terms of these goods, rather than by a categorical
imperative independent of persons or by arbitrary determinations of the will. (It does not matter
whether "will" here is divine or human; and if human, individual or collective.) The issue that
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remains, once we accept these assumptions, is how we should proceed when the requirements of
two different goods, or of the same good in two different manifestations, appear to conflict.
Anti-proportionalism, while only one aspect of Finnis and Grisez's thought, nonetheless is what
makes their thought distinctive within the broader natural law tradition. The two share a master
argument that further expresses their distinctive contribution to ethics. This argument maintains
that, since goods are incommensurable, proportionalist moral reasoning is impossible (and not just
dangerous).
The exclusion of proportionalism is therefore to be taken strictly, as barring this style of
moral reasoning in any context. As Finnis puts it,
Once a moralist accepts a proportionalist method, even as one methodological principle
amongst others, he can produce arguments in favour of any solution which he already
favours. All such arguments will be illegitimate, i.e., mere rationalizations. Moreover, to
the extent that he seeks to deny his proportionalist method the exclusive status which it has
in the classic utilitarian and other consequentialist systems, he can find no grounds for so
restricting it which are not either (a) rationalizations or (b) grounds for excluding the
proportionalist method altogether. (FE 95)
Or, as Grisez puts in a popular work, "proportionalists speak in measured, rational terms about
greater goods and lesser evils, but in the final analysis their system, like the judgments it purports
to justify, has no rational basis" (FC 71). For the attempt to weigh and balance competing goods is
for Grisez inevitably a mask for an arbitrary decision or the promptings of appetite.
Finnis and Grisez conclude that, since every possible reason for rejecting stringent moral
norms can be refuted with the help of their master argument, a morality that commands
unconditional respect, in each and every act, for each and every basic human good, is for that the
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only rationally available option. Merely technical (means-end) commensuration, however, they
admit as legitimate (e.g., FE §IV.3).
Grisez at least uses the anti-proportionalist method to argue that, once the claims of Church
authority are admitted even prima facie, no reason however strong suffices to override them, at
least about moral issues (WLJ ch. 1, q. C).
For there is no way of arguing as follows: adherence to Church teaching is an important
consideration for the moral theologian, but except in the case of infallible teachings the claims of
such teachings can be overridden by other considerations. In practice Grisez admits that some
magisterial pronouncements -- such as those pre-Vatican II papal statements hostile to religious
toleration -- are "noninfallible" and thus open to development (WLJ 126), though on his account
this development cannot involve proportionalist reasoning. For if proportionalist reasoning is
impossible, neither the Pope and bishops, nor the Church collectively can engage in it any more
than can private individuals or dissenting moral theologians.
Grisez understands his proportionalist opponents as asserting that the degree of
consideration to be given a good is independent of the moral character of the agent, so that once a
person undertakes to assess conflicting moral requirements in proportionalist terms, the correct
answer inevitably follows. Hence, he argues, the proportionalist cannot satisfy two requirements
that any moral method must meet: giving results, and making moral error possible. In Grisez's
own words:
If the first condition is met and the morally wrong action could be chosen, then its morally
acceptable alternative must be known. Otherwise one could not choose wrongly, for one
chooses wrongly only when one knows which option one ought to choose and chooses a
different option. But when the first condition is met, the second cannot be. The option

The Search for Moral Absolutes

69

Philip E. Devine

which promises the definitely superior proportion of good to bad cannot be known by a
person who chooses an alternative which promises less. If the superior option were known
as superior, its inferior alternative simply could not be chosen. (WLJ 132)
Moreover, he argues, if proportionalism were true, there would be no freedom of choice, since to
see the greatest good would be do it; in his own words,
All that proportionalists really say is that it would be wrong to choose precisely that which
`practical judgment (as they understand it) would exclude as a possibility for free choice,
namely an alternative measurably inferior in terms of the relevant goods and bads. (WLJ
chap. 6, q. F, § 7). xiv
There are some striking similarities between anti-proportionalism and the tradition of
ethical skepticism represented by Hume and Nietzsche. Against proportionalists, Grisez holds that
the relative claims of various goods, though not their status as goods, is determined only in choice.
In his own words, "choice does determine which good henceforth will be considered greater and
which evil lesser, because the good which one identifies in choosing becomes part of one's personal
scale of value" (WLJ 157). Thus, apart from moral constraints, he is committed to Hume's maxim
that it is not irrational to prefer the destruction of the entire universe to the scratching of one's little
finger.
We can also discern positivist influence on Grisez is his understanding of the Galileo affair.
He understands the conflict between science and Church authority in terms of a strongly drawn
contrast between empirical issues on the one hand and those of theology and morality on the other
(WLJ 10, 899-900). Since Galileo was a scientist, he had persuasive reasons to prefer his own
conclusions to the official teaching of the Church of his day, but contemporary critics of official
sexual morality cannot have such reasons. Unfortunately for Grisez, Galileo's theories were shaped
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by an understanding of what the world was like and what an adequate scientific theory
consequently must be like, which did not derive entirely from observation or experiment. xv
In any case, Grisez has created a false dilemma here. On the one hand, the character of the person
doing it affects moral reasoning. A selfish person will systematically neglect to see the claims of
other people, an ungrateful person the claims of gratitude. On the other hand, to reduce our
evaluation of a moral judgment to a judgment of the character of the person making it is to invite a
sort of pharasaism against which the New Testament preaches more vigorously than it does against
any form of sexual irregularity. Virtue ethics has an indispensable contribution to make to our
understanding of the resolution of moral problems, but so does our understanding of the state of
affairs external to the agent.
A more adequate view holds that goods impose a vague and unspecified hierarchy of claims
on us before choice, and by that our choices we give this hierarchy a clearer structure. Defects in
temperament or moral education for which the agent is not to blame may lead to good faith moral
error, which we can understand as a failure of perception. But habitual wrongdoing, understood at
least initially by the agent as such, can also warp his moral capacities; this is traditionally called the
darkening of conscience. Choice between good and evil is possible, because either past decisions
of the agent or conditions of human life for which the agent is not, as a discrete individual, to blame
("original sin") have muddled our understanding of the order of goods. (How human beings not so
afflicted could choose wrongly seems to me a mystery; perhaps anti-proportionalism would be true
within the gates of Eden.) But reasoned decision is possible because careful reflection, given a
generally virtuous disposition (and, a theologian would say, God's grace), will illuminate the moral
situation and enable us to appreciate the proper hierarchy of goods. It is not possible, on this view,
to give a general answer to the question whether a person ought to undertake a proportionalist
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judgment, or to act on it once he has made it. Much depends on the danger of misperception, either
on the agent's part or on the part of other people influenced by him.
Such an account avoids Grisez's difficulties with the notion of blameless moral error (WLJ
91). Failures of perception are not necessarily blameless; at least in the present world, the failure to
give any importance whatever to the interests of whole classes of people is unlikely to be so. But
when a multitude of considerations are at stake, it is easy to see how an intelligent person, in good
faith, could get the answer wrong. Nor need we suppose the least laxity in any department of
morality necessarily threatens the whole system.
In short, an adequate account of moral judgment must include both the contribution (and
hence also the responsibility) of the agent and the sense of external constraint under which agents
labor. Such an account will lead us to recognize the lumpy, grainy, texture of value, in contrast
with the smooth, homogeneous texture supposed by consequentialists and the rocky, unyielding
texture supposed by their militant opponents. Moralists need to learn to respect the differing
qualities of the moral terrain, as agriculturists need to learn to respect the differing qualities of the
soil, some parts of which are in greater need than others of what Wendell Berry calls "kindly use."
4.2 An Appeal to Heaven
I now consider an argument of a rather different character, one directed only to theists.
Finnis appeals to the belief that God governs the world by His providence in defense of the
existence of moral absolutes. As Finnis has put it,
Divine providence involves permission of evil (of any and every kind) only so that out of it
God may draw a somehow greater good. So that if the supreme or decisive moral
responsibility is to pursue a state of affairs embodying greater good, the moral norm in
every problem-situation would be, quite simply, try anything. That is, Do anything you feel
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like! For if you accomplish what you attempt, you can be certain that what you chose
tended toward overall long-run net good (since God's providence permitted), whereas if you
fail in your attempt, you can be certain that your failure tended toward overall net good
since God's providence excluded the success of your effort. (MA 15-16)
But this argument threatens to destroy all forms of religiously motivated morality. Any
morality must suppose that it is better that human beings should observe its requirements than that
they should breach them. And if "all manner of things will be well" whatever I do -- if even my
damnation, if that is the result of my action, is good because it contributes to the glory of God -then radically antinomian conclusions follow. If, on the other hand, we call upon Providence to
make the consequences of adhering to a moral rule come out right, despite appearances to the
contrary, "the motivational sinews of consequentialism are left intact, and are qualified only
extrinsically." xvi
4.3 Getting Down to Cases (1)
It is now time to consider the way Finnis and Grisez handle concrete moral issues. I begin
with their critique of the arguments made by critics of traditional moral absolutes, since their theory
was first forged in concrete moral controversy of this sort.
Finnis is guilty of a rhetorical and methodological error, which may have adverse effects
even on the substance of his conclusions. He starts with a controversial sexual example
(remarriage following divorce [MA 7]), and thereafter heavily emphasizes contraception. If he had
begun instead with rape or torture, his case would be more persuasive, but one might also expect
different concrete results, say a lesser stringency about sexual morals and a greater stringency about
killing (for example, about capital punishment).
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An example of Finnis's methodological difficulties is his use of the ancient art of casuistry
to defend moral absolutes is his support for an absolute prohibition on artificial contraception, but
one understood as permitting Natural Family Planning. He maintains,
The system of identifying fertile times and avoiding intercourse at those times can ... be
ffollowed by couples who form no intention to impede the coming-to-be of a new child, and
who in following that system of avoiding intercourse intend only to avoid the bad side
effects which having a baby may bring about. (MA 86).
But that such couples avoid offspring by abstaining from intercourse does not resolve the
question of their intentions. For they take active measures (discovering the woman's fertile period,
for example) to achieve their goal, i.e., to enjoy the other goods involved in sexual intercourse
without producing offspring. (Paul VI himself speaks of Natural Family Planning as a way of
"controlling birth," i.e., of preventing births at inappropriate times, and urges scientists to determine
"a sufficiently secure basis for the chaste limitation of offspring." xvii And one can manifest an
impermissible intention by inaction, e.g., by failing to provide a prisoner with food.
The central difficulty for Finnis's argument has to do with the concept of intention. The
root question is to what extent differences of intention can be cashed in terms of overt action, and
to what extent very different intentions can be expressed in to what to all appearances is the same
act (to use another example, in giving a person dying in great pain a substantial dose of morphine).
Finnis both displays and conceals the central difficulty in this concept when he writes:
Aquinas puts the point starkly when he says that a conjugal act of intercourse and an act of
adultery are acts of different types even though the behavior, the physical and
psychosomatic activity, may be identical. And he does not mean to make the logical, empty
point that the two types of act are morally right and morally wrong. Rather, he is saying that
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the reason that there can be this profound moral difference is precisely that, despite their
physical identity, they are different types of human act: the wills of the parties relate to the
human goods at stake in intercourse quite differently. (MA 38) xviii
But there are is no reason to suppose that all married, all unmarried, or all adulterous, lovers relate
their wills to the goods involved in sexual intercourse in the same way.
Finnis is aware of the complexities involved in applying notions such as intention. He has
for example written:
Too generalized or rule-governed an application of the notion of "double effect" would
offend against the Aristotelian, common law, Wittgensteinian wisdom that here "we do not
know how do draw the boundaries of the concept" -- of intention, of respect for the good of
life, and of action as distinct from consequences -- "except for a special purpose." (RWA
143-4) xix
But he appeals to the judgments of "those whom Aristotle bluntly calls the wise" to resolve difficult
cases for the application of these concepts (RWA 144). And he never explains how is possible for
the wise to do so, without some implicit proportionalist judgments concerning the relative
importance of the goods and evils at stake in each choice.
The closest thing to an answer to this difficulty is to be found in the following passage:
To judge one's option right, one must consider all morally relevant circumstances -- bonum
ex integra causa. But one can judge an agent's action wrong as soon as one identifies a
morally significant defect in one's motivation, or an inappropriateness in relation either to
the circumstances or the means involved in that option -- malum ex quocumque defectu.
(MA 16-17)
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«USNX»But it is not to be taken for granted that, in every problem situation, a solution free from
every "defect" is possible. And, if not, the principle of the lesser evil will be an inescapable feature
of our processes of moral reasoning, despite Finnis and Grisez's objections.
4.4 Getting Down to Cases (2)
Similar problems arise when Finnis and Grisez attempt to defend moral judgments in their
own right. Grisez formulates the core anti-proportionalist moral principle (or in his own language,
"mode of responsibility") as follows: "One should not be moved by a stronger desire for some
instance of an intelligible good to act by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other
instance of an intelligible good" (WLJ 216). I shall call this mode of responsibility the principle of
respect for human goods. In defense of the principle of respect for human goods, Finnis and Grisez
reasons as follows: proportionalist reasoning is always fallacious, so that there can be no possible
warrant for rejecting the claim of any intelligible good in any situation.
Hence, Grisez reasons, artificial contraception is always wrong, since it involves a direct
attack on the basic good of reproduction (or on the good of life in its procreative aspect). In what
may be fairly regarded as a manifesto of the anti-proportionalist school, The Teaching of Humanae
Vitae, Grisez and Finnis join Joseph Boyle and William May in arguing that "contraception should
be regarded as homicide is regarded," citing as authority a provision of Catholic canon law no
longer in effect (THV 37). Many people will regard this result as so absurd as to warrant the
rejection of any moral theory from which it is drawn. For, if artificial contraception is morally
speaking a form of homicide, it is hard to see why there is so much difficulty about legalized
abortion, since very few people believe that contraception should be a crime (for Grisez's view, see
A 438).
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Grisez could argue that contraception, like suicide, though morally speaking homicidal,
does not involve injustice. (Compare LDLJ.) But our reason for rejecting the claim that
contraception involves injustice is also a reason for rejecting the claim that contraception is a form
of homicide, or to be regarded as such. It is that we cannot specify who is being unjustly treated
when a couple practices contraception, unless we are prepared to say that there are souls in Heaven
waiting to be conceived, who may be wronged even by a decision to abstain from intercourse.
This may not be a decisive objection for Finnis for, as we shall see below, he separates the order of
justice from the good of individual persons.
Likewise, suicide is always wrong on anti-proportionalist premises. For it involves a direct
attack on the basic good of life. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the new rigorists admit the
legitimacy of killing in self-defense, including the somewhat controversial case of abortion to save
the pregnant woman's life. (Grisez acknowledges some tension with official Catholic teaching
authority at this point [A 345-6].) As Grisez puts it,
The justification is simply that the very same act, indivisible as to its behavioral process,
has both the good effect of protecting human life and the bad effect of destroying it. The
fact that the good effect is subsequent in time and in physical process to the evil one is
irrelevant, because the entire process is indivisible by human choice and hence all aspects
are equally present to the agent as he makes his choice. (A 340)
In other words, it is possible in such cases to choose the preservation of the woman's life, while
accepting the child's death as a regretted side effect, even when what is at issue is the crushing of
the child's head. But this very compact reading of the agent's intentions, for the purposes of the
principle of double effect, supposes a background judgment that leniency on this issue does not
threaten the general principle of respect for life (as would for example approving decapitation as a
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remedy for headache). In short, principles like that of double effect are helps to prudence rather
than substitutes for it, and proportionalist reasoning is involved in the construction of intention and
not in the requirement of proportionate reason alone.
Finnis and Grisez differ in their application of the neo-rigorist to capital punishment. Such
punishment takes the death of an individual as an end in a way (individual or collective) selfdefense and possibly even abortion do not: even on the wildest science-fiction hypothethicals, if
the convicted criminal survives, the execution has failed. Nonetheless, Finnis defends the death
penalty on the grounds that "the defining and essential ... point of punishing is to restore an order of
fairness which was disrupted by the criminal's criminal act" (FE 118). xx The missing premise here
is that the "order of fairness" outweighs this criminal's life in the scales of moral reasoning -- a
contention that looks proportionalist to me. Hence Grisez seems to have the better of the argument
when he expresses the hope that Christian doctrine will develop in such a way as to exclude the
death penalty (WLJ ch. 8, q. H, § 10).
It seems that Finnis and Grisez would be pacifists if they were consistent, on the grounds
that all killing in war intentionally destroys human life. Enemy soldiers as such are surely not
criminals, nor are their deaths a requirement of justice of the sort Finnis invokes. The background
prudential judgments that prevent many people from reaching this conclusion are not necessarily
wrong, but it is hard to see how Finnis and Grisez are entitled to make them.
In any case, applying Grisez and Finnis's principle of respect for human goods requires
proportionalist judgments. Consider for example the prolongation of human life. The more
invasive or expensive a therapy is, the easier it is to justify its omission; the less invasive or
expensive it is the harder it is to do so. For example, the conclusion that we are not engaging in
mercy-killing, but only using good medical judgment, if we decide to omit invasive and expensive
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treatment of a patient suffering from Down's Syndrome, or to give a dying patient normally
unacceptable doses of pain-relievers, involves a background of proportionalist reasoning.
Again: reproduction is a basic good. Suppose that a fertile man with a barren wife finds
himself attracted to a fertile woman. If he reins in his sexual desires because he wants to remain
faithful to his wife, it would seem that he is at least "impeding," if not exactly "damaging" or
"destroying," the basic good of reproduction. Only a sense of the overriding value of marital
fidelity could lead us to say that one is not exactly choosing, in such a case, to impede that good.
But this way of reasoning has an inescapable proportionalist element. To be sure, this particular
problem could be evaded by deleting the word impede from the principle of respect for human
goods, with the result that the principle would permit at least temporary sterilization.
Friendship is also an important human good. Like human lives, friendships are unique and
irreplaceable, so that it is not sufficient to say that someone in a difficult situation can always make
a new friend. But friends, being imperfect, sometimes injure or corrupt one another. xxi It is not
sufficient to dismiss a dangerous friend as no friend at all, or to rely on "love's knowledge" xxii to
avoid the possibilities of exploitation and degradation inherent in human relationships. A person
may decide to break with a friend whose influence he finds corrupting, and a parent may for the
same reason interfere with a child's associations. Such decisions are always painful, but cannot be
excluded by a prohibition against ever acting directly against the good of friendship. Nor can the
system of Finnis and Grisez deal with the conflicts of loyalty to friends or groups of friends
(including national communities) which for many people are the most important source of moral
anguish, and which in the nature of the case cannot be resolved in absolutist terms.
Grisez concedes that virtuous people sometimes make what look like proportionalist
judgments: for example a woman subjected to sexual harassment might reason: "Certainly it was
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bad to be let go, but it would have been a lot worse to behave like a prostitute in order to keep
working there " (FC 64). But he is forced to argue that such proportionalism is somehow spurious.
Politics too makes proportionalist judgment indispensable, even for those with strong
deontological convictions. Suppose we are citizens of the West like Finnis and Grisez who
conclude, at the height of the Cold War, that nuclear deterrence is an immoral strategy (ND). If, as
seems likely, we see no hope of getting our moral judgments accepted as a basis for public policy,
we still have to make prudential decisions about conventional warfare and such things as "Star
Wars." And while political issues present some technical aspects, they also involve decisions (E.g.,
about risk assessment), which cannot be understood either in merely technical terms or by appeal to
the unconditional requirements of human goods.
In arguing for their principle of respect for human goods, both Finnis and Grisez invoke
atrocities defended on proportionalist grounds. Although they hold that proportionalism is
meaningless, they still have a pretty good idea of the sorts of behavior it will be used to justify:
"the Allied terror bombing belatedly condemned by Vatican II, ever more widespread resort to
abortions of convenience, and the killing of defective children" (BE 9) as well as the nuclear
holocaust that has not, yet at least, taken place (A 346).
Even if we grant that proportionalism is the culprit in these cases, this argument proves selfdestructive. For on Finnis and Grisez's showing, proportionalism cannot logically imply approval
of such behavior. And if causal relationships are the issue, then the evil done on proportionalist
grounds needs to be balanced against the good so done -- for example the abandonment of
religiously grounded prohibitions on anesthesia during childbirth. Finnis and Grisez might argue
that any principle even invoked to defend terror bombing or elective abortions is discredited by that
fact alone, but all principles can be, and sometimes are, misapplied. And their argument implies
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that we can never rationally strike a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting a moral principle.
The new rigorists are Catholic moral theologians as well as philosophers. And both Finnis
(BE) and Grisez (THV 7-32) xxiii are on record as calling for solemn ecclesiastical condemnation, of
a sort not customarily invoked in moral matters, of views advocated on proportionalist grounds.
Before taking such advice, the Pope and the bishops are surely required to weigh, not only the truth
of the matter, but also the effect of such condemnations on the well being of the Church. Since
popes and bishops are -- like it or not -- political as well as spiritual figures, any other course would
be irresponsible.
Again, all moralities distinguish between more and less serious offenses. For Finnis and
Grisez, this distinction takes the form of a distinction between mortal and venial sin. To be more
precise, it is the distinction between light and grave matter: the "subjective" requirements of mortal
sin -- sufficient reflection and full consent -- are not presently at issue. I here consider Grisez's
detailed discussion in The Way of the Lord Jesus.
Grisez would make life easier for himself if he subordinated the concept of light matter to
that of sufficient reflection and full consent, and held that minor sins, though they could
conceivably involve a deliberate rejection of God, are relatively unlikely to do so. He attributes
such a view to the theorists of "fundamental option." On this approach, grave matter is the sort of
thing, which is likely to be an occasion for making or reversing one's fundamental option. Actions
not likely to affect one's basic orientation toward or against God are light matter. (WLJ 385). xxiv
Such a view would fit better with his theoretical outlook than the one he adopts, since it reduces his
need to distinguish between graver and lighter offenses in terms of the external damage they do.
(Recall here the otherwise unintelligible contention that contraception is tantamount to homicide.)
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But even on such a view he would need to explain why, on anti-proportionalist premises, genocide
involves greater damage to the good than does adultery or missing Sunday mass (and thus is more
likely to be a mortal sin).
In fact Grisez undertakes to defend a tradition in which the distinction between grave and
light matter is maintained "rigidly" rather than adapted to the vagaries of individual psychology and
cultural formation. But in specifying what this is, he is reduced to appealing to the judgment of the
Church, "which perhaps defies easy articulation" (WLJ 396), but which cannot on his premises be
proportionalist. This judgment is surely not an example of the merely technical commensuration
whose possibility and legitimacy the new rigorists admit.

4.5 Conclusion
Finnis and Grisez are right to warn us of the dangers of proportionalist reasoning in ethics.
It can be, and frequently is, used to rationalize decisions made on other, often highly questionable
grounds. But there are serious objections to attempting to do without proportionalist reasoning
altogether.
If Finnis and Grisez were more consistent, they would depart from Catholic tradition as they
understand it in at least three ways. They wound accept absolute pacifism, since any killing
involves an infringement on the basic good of life. They would adopt a fundamental option view of
moral responsibility, since on their view there is no way of distinguishing graver from lesser
offenses in terms of the gravity of the harm done). They would defend an anti-political (radical
Reformation) view of the Christian community, since Christians on their view cannot make
judgments of political prudence.
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It is easy to draw from their theory further consequence contrary to Catholic tradition, e.g.,
that vows of celibacy, which imply a permanent renunciation of a person's procreative capacities,
are morally wrong. Moreover, Finnis and Grisez's rhetoric of a church in crisis, which supports
their calls for anathemas, is in sharp contrast with their professed willingness to accept bad
consequences, in the hope that God will work things out eventually.
Even the appeal to tradition is questionable on anti-proportionalist grounds, unless one
believes that God has revealed a complete system of casuistry. For unless human beings can learn
from moral experience, there can be no such thing as the wisdom of the ages. While Grisez affirms
the development of moral doctrines (WLJ ch. 36, q. G, §§ 1-5), he cannot admit that this
development can take place by way of either greater insight into the effects of forms of human
behavior (say slavery) or greater insight into the relationships among the goods sought in the forms
of human life (say marriage). Neither will it be possible, on his premises, to fashion fresh moral
doctrines to deal with urgent problems about which absolutes are not available, such as
unemployment or the fouling of the environment.
In short, anti-proportionalists, by reason of their unwillingness to assume a hierarchy of
values at least to some degree independent of choice, are unable to reach the sorts of judgments
required by the tradition with which they are most closely associated, and which its arguments are
designed to support (as well as by any other tradition of which I am aware). On the contrary, I
conclude, proportionalist judgments are both necessary and possible, and for that reason sometimes
legitimate.
But there is no reason to suppose that proportionalist judgments are always possible, let
alone always legitimate, and considerable reason to suppose that they are sometimes barred. For
they frequently baffle our understanding, and are frequently used to justify atrocities. We require
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prudence (in the Aristotelian sense of virtue using its head) in order to know when to take a firm
stand for a moral principle, and when to make a more accommodating situational judgment. But
prudential judgment is difficult both to practice and to understand. xxv
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5
PRUDENCE
In all moral systems, rules and principles sometimes fail to give us the guidance we need.
And the problem of reaching reasonable judgments where rules and principles are insufficient
arises, not only in morality, but also in the philosophy of science, in critical theory, and in the
attempt to deal intellectually with the relationship between rival cultures. i The sort of judgment
then required has gone by various names. One such word is discernment, but its aesthetic and
theological overtones are best avoided at this stage of the argument. Prudence is better but requires
some elucidation.
For mainstream English speaking philosophy understands prudence as that virtue concerned
with promoting one's own interests, ii or even as one self-regarding virtue among others (distinct,
for example, from courage). iii But prudence in the proper moral sense takes into account the
interests of other persons, at least insofar as virtue requires attending to them in our decisions. And
one requirement for an adequate account of prudential reasoning is to avoid (or at least minimize)
the quantitative language that bedevils prudential reasoning.

5.1 Understanding Prudence
Our first task must be to understand, as adequately as possible, the prudential judgments human
beings make. I begin with some examples, and then examine the contribution of Aristotle and his
followers.
5.1.01 Some Examples
1. The following sort of thing might have happened at Oxford between the two World Wars.
A frustrated and lonely man, call him "Joseph," discovers that a younger friend, call him

"Kevin," desires him sexually. Joseph feels a conventional repugnance to homosexual
practices -- a repugnance that includes elements of fascination -- whose moral standing and
whose motivational force for Joseph are so far untested. He is unwilling, despite the
conflicts which Kevin's advances trigger in him, to sacrifice a friendship to which he
accords great value. Joseph recalls the ideal of Platonic love, and casts himself in the role
of Socrates and Kevin in the role of Alcibiades or Phaedrus, a role which, let us suppose,
Kevin is willing to accept. Thus Joseph preserves a valuable friendship while avoiding a
more passionate relationship that might well (although we cannot be sure of such things)
have ended in mutual hatred. His decision is not merely to observe the Law of Moses, but
to take his situation as an opportunity to realize a good not otherwise attainable.
2. A Scriptural text of persistent interest to philosophers is the prophet Nathan's rebuke to
King David for his adultery with Bathsheba and his murder, under cover of battle, of her
husband Uriah the Hittite (II Samuel 12). Nathan does not charge David with violations of
the Ten Commandments; rather he tells him a story of the theft of a ewe lamb, and thus
secures David's repentance. As an example of the principle, Treat like cases alike, this is
rather poor. Wives unlike ewe lambs have developed preferences of their own; moreover
no one in the ewe lamb story claimed the privileges of royalty. On the other hand, the ewe
lamb story did not involve murder. What Nathan did was to get David to see his behavior
as the gratification of passion at another's cost. Nathan did not show any special insight in
condemning David's behavior -- about that there was really no question. Rather he showed
prudence in the always-hazardous task of reproaching the powerful.
3. The evaluation of rival candidates for an academic position involves incommensurable and
overlapping considerations: scholarship, teaching, and a candidate's "fit" with a particular
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department and institution -- even apart from more controversial issues such as those
involved in affirmative action. It is also necessary to interpret ambiguous information, for
example a letter of reference, which describes a candidate as "excitable." Somehow a
committee (and each member of it) must bring all these considerations together into an
intuitive judgment that some particular man or woman is the right one for the job.
4. Artists sometimes request public support for works offensive to the moral or religious
sensibilities of many of their fellow-citizens. On the one hand, art is good, and requires
liberty: many great works have offended the more prudish of the artists' contemporaries.
And artistic experience should not be the monopoly of the wealthy and their protégés. On
other hand, it is not acceptable to ask citizens to be indifferent to the way their tax dollars
are spent, or to demand that hard-pressed working people subsidize crude assaults on what
they hold most dear. (Imagine a publicly supported festival of anti-Semitic art, uncritically
presented, or the use of public money to support a vacation in Tahiti or a meal at an
expensive restaurant, presented as a form of "concept art.") The needed aesthetic judgments
inevitably have moral and even political overtones; apolitical aestheticism is among other
things a political ideology, designed in part to protect existing institutions against some
forms of criticism. The attempt to resolve the problem by ceasing public support for the
arts threatens all governmental support for high culture, even public libraries, leaving
television in undisputed possession of our common culture. What we need are arts
administrators with a firm sense of the difference between art and trash (tacky lawn art for
example), which should not receive public money even if it offends no one. They also
require a sense of a difference between what a society tolerates and what it encourages and
supports; not everything that ought not to be made a crime deserves to be celebrated as
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good. Such administrators will be able to distinguish challenging and even disturbing art
from mere crudity, and to judge when a controversial work is good enough to risk public
outcry.
5.1.02 Aristotle
`

The Aristotelian tradition insists that prudence is not a morally neutral quality, that the

practical wisdom of the virtuous is different from the craftiness of the wicked. At the same time,
Aristotle iv thinks of prudence as pre-eminently the political virtue -- what we expect, but do not
always get, from our leaders, even if we are out of sympathy with them ideologically. v But this sort
of virtue is consistent with even the wicked projects; Hitler would have been more prudent to
postpone (or abandon altogether) his invasion of Russia, and to content himself with a smaller
empire in which to do his evil deeds.
Aristotle writes that "virtue ... consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is
defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it." vi But
he never sorts out the discernment necessary to deciding, e.g., how to deal with a difficult family
member, from the technical judgments a person must make in carrying out his morally worthy
projects. A physician must use prudence in deciding on a course of treatment even when there is
no question about the wisdom of attempting to prolong the patient's life. But it is characteristic of
personal relations, except of the crudest sort, that their ends are not fixed, so that prudence in such
cases cannot be reduced to means-ends judgment.
Aristotle sometimes describes finding the mean as hitting a target, and remarks that, in
difficult cases, "the decision rests with our (moral) sense" -- a formulation that does not support talk
about calculation. But he elsewhere remarks, "Deliberating and calculating are the same thing."
And St. Thomas Aquinas bafflingly observes: "For though keeping the mean is the aim of moral
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virtue, it is in the correct marshalling of the means to the end [eorum quae sunt ad finem] that the
mean is to be found." vii
The aim of Aristotelian ethics -- a life of active virtue -- is not specifiable independently of
the moral quality of the acts that contribute to it. Hence one way of understanding Aristotle's
conception of prudence is as follows. viii Learning to perform well in a sport or game is partly a
matter of learning principles, but more importantly a matter of constant practice under the tutelage
of an acknowledged master. And since mastery includes knowing when to break the rules as well
as when to adhere to them, prudence so understood can be at the same time conservative and
progressive. Happiness (or more exactly eudemonia) is victory in the game of life, and prudence
tends to bring about victory of this sort (though chance can always interfere).
But applying this conception of prudence runs into two major difficulties. First, in games
and sports, we know when departure from the rules has won; in life there is no criterion, this side of
Jordan, by which such questions can be decided. Nor do we have a shared conception of happiness
by which various strategies of life can be assessed. Second, and connectedly, there is no
agreement about who the masters of the art of living are. The break-up of the polis, the rise of
Christianity, and the development of a post-Christian civilization, have left us with a plurality of
incompatible models, and our continuing disputes about the reputations of the famous and the
infamous testify to our bewilderment on such issues. Even in Athens, whether one accepted
Pericles as a model of prudence might depend on one's political sympathies. ix

5.1.03 Some Modern Writers
Perhaps some more recent writers will prove more useful in helping us reach an
understanding of prudence. We begin with two writers strongly influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas.
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Joseph Pieper identifies prudence with situation conscience: "It includes," he writes, "above all the
ability to be still in order to attain objective perception of reality." x And we may agree that
attentiveness to the situation as it in fact is, and not (for example) as it might please our amour
propre to suppose it to be, is an essential element of sound situational judgment. And attentiveness
to the still, small voice of conscience is part of prudence as many people experience it.
But we still need to know a lot more about how prudence (or situation conscience) works in
practice. Daniel Nelson has recently interpreted St. Thomas's ethics, so as to emphasize the priority
of prudence, especially over natural law as standardly understood. xi If we accept this interpretation,
we must ask how prudence is to be recognized. And the best Nelson is able to say is that
judgments of prudence depend on the common sense of some community. Nonetheless, “The
community can be wrong, and our culture knows of instances in which critics were able to persuade
a community of its corruption ... but in order to make the case the critics have to appeal to publicly
available criteria of judgment.” But this formulation raises the specter of relativism, since different
communities will have different standards, and these differences will persist however much they
reform their practice.
In the "analytic" camp, Martha Nussbaum (following Henry James) proposes a corrective to
the excessive intellectualism of the Aristotelian tradition.
Moral knowledge [she suggests] is not simply an intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not
even intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is a perception [and here she cites Aristotle]. It
is seeing complete, complex reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking
in what is there, with imagination and feeling. xii
Such knowledge includes awareness of the character and motives of all those concerned,
including that of the agent himself (who needs to know what sources of distorted judgment he
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needs to fear). Yet Nussbaum's account is in one sense not rich enough: it excludes the role moral
rules play in the judgments of even the most sensitive agents. She describes a difficult situation in
the relationship between a woman and her father, but their sensitive resolution of this situation
would not have been possible if incest were a possible solution. Concentration on the complex
ways in which the various sides of human life interact in real situations is a valuable exercise, but
carried beyond a certain point it paralyzes moral (and political) judgment.
Thus Hilary Putnam insists against Nussbaum that moral rules must be taken seriously.
They "are important because they are the main mechanism we have for challenging (and if we are
successful, shaping) one another's consciences." xiii He offers two metaphors for what we are to do
when the rules are ambiguous or in conflict: adjudication and reading. Both adjudication and
reading, he argues, are
By [their] nature provisional -- not in the sense that there must be a better perspective, a
"true" reading (or a truer reading) which we will all someday get to if we are lucky, but in
the sense that (for all we know) there may be. Some things which were once problematic
are now issues for condemnation or approbation and not adjudication. Human slavery is no
longer problematic; it is just plain wrong, xiv
Both adjudication and reading get their credibility "from a shared sense of what is and is not
reasonable, from people's loyalties to one another, and a commitment to 'muddling through'
together." xv But the persistence of injustice in our world means that we are unable always to
muddle through in tolerable fashion.
Putnam's examples of rules are the Ten Commandments and the Equal Rights Amendment;
his example of an adjudication or reading the Supreme Court's abortion decision in Roe v. Wade,
and his diagnosis of the impediments to successful "muddling through" a moderate form of Leftism
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critical of both Marxism-Leninism and neoconservatism. In other words, his examples of binding
rules include both an ancient text believed to have come from God and an unsuccessful attempt to
amend the American Constitution, while his example of adjudication is a judicial decision of the
most controversial (not to say explosive) sort. xvi And, in his broader analysis of our woes, Putnam
neglects the fact that we suffer not only from injustice but also from a number of other problems as
well.
These include lack of agreement about what justice requires (or even the creatures to which
it is due), from the absence of what Charles Taylor calls a "moral source" capable of motivating
people to bring about social justice, and from deep disagreements about the broader conceptions of
human nature and flourishing that are needed to support our conceptions of justice and provide
them with their motivating power. Nor is it possible to mend matters by adducing other examples,
or providing a different political analysis: any judgment with substance will be controversial in the
ways Putnam's judgments are.
Stanley Hauerwas adds an important dimension to the discussion of the nature of prudence.
Our moral reasoning [he writes], especially in cases of moral doubt, is not deductive
but analogical. That is to say, we do not find what we ought to do by having an
abstract principle from which can be deduced the "right act." Rather, what we do
when we engage in moral reasoning is, by comparing cases, to find out what is
common to the situations. ... In this sense moral reason is more dependent on
imagination than strict logical entailment. xvii
On such a view, moral notions such as murder, theft, and adultery define classes of
relevantly similar acts: they "are concepts that help us define areas of significance for our life
together." xviii Thus moral discernment consists in the ability to discover, for example, whether the
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analogies between abortion and infanticide are more important than the differences between them;
or whether discrimination against white males is essentially the same as, or importantly different
from, discrimination against women and black people.
Our judgment calls in these and other cases are affected by our background picture of self,
society, and world. Hence Hauerwas also writes:
Universal ethical principles become ethically significant only as we learn their meaning in
stories. ... Modern moral philosophers have failed to understand that moral behavior is an
affair not primarily of choice but of vision. xix
Thus our entire sensibility is thus at work in a judgment call.
Let us remember that judgment calls involve the interpretation of a cultural tradition, and its
application to complex situations. We then can see that Putnam has very well expressed the reason
for the phenomenon described by Hauerwas:
Not only is interpretation a highly informal activity, guided by few, if any, settled rules or
methods, but it is one that involves much more than linear propositional reasoning. It
involves our imagination, our feelings -- in short our full sensibility. xx
Our sensibility is formed, in significant part, by the social world in which we live. And the
interpretation of situations is an essential element of prudential judgment. Hence Hauerwas's ethics
requires a homogeneous community to sustain its judgments. xxi
A sentence by David Wiggins makes clear the central issue. "The man of highest practical
reason," he writes, "is the man who brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely
pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the
deliberative context." xxii But if anyone tried to take into account every possible consideration, or
even any consideration someone might think relevant, before making a judgment, the result would
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be paralysis. Emphasis must therefore fall on the expressions genuinely pertinent and genuinely
relevant.
We have some fairly clear notions of what is relevant to moral decisions in particular cases - for example, that a consideration of the abortion issue that ignores the facts of embryology is
inadequate. But it is in general a matter of prudence to decide what sorts of fact need to be taken
into account in making moral and practical judgments. Everything depends on how we represent a
situation to ourselves: what aspects of it we deem of crucial relevance and what aspects of it we
deem peripheral or irrelevant.
In fact, prudence, particularly in decision making on behalf of some community, places
limits on the questions of fact a decision maker investigates, excluding material of borderline
relevance that might raise irrelevant emotions. For example, if two of my colleagues have a longstanding quarrel, of whose origins I am ignorant, I might deliberately choose not to investigate
them, on the grounds that knowledge of it could only create confusion.

5.1.04 A Synthesis
We all make prudential judgments in our personal, professional, and civic lives. And
though judgment calls may be difficult to make and evaluate, it is easy to discern imprudence or
want of judgment, at least in others. In the same way, though it may be hard to discover the
Aristotelian mean, it is easy to identify people who habitually run to extremes.
Every attempt to give such a general account of how prudence works has failed, and the nature of
the prudential task does not encourage theoretical optimism. Mere abstract reasoning will never
grasp the complexity of lived experience, whereas immersion in the present moment in all its
concreteness fails to guide action; somehow these heterogeneous sorts of reasoning need to be
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combined. On the other hand, we need to avoid the sort of prudential nihilism suggested by many
critics of the rationalist tradition, which celebrates the unpredictability of human events and the
quasi-mystical perceptions of some political actors, and reduces the concept of good political
judgment to the capacity to persuade others by fair means or foul. xxiii
Prudential judgment does not centrally address the question, "Is act A right or wrong?" It deals
with the open-ended question, "What is to be done?" as well as, though less centrally, with the
question "How shall I respond to what Jones has done (or is doing)?" It constructs an imaginative
representation of the situation -- or in cases like Nathan's of the act to be evaluated -- which so
arranges its features that the proper course to follow (or the proper judgment) becomes apparent -or so one hopes. No subjectivism is implied here: the features of the situation to which the prudent
appeal, and quite possibly the order they discern in them, exist in the world before they make their
judgments. Still, considerable activity of mind is involved; in this respect prudence is to be
contrasted with intuition, conceived of as "gut" feeling reflecting the agent's cultural background.
Lastly, prudence involves trained attentiveness, of the sort needed by an artist or writer who needs
to know when his work is finished.
A certain effort at detachment is involved in prudential judgments. They nonetheless
engage the whole personality. Thus one of the most difficult problems for prudential judgment is
balancing the detachment characteristic of moral judgment with the identification with a given
community our dependence on a moral tradition implies. xxiv Prudence is, in any event, as far as
possible removed from decisions "under the veil of ignorance" in the manner suggested by Rawls.
But the considered judgments he takes as data will require prudence; otherwise we would never
know when we had moved sufficiently beyond off-the-cuff responses.
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Prudence is associated with conservatism in the sense of risk avoidance, though not
necessarily with conservatism as a political philosophy. It involves as awareness that we live in a
world we only imperfectly understand, and that our actions may set in motion trains of
consequences that we cannot control, and which we may well come to regret. But prudence
sometimes requires boldness -- on what occasions is itself a matter for prudential judgment.
Prudence replaces "probabilism," and every other attempt to provide general rules for dealing with
moral uncertainty.
Among the other virtues that tend to prudence, the most important are those, such as
patience, necessary to the maintenance of a marriage or other long-term commitments. The reason
is that such commitments require one to attend to the less obvious consequences (and more broadly
the less obvious aspects) of one's actions, and that this sort of awareness is an important element of
prudence.
We are in possession of rules and principles of varying degrees of stringency, including
what can be described as "rules of prudence." An example of this sort of principle is Do not go to
the limits of the permissible except for compelling reasons. But it is also part of prudence to know
when to go to the limit, just as it is part of prudence to know when it is necessary to undergo
martyrdom. In any event, such principles are not substitutes for prudence; they help the already
prudent person to decide what is to be done.
Prudence is directed to a comprehensive good, i.e., the flourishing of human beings in a
good society. This good permeates the means a prudent person chooses to attain it: it is for
example incoherent to suppose that one can build a just society by massively unjust means.
Prudence compares and mixes goods in a way that respects their diverse and partly
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incommensurable character, without freezing us into an impracticable rigorism. xxv Yet there are
reasons for dissatisfaction with this result. Wiggins has observed:
I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who feel that they must seek more than all this
provides want a scientific theory of rationality, not so much from a passion for science,
even when their can be no science, but because they hope and desire, by some conceptual
alchemy, to turn such a discipline into a regulative or normative discipline, or into a system
of rules by which to spare themselves some of the agony of thinking and all the torment of
feeling and understanding that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation. xxvi
But this suspicion is not just unfriendly, but also a bit unfair. For prudent moral agents are
well aware of their need for rules and principles, lest their actions be altogether chaotic or
opportunistic. And practical wisdom includes an awareness of one's own failings, including one's
disposition to rationalize misbehavior. Hence prudence can lead, not just to modifications of
received moral rules, but also to support for moral rules of a strict (and possibly even absolute) sort.
5.1.05. The Limits of Prudence
In a heterogeneous moral tradition, some persons -- and some aspects of each person -- will
stress one aspect of our shared moral ideas at the expense of others. Once admitted as legitimate,
prudence tends to claim for itself a hegemonic role. And, as Paul Ramsey has put it,
"proportionality's 'constitutional monarchy' within the kingdom of morality threatens to become a
despotism." xxvii But there can be no question of regarding prudence as the sole or sovereign
method of moral judgment, to the exclusion of moral rules and principles.
First, it is not possible to be "finely aware and richly responsible" towards all the features of a
situation every time one makes a decision; the method must be reserved for situations perceived on
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independent grounds as difficult. And prudential judgment is impossible unless some proposed
solutions are antecedently excluded.
Second, it is possible to offer a prudential argument against always expecting a firm
prudential judgment. A way of conceiving the situation that supplies a wholly satisfactory
resolution of a problem may not always be available. Sometimes we must slog along, observing
some moral constraints at least, without being entirely resolved or at peace.
Third, the representations of situations employed in prudential judgment include both not
only personal but also historical and even world-historical narratives. In the writings of John
Noonan, xxviii for example, it looks as if in order to make up one's mind about some moral issue, it is
necessary to know the whole history of the human race, both as it concerns the form of activity in
question, and as it concerns allied issues in, for example, theology. Thus his exploration of bribery
quickly entangles him in the complexities of the theological doctrines of grace and redemption. xxix
All our narratives are highly contested, the world-historical one most visibly so: where some see
progress, others see decadence. Hence there is no reason to suppose that people who attempt
prudential judgments will reach compatible results, especially in an age where the privilege of
strategic moral judgment is no longer reversed to a select few.
Fourth, there are incommensurable considerations that resist even trained moral judgment.
One of these is between death, thought of as the annihilation of the self, and continued life however
miserable. (Death thought of as the door to eternal bliss or woe is also incommensurable with
earthly life, though in a different way.) To speak of "incommensurable considerations" here is
dangerous, since we are dealing, not only with a difficulty in measurement, but with an obstacle to
the imagination that inhibits moral reflection of all sorts. xxx The obstacle can be evaded only by
treating death, not as the fate of a unique individual, but entirely from a third-person perspective --
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in Kierkegaard's language as "something in general"; xxxi or, in technical philosophical contexts, a
comparison among possible worlds. xxxii
Fifth, we must be concerned with the question, how prudential judgment is to be
distinguished from rationalizing what one wants to do. This concern is particularly acute in public
contexts, where necessity has always been the tyrant's plea. Sometimes the exclusion of
proportionalism rests on a deeper proportionalist judgment, that the risks of proportionalism in this
context exceed its benefits. xxxiii But it is not necessary, and quite possibly dangerous, to conclude
that judgments of proportion, rather than the unconditional demands of certain human goods,
support all our moral judgments at the deepest level.
Sixth, we must examine the question, to what extent judgments of prudence can be restated
in straightforward inferential terms. We may take it for granted that, at the time of decision,
prudential judgment goes beyond what can be argued for. But the possibility remains of rationally
reconstructing prudential decisions as applications of some principle; for example, Choose that
action which is most coherent with one's commitments, or those of the group for which one is
acting. As Peter J. Steinberger has put it, "Intelligent performance is at least prospectively
propositional." xxxiv
The principle of coherence is not an exception to the opacity of prudence. It seems to us
self-evident, in retrospect, that abolishing slavery was the right way to establish (relative)
coherence in the laws and customs of Jacksonian America. But, at the time, the way forward was
not so clear: defenders of slavery argued for a rejection of the individualist premises of the
Declaration of Independence, for the exclusion of black people from their scope, or for the
recognition of two different national communities embodying differing understandings of justice.
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Our own judgments on this matter inevitably reflect a decision already made, and sealed by a
bloody civil war.
This argument has implications for Steinberger's attempted resolution of the dispute
between Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer xxxv concerning the role of "prejudice" in
interpretation. Prejudice is not here derogatory: some prejudices are confirmed rather than rejected
upon reflection.
Gadamer maintains that it is impossible to get beyond prejudice (though our prejudices can
and do change); Habermas responds that a once we are aware of a prejudice we are also
aware of the possibility of thinking outside it. Steinberger attempts to split the difference,
concluding that

Prejudices are typically in the background and are invoked

intuitively, immediately, and unreflectively [in judgment]. But ... prejudices can be most
certainly can be uncovered and subjected to a systematic analysis, and it seems impossible
to deny that this kind of analysis dramatically alters their status. ... What was merely an
implicit knowing that becomes explicit and ... is suddenly eligible for evaluation and
revision. [Yet] any such analysis will itself depend on further prejudices. xxxvi
«This last sentence, however, gives the point to Gadamer, at least once he admits that prejudices
can and do change, and that what once was prejudice can be rejected or turned into a considered
judgment. xxxvii For at crucial points the issue will not be, how good an agent's articulate reasons
are, but whether he has the ability to make the required sort of judgment.

5.2 Back to Moral Absolutes
We now need to consider and examine a principle that lies in the background of much
philosophical discussion of morals. It may be called the Discontinuity Thesis -- that there is a sharp
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break between moral and "merely prudential" decisions. We may grant that the decision whether to
take one's own life or that of another is graver than a choice between vanilla and chocolate ice
cream, but this remark does not yet amount to sharp moral/prudential distinction.
Kant divides the field of decisions between questions of duty and other questions that have merely
to do with the choice of appropriate means to one's ends. There is no such distinction in Aristotle:
his table of the virtues includes those qualities conducive to giving a good party and to being an
entertaining companion xxxviii alongside those which a modern reader is likely to regard as moral
virtues. In a Kantian mood, one might be tempted to identify the moral with those decisions to
which prudential reasoning is inappropriate. But this way of drawing the distinction will not work.
A survey of examples of prudence, including the question of how a conscientious official should
resolve a controversial issue, produces many issues that at least feel moral.
Stuart Hampshire defines the sphere of the moral as follows:
Morality ... might be defined by reference to its central topics, and not by the alleged logical
peculiarities of moral judgments. ... It is a system of prohibitions and injunctions concerning
justice in social relations, the control of violence, about war and peace, the regulation of
kinship, the customs of friendship and family. xxxix
If we accept this definition, we will find prudential judgments everywhere within the moral realm.
I conclude that, while some decisions are worth more agony than are others, the Discontinuity
Thesis cannot be sustained.
The picture of moral reasoning that arises from the discussion so far is as follows.
Sometimes proportionalist, even consequentialist, reasoning is appropriate. Sometimes, however,
such reasoning is dangerous to essential features of a good human life. Moralists need to learn to
respect the differing qualities of the moral terrain, as agriculturists need to learn to respect the
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differing qualities of the soil, some parts of which are in greater need than others of what Wendell
Berry calls "kindly use."
It is the task of prudence to mediate incommensurables. In the simplest cases, we need to
decide between incommensurable goods; in more complex cases we are deciding between radically
differing ways of understanding the same the same situation: whether adultery, for example, is to
be understood as an adventure or a breach of a sacred obligation. The best we can do is to make the
needed judgments, without hoping to understand them very well.
Nonetheless, the complexity of human situations does not require situationism, but implies a
need for moral rules. Odysseus, when he wanted to hear the Sirens, had himself bound so as to be
unable to follow their voices to his doom; in the same way a husband or wife may accept a moral
rule prohibiting adultery for the sake of a successful marriage. And some of these moral rules may
even be absolute. But what moral rules we accept, whether any of them are absolute, and if so
which, are matters of prudential judgment and as such opaque to philosophical understanding.
We can, however, still make the judgment that our society is now insufficiently sensitive to
the rough texture of the terrain of value, and tends to reduce all considerations to pleasure and pain
(or to dollars and cents). Hence it may be the case that, under some circumstances, the best we can
do is follow received moral rules and not trouble ourselves about outcomes overall. The place of
moral absolutes in this picture will be our next question for consideration.
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6
ABSOLUTES
Any discussion of the question of moral absolutes must meet some formidable tests. As
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., has put it, "One is asked to be both theoretically consistent and
practically sensitive to the complexity and intransigence of reality -- in other words to plug all the
loopholes in a prudent and persuasive way." i I begin by attempting to define clearly what a moral
absolute would be, then assess both the case against such absolutes and the case for them.
6.1. Doing Evil to Achieve Good
The traditional phrase never do evil that good may come suffers from many ambiguities.
The first of these is whether the phrase "that good may come" is redundant: if, as the scholastic
tradition tells us, everything we choose we choose sub ratione boni, then there is no other way of
doing evil. Fr. McCormick denies the scholastic doctrine, and holds that "even a disvalue which
has no necessary causal relation to the good can be, perversely indeed, desired." ii My students
agree with McCormick: they believe in the possibility of unmotivated malice. It still seems to me,
however, that the traditional doctrine is sound, so long as one pays sufficient attention to the range
of goods that motivate choice (though the question is admittedly a close one).
In cases of seemingly pointless wrongdoing -- say the young St. Augustine's theft of
inedible pears -- the agent is moved by a desire to assert his independence, to establish a sphere
where he and no one else makes the rules. Within limits -- say in dealing with a domineering
parent -- this motive is even legitimate, though its excess is demonic pride. For a person can also
be deficient in self-assertion, as are those who submit to authorities so completely as to do evil at
their behest. And malignant envy, of the sort felt by Melville's Claggart for Billy Budd, arises out
of a warped respect for virtue and a warped regret that one falls short of its requirements (as well as

a warped admiration for Billy's other admirable qualities). In simple terms, Billy's beauty and
virtue make Claggart feel ugly and evil, and for that reason Claggart tries to release the tension by
destroying Billy. iii
One interpretation of the phrase never do evil (that good may come) is that one ought never
to do (what one oneself regards) iv as moral evil, to achieve any end whatever; or in short:
(W) In no circumstances must one do wrong. v
The denial of W is incoherent; as Thomas Nagel has put it,
The notion that one might sacrifice one's moral integrity justifiably, in the service of a
sufficiently worthy end, is an incoherent notion. For if one were justified in making such a
sacrifice (or even morally required to make it), then one would not be sacrificing one's
moral integrity by adopting that course; one would be preserving it. vi
St. Paul, when he counseled against doing evil that good might come of it, was centrally
interested in the sacrifice of one's moral integrity for the sake of spiritual benefit: sinning more that
grace might abound (see Romans 6:1). (Another version of the same idea is doing evil in order to
release one's creative powers.) Though a repentant sinner might rejoice, after the fact, in sins that
brought him grace, to advance this justification before the fact is to affirm that the same act both is
and is not a sin. W does nothing, however, to tell us what acts are right and what wrong.
But is it not possible to violate one's moral integrity by undertaking to deceive oneself about
what is right and wrong? The most common way of doing this, engaging in habitual wrongdoing,
directly violates `. Those who undertake courses of indoctrination, or habitually lie about moral
issues in hopes of persuading themselves, treat their future selves as persons other than themselves.
Their conduct thus falls under the principle to be discussed next.
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When one is dealing with other people's moral integrity, some distinctions have to be
drawn. If it is wrong to do an act, it is wrong to intend that another do that act on one's behalf. If it
is wrong for me to kill a colleague, it is also wrong for me to put out a contract on him. Hence -- so
long as my agent and I are in agreement on the pertinent moral question -- the question of one's
own integrity and that of others turns out to be the same.
If my agent and I differ in moral judgments, two cases need to be distinguished. I may
believe the act in question is wrong, while my agent has no scruples about doing it. (I employ a
hired killer for whom business is business trumps even the rule against murder.) In that case I
remain guilty of murder, but at least I have not corrupted anyone. In the other case, I believe the
act in question innocent or obligatory, but my agent regards it as wrong. A doctor, let us say,
strongly urges a Jehovah's Witness to have a blood transfusion to save his life, or even invokes
coercive means to get him to do so, while the Jehovah's Witness believes that receiving such a
transfusion is a major sin. The doctor may (1) hope to persuade his patient that his religion is, at
least in this respect, unreasonable, and so to consent in good faith to the transfusion. Or he may (2)
hope that, by being pressured into violating his convictions -- and perhaps by being convinced that,
if his religion were true, there would be no hope for his salvation -- the patient would be led to
renounce the Jehovah's Witness faith in favor of, say, liberal Protestantism. Or he might (3) be
indifferent to the effect of his behavior on the patient's soul, so long as he manages to do the
transfusion. Finally, he (4) may believe that the strength and sincerity of the patient's opposition to
blood transfusions may legitimately be tested, so that if it turns out to be merely conventional he
will be able to save the patient's life, while if it is sincerely held he will admire him for his integrity
while watching him die.
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The doctor's behavior in case 4 is easiest to defend: there need be, on his part, no intention
that the patient act against his own convictions. Case 1 is somewhat harder: since persuasion in
religious matters is notoriously difficult, it merges into the other and more difficult cases. Case 3 is
harder still: indifference to the patient as a moral being, and concern for him only as a diseased
body, is one of the banes of contemporary medicine. Hardest of all to defend is case 2: playing
with another soul in this fashion shows many of the marks of satanic evil.
In any event, we have a principle, which can demand acceptance as absolute if such things are
possible:
(S) It is always wrong to intend that a person do what he himself regards as wrong
The violation of this principle is called scandal; it reflects the fact that a person's moral integrity is
a good of a different order than the other goods he may also pursue.
We must distinguish scandal in sense of S, however, from the sort of scandal that involves
doing an action with morally corrupting effects. One possible example of scandal in the second
sense is proudly telling people about actions of one's own that they regard as wrong; another is
saying "Follow your conscience" under circumstances when this remark is likely to be taken as an
endorsement of moral subjectivism. vii
In such cases, however, the danger of scandal must be weighed against other possible bad
effects, including other sorts of scandal. To take the case of the moral adviser: the inquirer may
have a genuinely confused conscience, without being in a position to accept what his moral guide
believes to be the correct moral view. Or he may be driven away from observance of all the
requirements of morality by his guide's insistence on a view that he cannot articulate in a way
satisfying to the inquirer's intelligence. (John Mahoney calls this last possibility "scandal of the
strong.") viii
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But it would be rash to conclude that, by formulating the principle forbidding scandal, we
have completed, even provisionally, our search for moral absolutes. For the concept of scandal
presupposes a body of standards other than the principle itself; it belongs among what Alan
Donagan has called the "second order precepts" of morality. ix If we hold a view of morality
according to which exceptionless first-order principles are impossible in principle, then at some
point we will be reluctant to attribute such principles to others. For if we regard an alleged moral
conviction as unreasonable beyond a certain point, we may regard it, instead, as an emotional
aversion or social prejudice. x In order to gain the respect of others, a scruple of conscience need not
be exceptionless, at least not in the simplest possible way. xi A conscientious objector to a particular
war may accept wars in defense of the homeland, or pre-modern wars, or wars directly commanded
by God, or wars that meet the stringent tests of a just-war theory, or possibly even wars he deems
progressive. But if a person's judgment of conscience is responsive to any changes in circumstance
however small, we cannot expect those who have the power to change the circumstances of his
choice to have much respect for scruples that stand in the way of what they regard as politically or
even morally imperative projects.
We have so far been able to make some sense of the maxim, Do not do evil that good may
come. But it is absurd to refuse ever to do evil to achieve good, if doing evil means doing an act
with some bad aspect or consequence. For there are many circumstances in which whatever we do
is bad in some respect, if only by causing some people emotional pain or defeating their legitimate
expectations.
In order to gain further precision on this issue, let us consider the following sentence from
Pope Paul VI's controversial encyclical on contraception.

The Search for Moral Absolutes

115

Philip E. Devine

(V) It is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it -- in
other words, to intend directly something which by its very nature contradicts the moral
order. xii
Let us especially consider the phrases something which by its very nature contradicts the
moral order and to intend directly. If by "something which by its very nature contradicts the moral
order" is meant moral evil, we have here W or S -- principles that yield no specific results about
contraception or any other first order moral issue. If it means something non-morally bad in itself,
for example a disease, two difficulties arise. First, it is sometimes right to infect a person with a
mild case of a disease in order to prevent a severer one later on (the process is called inoculation).
Second, it is not a bad thing that a couple should have intercourse without procreating, that a
woman should be temporarily sterile, or that a spermatozoon should be ejaculated without
fertilizing an ovum. This last event takes place massively even in fertile intercourse.
Nor is it clear what it is to "directly intend something." Do homosexuals directly intend the
sterility of their relations? Do those who practice artificial insemination by husband, or versions of
in vitro fertilization employing the husband's semen, take as the object of their intentions something
different from married people desiring offspring who have intercourse with the specific intention of
producing an heir? What do those who practice Natural Family Planning intend directly, if not to
enjoy the other goods of sexual intercourse without producing offspring? xiii There are cases where
we cannot answer the questions of intention, and of the moral acceptability of what is intended,
except by way of a moral judgment on the form of activity in question. In the cases where an
independent moral judgment is required to apply V, it is not functioning as a moral criterion, but as
a way of expressing a conclusory moral judgment xiv
6.2. The Search for Moral Absolutes Continued
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Let us therefore begin afresh. To say that a norm is a moral absolute is to say, in part, that it
is never permissible to breach it, no matter what the circumstances. But not every norm that meets
this requirement counts as a moral absolute in the relevant sense.
For consider the following principles:«
(D) One ought always do one's duty.
(F) One ought never to engage in sexual immorality (in one sense of that word, fornication).
(L) One ought never to engage in wrongful deceit (in one sense of that word, lying). xv
(M) One ought never to engage in wrongful killing (in one sense of that word, murder). xvi
There are ways of reading these standards that give them some content. Thus duty in D can
be read in the sense of "my station and its duties," and immorality in F in the sense of breach of
conventional moral standards. But, taken in their most straightforward sense, these standards tell
us nothing about, for example, which sorts of deceit are morally acceptable and which not. At most
they point out zones in which transgression is likely and dangerous.
Consider, second, the moral axioms discussed in chapter 3, for example:
(A1) One ought always do good and avoid evil.
These axioms can be specified further, without gaining significant content; for example:
(A1m) In medical practice, do good and avoid evil.
If these axioms are true, one ought never to break them. And they are not completely
trivial, since they at least make some moral arguments easier and others more difficult. A1, for
example, directs our attention toward non-moral goods to be promoted, preserved, or respected in
our actions, and away from an ethics of duty for duty's sake. But the sorts of absolutes with which
moralists are concerned give far more guidance in decision making than, on the most optimistic
assumptions, a moral axiom can do.
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A more difficult case is:
(P) It is wrong to inflict serious pain just for one's own or another's pleasure.
P seems to be both true and exceptionless, but does not satisfy the demand for moral absolutes. It
fails to do so, I think, because there is no so such thing as doing something merely for pleasure:
there is always something else that pleases one in one's action, for example emotional release or the
exercise of power. And the desire to please another involves either the expression of love (at least
in the sense of affection) or some ulterior end, such as placating someone in power.
Also tricky is the following:
(H) One ought never act out of hatred for a person. xvii
In order to make this example plausible, it needs to be read as:
(H*) One ought never to act only out of hatred for a person.
For it may be morally necessary to kill or otherwise injure someone. And, in doing so, some
feeling of hatred may be inevitable. In that case hatred is regrettable, but not, if involuntary,
morally wrong. (A harder case is where hatred is deliberately stirred up, say in soldiers before a
battle.) But H* implies that one has no sufficient reason, other than hatred, for injuring (or
attempting to injure) a person. It is thus only apparently a moral absolute.
Another tricky case is:
(K) It is wrong to kill your boss because he has refused you a promotion, where you have
been working at your job with reasonable but not extraordinary diligence for less then three
years and need the money to buy a second yacht, where neither you nor your boss are
members of caste in which killings of honor are an accepted custom ... (and so on for a
complete description of the action in question).

The Search for Moral Absolutes

118

Philip E. Devine

Such statements, if true, have no exceptions. Nor do the descriptions they include contain an
adverse moral judgment by way of logical implication. Nor do they restate moral axioms. Yet they
do not count as moral absolutes in the needed sense, since they do not enable one to conclude that
an act is wrong independently of a complete evaluation of the situation.
There are also moral standards that are in no sense absolute, but nonetheless give real
guidance. An example is:
(B) Gratitude is due to benefactors.
Another is:
(O) In an imperfectly just society, xviii do not violate the civil law.
Both of these principles are guides to virtuous conduct, though neither plausibly holds no matter
what.
Many moralists have asserted the following non-trivial principle as absolute:
(A) One ought never to commit adultery.
Many people who hold A also hold, independently or as an instance of it:
(F*) One ought never have sexual intercourse outside marriage -- what is in the other
principal sense called "fornication."
But in my discussion of adultery I shall leave open the question both of the truth of F*, and whether
A includes or entails it.
Consider now the following cases:
(C1) Abraham lives in a society in which it is customary for a man to have more than one
wife. He marries Sarah, and when she proves barren, Hagar.
(C2) Bertha lives in a society in which it is customary for a woman to have more than one
husband. She marries Sam, and when he grows old, Henry.
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(C3) Charles lives in a society in which marriage is monogamous, but in which men who
are faithful to their wives (but not women who are faithful to their husbands) are looked
down upon, even by their wives, as insufficiently macho. He marries Mary, and has affairs
with Jane and Jill.
(C4) Deborah lives in a society in which marriage is monogamous but in which both
married men and married women who fail to have extra-marital affairs are looked down
upon, even by their spouses, as prudes. She marries Martin, and has affairs with John and
Philip.
(C5) Edward and Frieda live in a society in which serial polygamy is customary; in which
marriage, though exclusive, is understood by all concerned to be dissoluble. They get
married, and thereafter abstain from sexual relations with others. But, after their marriage
breaks down and they are legally divorced, Edward marries Linda, and Frieda Carlos.
(C6) In the same society, George and Hilde get married and then divorced, after which they
marry Susan and John. But they have sexual relations with their new partners before their
divorce papers are final.
(C7) Isaac and Justine are living together in an informal relationship, understood by both of
them to be exclusive so long as it lasts. But Isaac has an affair with Roberta, which he
conceals from Justine just as an erring conventional husband would do.
(C8) Karl and Leonard are also living in such a relationship -- homosexual marriages not
being legally recognized in their society. Karl has an affair with Joseph, concealing his
affair, as would a conventional erring husband.
(C9) Martina and Nancy likewise have a homosexual "marriage." But Martina has a covert
affair with Kingsley, whom she subsequently marries.
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(C10) Oliver and Paula are Roman Catholics, and understand their marriage as indissoluble.
But Oliver leaves both the Church and Paula, and marries Dorothy in a civil or Protestant
ceremony. Until his marriage to Paula, Dorothy regards Oliver as still her husband, but
afterwards feels free to marry William (and does so).
(C11) Quentin and Roberta are also Catholics. After their marriage fails, Quentin
dishonestly obtains an annulment and remarries Lucy in the Church. Roberta then marries
Richard.
(C12) Steven and Theresa are divorced and Theresa marries Jonathan. During her
marriage to Jonathan, Theresa has an affair with Steven. xix
There are more questions one can ask about such cases than "are these acts right or wrong?"
What I am concerned with here is whether the behavior of Abraham and the others constitutes
adultery. In giving our answer to this question, we must also ask to what extent our
characterization of an act as adulterous, if we in fact so characterize it, is a result of a prior
judgment that it is reprehensible -- or, rather, that it is reprehensible in the way adultery is thought
to be by those who hold A.
There is a lurking ambiguity here. If an act is reprehensible in precisely the way, and
precisely for the reasons, adultery is, it is a case of adultery. Still, there is a difference between
saying action-kind X is wrong for the same sort of reasons as action-kind Y, and saying, straight
out, that X is a subset of Y. There are forms of betrayal, which are wrong for some of the reasons
adultery is, without being themselves adulterous. But to the extent that the judgment "Abraham is
(or is not) guilty of adultery" rests on an independent judgment of his act, A has become a spurious
moral absolute, to be spelled out perhaps as follows:
(A*) One ought never, by one's sexual conduct, breach the obligations of (true) marriage.
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Thus Finnis moves too quickly when he writes: "where, as in most cases of adultery, there
is no doubt that the one party, if married, is not married to the other, then the Lord's precept applies
exceptionlessly, whatever the other circumstances." xx For if he were casuistically minded, D.H.
Lawrence could have argued that Mellors and Lady Chatterley were not adulterers. For Sir
Clifford's failure to relate his will appropriately to the goods at stake in marriage, he might have
argued, invalidated his supposed marriage to Lady Chatterley, whereas she and Mellors (at least
relatively speaking) related their wills to these goods in an appropriate way. xxi And a couple one or
both of whom has a divorced spouse still living can have intentions that are in the fullest sense
marital, e.g., to procreate and rear a child as an expression of their mutual love.
The question whether a person relates his will appropriately to the human good, and
whether his conduct is morally appropriate, cannot be distinguished in practice. If I am right in this
assertion, then Finnis has turned A into the following spurious absolute:
(A**) One should never engage in sexual behavior that relates one's will to the goods at
stake in sexual intercourse in an inappropriate way.
One source of difficulties here, and many other difficulties about sexual ethics, is that
marriage has multiple aspects, and that these sometimes fail to coincide. Marriage is a sexual (and
otherwise intimate) relationship between the spouses. It also is a civil relationship, connected with
property relations and responsibility for the rearing of children. It is also a link between families
and groups of friends -- as can be observed at a conventional wedding. Finally, it is a religious
institution, important among other things for what it symbolizes. There are acts that are in breach
of marriage in all four dimensions, which are therefore uncontroversially adulterous. But these are
difficult to specify, and in any case represent a far narrower range of behavior than adherents of A
usually intend.
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Another common example of a moral absolute is the rule against murder. Murder is often
defined as the intentional killing of the innocent. But the term innocent is ambiguous: it ranges in
meaning from "not at fault morally" to "not harming," with all the ambiguities of the word harm.
Consider the following cases:
(M1) the execution of a killer for a legacy now rendered harmless;
(M2) the killing in war of an enemy soldier, who may or may not believe in the justice of
his own cause;
(M3) the killing of a prisoner, in a war in which we regard our enemies not just as wrong
but as criminal.
(M4) the abortion of a fetus or unborn child whose growth threatens his mother's life (even
if we regard fetuses as in every sense human beings or persons).
(M5) the shooting of an insane person who is on the verge of shooting someone else;
(M6) the killing of an infant rival to the throne;
(M7) the exposure of a child whose existence threatens a country with overpopulation or a
family with destitution.
Reasoning about M1- M7 will illustrate how much moral judgment goes into designating a person
as innocent, in order to declare killing him murder.
The views of St. Thomas Aquinas on paradoxical episodes in the Old Testament such as the
(almost-) sacrifice of Isaac illustrate further the difficulties that afflict the search for moral
absolutes. xxii St Thomas argues as follows. When God commanded Abraham to slay Isaac, He
changed the species of the act from murder (or unjust killing) to sacrifice (or just execution). This
change was possible because, as a result of original sin, Isaac deserved to die "the death of nature."
Murder and sacrifice (like adultery and marital intercourse) are thus physically similar, but morally
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different, sorts of act. And this distinction does not mean only that the one sort of act is right and
the other wrong.
St. Thomas does not invoke the principle of double effect in such cases: he does not argue
that Abraham does not intend Isaac's death, but only accepts it as a side-effect of his religious
obedience. Rather he argues, in Lee's words:
The direct object of Abraham's act here is the justice God intends in the act, even if
Abraham does not understand how it is just. That is, Abraham does not do anything, or
intend anything, other than to execute God's intention. ... The executor of a superior's
project (intention) has no project of his own distinct from that of the superior.
There are circumstances where such an analysis is possible, even for people who have come
to distrust the defense of superior orders. Socrates, who condemns suicide before drinking the
hemlock, intends only to obey the decree of the Athenian court. But this analysis will not work for
Abraham: he must form plans and intentions of his own to carry out what he believes to be God's
will; for example he must secure Isaac's compliance or at least acquiescence.
If we set aside the implausible claim that Abraham did not intend to kill Isaac (and, had he
killed Isaac, would not have done so intentionally), the supposed moral absolute at stake here
would seem to be:
(K*) One ought never to kill a person unjustly.
This principle might have some content, insofar as it excludes killing someone on grounds of public
or private benefit deemed to overrule considerations of justice. But St. Thomas's argument requires
him to understand K* as permitting the killing of anyone except Jesus Christ (and, given later
theological developments, the Virgin Mary), at the behest of God, Who, as author of Nature, is
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entitled to exact the penalty for original sin and to authorize others to act on His behalf. This is not
what is usually meant by an absolute prohibition against murder.
Moreover, K* is a special case of
(U) One ought never act unjustly.
And U is very close to the tautology:
(W) Under no circumstances must one do wrong.
U and W are different because injustice is not the only species of wrongness. An act, even
one of killing, can be wrong, not because it is unjust but because it is cowardly or cruel. xxiii But,
since any justification a theist might offer for homicide could be understood as an attempt to show
that it is agreeable to the will of God, and for that reason not unjust, the distinction between U and
W is of no practical importance.
It still seems possible to formulate some standards that are absolute if any standards are.
(G) It is wrong to kill people by reason of their ancestry (genocide).
(R) It is wrong to engage in sexual activity with a person without his or her consent (rape).
(T) It is wrong to torture a person. xxiv
Despite the ambiguities about consent that sometimes afflict R, and the blurry line between torture
and beating someone up or threatening him that afflicts T, it seems that these propositions are both
true and exceptionless. (I leave it to the reader to find possible ambiguities in the rule against
genocide.) Or rather only an a priori conviction that all moral rules have exceptions can lend
credence to the possibility of sometimes justifying their breach. Yet those who are committed to
finding exceptions to all moral rules will no doubt be able to develop plausible exceptions even to
G, R, and T.
6.3. The Case Against Moral Absolutes
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It is not possible to settle the question of moral absolutes by formulating putative absolutes
and testing them against intuition with the help of real-life or ingeniously constructed examples.
For any morality will involve hard cases, i.e., cases about which individuals and communities are
ambivalent. And all plausible exceptions to plausible absolutes will fall into this class.
Nor is it possible to settle the issue by invoking the refusal of admired persons to break
moral rules when the consequences of adhering to them were grim. Examples include Socrates’
refusal to "fetch Leon of Salamis from his home for liquidation" xxv and St. Thomas More's decision
Knowingly [to incur] the traitor's penalty of life imprisonment and confiscation of all his
goods, ... not because the oath [demanded of him] was against the faith... but because
swearing that he believed a marriage invalid when he judged it valid would have been a
lie. xxvi
Those who accept the correctness of Socrates’ and More's judgments in these cases could
still argue they would have acted otherwise if the consequences of what they did had been worse or
more certain of occurrence. (Socrates was not in fact punished for his refusal.) Or they might
argue that they would have behaved otherwise if broader circumstances rather than immediate
consequences had been different. (More was a respected lawyer whose judgment on Henry VIII's
marital shenanigans had special weight; moreover as a lawyer he had a special interest in the
integrity of his own judgments.) Accordingly, I approach the question of moral absolutes as an a
priori issue. I here state the case against absolutes, postponing the case for them and the drawing of
my conclusions until the next section.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the moral legitimacy of an act is a function of
the intentions of the agent and the foreseeable consequences of his act -- that the other dimensions
of situations (the symbolic dimensions of acts, for example) can be reduced to these two. If so, an
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absolute would be an independently specifiable class of acts such that, for any member of that
class, its intentions, its consequences, or both together, render it impermissible. But each human
action is different. Each has a unique set of (expectable) consequences; in each case the agent
displays a unique set of evaluative priorities and patterns of practical reasoning. Nor is there any
reason that human acts will seem other than unique when dimensions other than intentions and
consequences are taken into account.
Now consider action kinds to which there attaches a moral stigma, such as adultery, theft,
and murder. The language by which we describe such conduct is open-textured: there are more
central and less central cases of each, and moralists sometimes extend or contract their range of
application in surprising ways. Moreover, people sometimes propose to retire a morally
stigmatizing word from circulation -- as for example miscegenation -- or re-describe what would be
called by condemnatory terms such as mass murder in neutral terms such as the final solution.
Some of these proposals are horrible, and others legitimate, but our evaluation of them rests on a
prior set of evaluative commitments not supportable by conceptual analysis.
The defense of moral absolutes not reducible to a moral axiom or to a tautology, therefore,
requires either (1) a complete survey of the possible consequences of, or of the possible intentional
structures accompanying, a given sort of act; or (2) an essentialist ontology of actions
corresponding to the action-kinds recognized in ordinary English (or medieval Latin). xxvii An
understanding of some tradition as fixed at say 1300, or of the symbolic significance of actions as
immune to changes in the understanding of both agents and their neighbors, might also accomplish
the same task. All these enterprises face formidable obstacles.
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There is still room, on this view, for moral rules of thumb. But we must always keep in
mind the possibility that any situation, if we look at if with sufficient care, will disclose features
unique to it that require a modification of stock moral judgments.

6.4. The Case for Moral Absolutes
Many absolutists are aware of the central premises of the case against moral absolutes. xxviii
And it is possible to combine a belief in moral absolutes with recognition of the open-texture of
moral concepts (including crucial concepts such as intention). In order to see how this is so, let us
ask how things would be if the arguments for situationism were given their fullest rein.
That evaluatively laden language is open to interpretation, and that diverse agendas will
produce diverse interpretations of crucial terms, is a commonplace among those familiar with the
history of literary criticism, theology, and law. But if situationists are right, there are no constraints
on the interpretation of a word such as murder: what other people call murder can be reinterpreted
as population control, the vindication of one's honor, or the destruction of the Queen's enemies.
Conversely, the slaughter of animals for the human table can be re-described as murder. Moreover,
even if it is conceded that a proposed act is one of murder, the possibility always exists for
situationists that murder is necessary under the circumstances -- even that it is the most loving act
possible. And what these circumstances are cannot be specified in advance: they are left solely to
the discernment of morally responsible persons. But a clause exempting us from observance of all
moral rules in cases of necessity is unlimited in its application, unless we restrict it in ways that
produce a new, formally exceptionless, rule. xxix Or the very word murder, like blasphemy in many
circles, may pass out of use or be sidelined. In that case, whatever restraints there might be on the
taking of life will be conceptualized in radically different ways, and many kinds of killing now
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regarded as out of the question will be routinely open for consideration. And what is true of
murder is true of all other crucial moral concepts, such as torture, fraud, and incest.
Situationists do not conceive of themselves as promoting moral anarchy, but as advocating a
higher ethics based on the Greatest Happiness Principle, or on the Law of Love. But happiness and
love are also open to interpretation: people dispute whether a state of drug-induced euphoria is one
of happiness, or killing another human being can be an act of love. Hence whatever hermeneutical
maneuvers are available for murder are available for these moral notions as well, and indeed for
any concept that one might invoke in moral argument.
One can also appeal to moral paradigms to place limits on the vagaries of moral judgment:
the Nazis, we can all agree, were evil, and behavior that resembles theirs is to be avoided. But we
can re-describe the Nazis as moral pioneers, and their opponents as fuddy-duddies deluded by
illusions of an objective moral order. Or we can distinguish our "liberal" euthanasia campaign,
designed to deal with the stresses of a superannuated society that spends too much of its resources
on health care, from the Nazis' "reactionary" program, infected with racist, sexist, and homophobic
notions.
The argument just made might be dismissed as a "parade of imaginary horribles" or
"slippery slope." "You ignore," a critic might argue, "the good sense of human beings, and their
capacity to make necessary moral distinctions." But slippery slopes do occur, the social fabric does
break down, and atrocities of every variety are a frequent occurrence in human history. (Indeed,
there are reasons to fear that our own society is on such a slope, and about a number of issues.) No
doubt such events have economic and political as well as cultural causes, though these sorts of
causation can only be distinguished to a limited extent. But I am not here concerned with political
strategy, however broadly conceived, but with a problem in the logic of morals: how to constrain

The Search for Moral Absolutes

129

Philip E. Devine

the human capacity to defend a wider and wider range of behavior by discovering and exploiting
ambiguities in our shared moral code.
At this stage of the argument a critic will invoke the ethics of virtue. A virtuous person will
know what analogies and distinctions are legitimate and what mere sophistry. The most important
virtue in question here is called prudence (§ 5.1). But living in a corrupt society can undermine our
prudence, and discerning which societies are corrupt and which virtuous itself requires judgment.
Hence we require principles beyond situational prudence (though not of prudence in the widest
sense), which can support the promulgation of moral rules.
Many writers appeal at this point to the concept of human nature, as placing limits on the
possible vagaries of moral language. Thus in a striking passage, Thomas Fleming writes:
The laws and decrees enacted by human government are mutable and sometimes tyrannical,
but the laws of human nature, curled tight within the spiral of the genetic code, are
unchanging and just. More than just, they are justice itself, in this sublunar sphere. xxx
Some sorts of acts, such people argue, are bad for human beings, both those who perform them and
others. And what particular acts fall into these sorts is itself determined by the features of human
nature that make actions of such sorts bad.
But human nature itself is a highly contested concept, and the appropriate relationship
among the intellectual, social, emotional, and physical sides of our nature is much debated. For
that reason, defining the classes of forbidden acts will pose considerable difficulty. And naturalists
like Fleming have a hard time explaining how institutions and forms of behavior he regards as
unnatural in fact take place.
The argument of this section and that of the last are consistent with one another. For the
previous argument calls into question our ability to discern moral absolutes, while this argument
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concludes that some absolutes are necessary to a functioning morality and thus also to social life,
however difficult it may be to discern them. I have, in short, defended the commonsense claims
that "there are limits," that there is such a thing as "going too far," that it is necessary to "draw the
line somewhere." But the question, where exactly we should draw the needed lines, remains
unanswered.
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7
THE CONCEPT OF THE SACRED
The final stage in the argument of this book is to place the conclusions reached so far within
the context of the larger questions of worldview that perplex men and women of our time, and to
try at least to roughly locate the moral absolutes whose possibility in principle I have argued for so
far.
7.1 Cultural Left and Cultural Right
Irving Howe has protested the use of the expression cultural Left` i to refer to a movement
that has little in common with the traditional political Left except some rhetoric and an ad hoc
alliance. ii But no better language suggests itself -- Howe’s "insurgents" has problems of its own,
since the insurgents are sometimes in control. And the Right-Left continuum in culture is more
stable than the corresponding continuum in ordinary politics. The issue, how much the fortunate
owe the unfortunate, and to what extent this obligation may be enforced by civil law, remains
important. But after Rawls and Nozick, the best that can be said about distributive justice
theoretically is that divergent positions represent rival understandings of the same moral and
political tradition. iii The most serious problem is motivating people to make the sacrifices required
by even the most undemanding requirements of social justice.
One source of difficulty is that words like liberal and conservative, and even supposedly
more precise expressions like neoconservative, designate primarily not systems of ideas, but groups
of people brought together by the contingencies of political alliance and enmity. Alliances of this
sort have an impact on the life of the mind; since people tend to accept their friends' views on
questions they are unable to investigate for themselves, including disputed questions of fact.

It is nonetheless possible to indicate, in broad terms, the issues that divide the cultural Right from
the cultural Left. The cultural continuum ranges from Alasdair MacIntyre to Paul Feyerabend
among mainstream English-speaking philosophers, from the Ayatollah Hominy to Michel Foucault
among other intellectuals, and among non-intellectuals from the Russian Old Believers to groups
such as Queer Nation. It concerns the question, to what extent human life can be governed by
stable norms, and to what extent it is a matter of continuous and idiosyncratic adaptation, so that
any attempt to constrain the way of life that emerges from the practice of an individual or group is
oppressive. This issue applies also to intellectual questions, e.g., the legitimacy of nonstandard
ways of investigating the human mind and body and treating their ills.
A representative of the hermeneutical school, Manfred Frank, suggests another way of
characterizing the difference between the cultural Right and the cultural Left.
The model that underlies both the structural theory of language and texts, as well as Searle's
"taxonomy of speech acts" is ... the crystal lattice in which all the molecules are immovably
fixed in their positions, if the temperature is sufficiently low, separated from all the others,
but also connected with them. In contrast with the elemental world, the historical-cultural
world cannot simply be cooled down to the absolute freezing point. ... Language and
literature thrive only in a certain warmth that permits flux: the exchange and reconstellation
of signs. iv
If we accept Frank's analysis, we need to ask whether the prospect of conceptual meltdown
is a promise or a threat, and how we are to deal with the resulting theoretical and practical
decisions. Those who find such a meltdown liberating belong to the cultural Left, while those who
find it threatening belong to the cultural Right.
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A line of thought that has had much influence on the cultural Left goes as follows. God is
dead. Religion continues to be practiced, of course, but honest would-be believers can be brought
to acknowledge that they are going through the motions, for the sake of the children perhaps. And
the death of God means more than the end of religion: it means the end of an intellectual and
cultural tradition centered on claims to objective truth, and hence also of philosophers' logical
scruples about saying that God once existed and now does so no longer. This supposed insight is
not an axiom from which the rest of the argument follows deductively, but rather a perspective that
informs the interpretative and dialectical methods of its adherents.
The most thoroughgoing version of cultural Leftism is called "postmodernism."
Characteristic of the postmodern sensibility is the juxtaposition of concepts and images drawn from
discordant universes of discourse, without any attempt to establish even the appearance of
coherence or consistency among them. Much contemporary literature expresses a postmodern
sensibility, v and the "real world" persistently produces postmodern phenomena as well. The New
York Times coverage of the recent Middle East peace negotiations vi heavily emphasized the color
of President Clinton's tie. In its most consistent forms -- not that postmodernists value consistency
highly --, postmodernism is apolitical, is devoted to a merely expressive form of politics, or accepts
the status quo and exposes the absurdity of all attempts to improve it. But an important variant,
called "political correctness," tries to turn postmodernism into a "progressive" political dogma.
Some of our contemporaries attempt to stop the slide into chaos by embracing the status quo: the
end of history is, if not their belief, then at least their hope and their goal. We must live with
injustice, they argue, or better yet redefine our conception of justice so that persistent injustice
ceases to count as such. vii These writers dismiss the egalitarian strain in our tradition, despite the
Declaration of Independence, as a product of envy. But too many people find the status quo
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intolerable, for reasons recognized as legitimate by our cultural and political tradition, to make this
strategy acceptable.
I have dealt with the roots of the cultural Leftist argument elsewhere. viii Arguments for the
existence of God are useless here, since such arguments suppose that God is a coherent concept,
which a cultural Leftist will deny. But if there is no way of proving the coherence of the concept of
God, there is no way of disproving it either, at least in the absence of a criterion, such as the
positivist Principle of Verifiability, which the advocates of deconstruction cannot admit. Hence we
may postulate the falsity of Nietzsche's maxim, and proceed from there.
Despite their propensity to use dogma and metaphysics as terms of abuse, the cultural Left
does what dogmatic metaphysicians have always done: they take certain features of our experience
as the key to reality. As Plato took mathematics, Aristotle biology, and Kant the claims of duty, so
the cultural Left takes historical change and malleability of language as their key to how things are.
It is a dogma of the cultural Left that no norm or standard of any sort can be taken as more than
provisionally binding. We may call this dogma the metaphysics of universal contingency; its
slogan is Never say never.
One application of this dogma is the situationist denial of exceptionless moral rules: others
include the denial of infallible moral and spiritual authorities, the rejection of necessary
propositions with interesting content, and belief in the possibility of a completely open mind.
These are stock beliefs among intellectuals; only lack of caution distinguishes postmodernists from
many liberals, and only dogmatism and intolerance distinguishes the politically correct from much
of the rest of academia. The attempt to use relativism to resolve social issues is widely accepted,
even among the bitterest opponents of the politically correct.
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The metaphysics of universal contingency is self-destructive. If it is true, it is false (or on
another interpretation, we have no right to assert it). Nor does it help to limit its scope to (firstorder) principles, while designating it as a meta-principle. For whatever reason one might have for
asserting it would also appear to be a reason for asserting a broader principle (call it a meta-metaprinciple) which applies to the metaphysics of universal contingency itself. And, if we decline to
make this move, there is no way of excluding the possibility of another meta-principle, likewise
absolute in character, having interesting implications at the level of principle, such as one requiring
certain conditional principles to be treated, for practical principles, as absolutes.
Nor can one save the metaphysics of universal contingency by limiting its scope -- say by
reducing it to the claim that all non-tautological principles are contingent. This modification limits
the metaphysics of universal contingency in two ways: (1) some necessities are admitted, i.e.,
tautologies; (2) among contingent truths, some may be exceptionless (and even have the quasinecessitarian status of laws of nature). But this principle -- call it the empiricist principle -- is
neither a tautology nor is it treated by its adherents as contingent.
On the other hand, the attempt, characteristic of the cultural Right, to avoid prudential
accommodations to the world of one's experience is self-destructive. Sometimes, to be sure, an
unbending attitude is appropriate: the Hasidim who went to the gas ovens chanting, "I believe in
the coming of the Messiah, and, though he tarry, yet I shall wait for him," fared better, even in
worldly terms, than those of their fellow Jews who went to their deaths cursing God. But at an
earlier stage of the Holocaust, when there was reason to hope that wise decisions would enable the
Jews to escape the gas ovens, the use of prudence to protect oneself and one's family was
obligatory. Moreover, the attempt to specify what aspects of our culture represent the "permanent
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things," and are for that reason immune to challenge, runs into persistent difficulties, some of
which we have explored in this essay (§ 6.2).
Both the cultural Left and the cultural Right, in their extreme forms, are guilty of a
Manichean revolt against the created order, which includes elements of both permanence and
change. In more mundane terms, both cultural Rightists and cultural Leftists ask us to feel guilty
about being human -- about adapting to circumstance while at the same time refusing to regard
every aspect of our lives as open to radical revision.
Neither the cultural Right nor the cultural Left can possibly win, though both of them can
do much damage (and conceivably some good) in the process. The cultural Right cannot win
because the world changes. There is no such thing as an unchanging society, and our society
contains within itself many internal sources of change -- technology and a market economy, for
example. And when the world changes, people will ask whether the old rules still apply -- and the
right answer will sometimes be No. The cultural Left cannot win because a society in which
nothing is constant cannot survive from one generation -- or even from one moment -- to another.
The idea of progress disappears unless there are constant standards by which we can distinguish it
from degeneration (or pointless change). Nor can one speak of development, as opposed to
discontinuous change, unless there is something constant that undergoes it. Hence traditional moral
standards cannot be questioned all at once: even apologists for Michel Foucault ix hasten to assure
us that he did not deliberately infect other people with AIDS -- as distinct from risking the
transmission of the disease.
One source of the cultural Left is a desire to defend the conclusion either that our ancestors
were wrong about important moral issues -- let us say slavery --, or that changed circumstances
mean that we are no longer bound to follow their views. But unless there is some constant
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principle linking them and us, such judgments represent nothing more than an irrational "paradigm
shift," which can be imposed by force but not established by reason.
We have two ways of seeing our beliefs, including our moral beliefs, which do not fit
together very well. One is as a set of propositions that exclude their contradictories, which we
normally claim are true but sometimes doubt; let us call this the "truth and error perspective." The
other is as a product of our interaction with our natural and social environment, and that of our
physical and spiritual ancestors -- an interaction that will continue after we are dead. Let us call
this the "historicist perspective."
There is no formal inconsistency between these two perspectives: our beliefs are both true
(or false) propositions and cultural-historical products. But each of these perspectives, when
pressed to the limits of its logic, crowds out the other. Our bitterest opponents' positions quite as
much as our own, are products of the interaction of traditional ideas with their natural and social
environment. And the rise and fall of intellectual systems, that has entered in to the outlook of both
ourselves and our opponents, is only in part the result of reasoned argument in any sense:
sometimes war and conquest decide the issue, and sometimes a way of thinking loses its grip on its
adherents in a way that cannot be rationally reconstructed.
The truth and error and the historicist perspective share a common root, in our capacity to
step back and examine our beliefs, first to ask whether they are true, and second to notice that they
differ from those of their ancestors. To make them cohere fully would require a sort of radical
transcendence of which human beings are not capable: not just the limited transcendence involved
in asking where the truth lies in some contemporary controversy, or making sense of some portion
of our history, e.g., the history of philosophy, but a "God's eye point of view" in the fullest sense.
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The writings of John Noonan illustrate the central issue. x Noonan has strong moral beliefs.
He condemns bribery as he condemns many other traditionally condemned activities. He finds his
criterion of moral judgment in "the satisfaction of true human needs," and supports his judgments
by moral arguments of the customary sort. But in his historical and sociological perspective, the
distinction between bribery and the other reciprocities that form the ordinary stuff of social life
turns out to depend on the discretion and felt necessities of the authors, interpreters, and enforcers
of law. Our understanding of bribery, as of other moral issues, will develop or degenerate as the
history of our civilization unfolds, but there is no reason to suppose that such developments will
eliminate the element of historical contingency in our morality. Noonan's innocence of any
deconstructive intent only makes more urgent the question of the relationship between history on
the one hand and the categorical requirements of morality on the other.
The question of our right to accept our inherited beliefs, as reformed by dialogue with one
another, encounter with other traditions, and interaction with our shared environment, is another
version of the question of our right to trust our faculties. Any argument we might make against
"demon" skepticism supposes that we are able to know its premises and that they support its
conclusion. Thus our trust in our faculties must of necessity be a matter of (rational) faith.
7.2. The Concept of the Sacred
The thought that informs my reasoning in this essay is as follows. The cultural Left is
correct in asserting the diversity and complexity of human life. Each friendship is, for example,
unique, because each person, and each history of interaction between two or more people, is
unique. And the same is true of every marriage.
Yet those who celebrate chaos underestimate human complexity. For one persistent human
desire is for an orderly life, in the teeth of the many internal and obstacles to achieving it. And it is
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arbitrary for the votaries of openness to close themselves to this desire, alone among the galaxy of
human desires. We need an understanding that enables us to see both the threat of chaos, and the
dangers of the wrong sort of order, while allowing individuals and groups to seek order in
appropriate ways.
Leszek Kolakowski undertakes "to speak in defense of the conservative spirit,”
However, [he writes] it is a conditional conservative spirit, conscious not only of its own
necessity but also the necessity of the spirit that opposes it. As a result, it can see that the
tension between rigidity and structure and the forces of change, between tradition and
criticism, is a condition of human life.
This conservative spirit would be a vain and empty satisfaction were it not constantly aware
of itself and mindful of the extent to which it was, is, and may continue to be used in
defense of irrational privilege; and that it may be used in this way, not as a result of
irrational privilege; and that it may be used in this way is the result, not of contingent
circumstances, not of occasional abuse, but of the very nature of the conservative spirit.
This conservative spirit knows the difference between the conservatism of great bureaucrats
and that of peasants, just as it knows the difference between the revolt of a people who are
starving or enslaved and the purely cerebral revolutionism that reflects an emotional void. xi
There is considerable ambiguity in this "conditional conservatism"; for example, it is not
clear, on Kolakowski's showing, whether we are to prefer the conservatism of bureaucrats or that of
peasants. But for present purposes his most important observation is the following:
The sacred order, which encompassed the realities of the secular world, never ceased to
proclaim the message, "This is how things are, and they cannot be otherwise." ... We live in
a world in which all our inherited forms and distinctions have come under violent attack;
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they are attacked in the name of homogeneity, which is held up as an ideal with the aid of
vague equations purporting to show that all difference means hierarchy, and all hierarchy
oppression. ... Sometimes it seems as if all the words and signs that make up our conceptual
framework and provide us with a basic system of distinctions are dissolving before our
eyes, as if all the barriers between opposing concepts are gradually being torn down. xii
One feature of many moral rules held as absolute is that they mark out the difference
between socially important categories, say between human beings and brute animals. One drowns
superfluous kittens, but not superfluous infants; one eats the flesh of beasts but not that of human
beings. And when some people defend their moral judgments by saying -- rightly or wrongly -that human life, marriage, or private property xiii is sacred, and others reject such appeals as
irrelevant and oppressive, the resulting debate is best understood in terms of Kolakowski's
observations.
Another feature of moral absolutes is that they have a motivational dimension: a virtuous
person will not merely abstain from rape or torture, for example, but will have an entrenched
aversion to such acts that will prevent him from performing them even when they appear to be
justified. Stuart Hampshire has provided us with a useful phenomenology of actions prohibited in
this way: they involve
a sense of disgrace, of outrage, of horror, of baseness, of brutality, and, most important, a
sense that a barrier, assumed to be firm and almost [?] insurmountable, has been knocked
over, and a feeling that if this horrible, or outrageous, or squalid, or brutal, action is
possible, then anything is possible and nothing is forbidden, and all restraints are
threatened. xiv
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We expect virtuous people to consult their heads as well as their hearts, but sometimes our heads
will tell us that such aversions are to be cultivated rather than resisted.
Sacred xv is not just a strong word for good. xvi In its traditional meaning, it has the double
sense of "holy" and "accursed." Oedipus, just before his death, was sacred, both because he was
polluted by patricide and incest, and because suffering for offenses committed in ignorance had
hallowed him. And what is holy is also dangerous: a man can be struck down for laying profane
hands on the ark of the Lord.
A contemporary example is the attitude sometimes expressed toward persons with AIDS.
One can contract a deadly disease by contact with such persons, and irrational fears of them outrun
the real dangers. And an HIV-positive person is marked for early death, without necessarily being,
in the usual sense, sick. Many such persons also have the spooky quality associated with sexual
ambiguity. Moreover, they are suffering, in a particularly horrible way, the consequences of a
collective decision to take sexual matters more lightly than in retrospect seems defensible. Hence
they are sometimes shunned, but sometimes also they are treated with a sort of reverence -- even as
oracles, as in Tom Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities. xvii Hence if we say that human life is sacred, for
example, we mean two things. First, human beings are valuable in themselves, and their
destruction for that reason an evil. Second, that the value we place on human life -- and the moral
restraints we attempt to place on its destruction -- are in the following sense strategic.
Infringements are not only bad in themselves, but threaten systematically to undermine the entire
set of moral restraints that distinguish tolerable human social life from barbarism.
It is now time to respond to two characteristic consequentialist arguments. Kai Nielsen
writes:
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The general moral principles surrounding bans on killing innocent people are strong and
play such a crucial role in the ever floundering effort to humanize the savage mind -- savage
as a primitive and savage again as in contemporary industrial society -- that it is of the
utmost social utility, it can be argued, that such bans on killing not be called into question in
any practical manner by consequentialist reasoning.
However, in arguing in this way, the moral conservative has plainly shifted his ground, and
he himself is arguing on consequentialist grounds that we must treat certain nonconsequentialist principles as absolute (as principles which can never, in fact, from a
reasonable moral point of view, be overridden, for it would be just too disastrous to do
so). xviii
But to invoke consequentialist considerations to justify the acceptance of a moral rule need
not involve the acceptance of the contention that it admits of consequentialist overriders, as distinct
from the acceptance of consequentialist arguments to resolve ambiguous cases in its application.
(The principle of double effect, which includes a clause requiring "due proportion" seems -- despite
Finnis and Grisez -- to require a limited sort of consequentialist reasoning.) On the contrary, the
consequentialist argument for accepting a rule against killing the innocent is also an argument for
resisting the making of consequentialist exceptions to it.
Consequentialists also argue as follows. If we regard God or Society as the author of the
moral law, each of us may have to follow its requirements, even when they conflict with (what
seems to be) what would produce the best consequences overall. But if I view myself as the author
of the moral law, as one side of the Kantian tradition would have me do, I have no reason not to set
aside some rule when it conflicts with my obligation to promote the good. As Conrad D. Johnson
has put it, "to stand under external authority implies that the competence to make ... fundamental
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revisions belongs to someone else (God, an elite, or the majority through the social conventions
they create." xix Hence consequentialism is the most appropriate morality for a secular, pluralistic
society.
But this argument, even if we accept its ontological underpinnings, proves too much.
Unless my morality includes some sense of external constraint, I have no reason not to revise it
when it conflicts with my own interests or even my present inclinations. I therefore have no reason
to prefer consequentialism to some form of moral minimalism -- whether nihilistic, egoistic, or
extreme libertarian -- that denies that I have any obligation to come to the aid of others in their
need. xx
7.3. The Search for Moral Absolutes Concluded
I thus conclude that strongly entrenched moral rules are necessary to a workable morality,
and thus also to social life, and that these rules are to be found in domains of human life where
enormous powers for both good and evil are at work. The thought that there are norms whose
reasons we may not fully understand (in hard cases, anyhow), but whose observation is necessary
to tolerable social life, is extremely common. But its application runs into a number of difficulties.
First, the concept of a tolerable social life is not neutral among moral theories and moral
positions. If radical animal rights advocates are right, nearly all human societies are in the Nazi
class. Even vegetarian societies exploit animal labor in ways these advocates condemn.
Second, the relevant causal claims are easy to make but hard to sustain, even in retrospect.
There may be people who, starting with reading newspapers on Sunday, or the use of conventional
playing cards, have made shipwreck of their lives. But even in these cases it does not follow that
the decision to play cards was the wrong turning of greatest practical importance; that may have
come later or earlier.
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Third, society has the ability to absorb remarkable amounts of misbehavior -- whether
defined by its own standards or by the standards a critical moralist would defend. But sometimes
this misbehavior reaches a point -- call it a "Watergate point" -- at which it is necessary to uphold
or abandon challenged standards. But such points are unpredictable in advance; deciding when
they have arisen is one of the most delicate tasks of prudence.
Finally, the decay of social orders, though always risky, is not bad without qualification.
Some social orders are unjust beyond the limits of tolerance; some, for example, require lynching
and other evil means to keep them going. Sometimes it is reasonable to endeavor to build a new
society in the ashes of the old.
Nonetheless, social disasters do occur, and at least some examples of them are
uncontroversial, at least in retrospect. And the path to disaster is paved by a multitude of individual
and collective decisions, some of which at least are well intentioned. And the hope that social
disaster will lead, after all the bloodshed and chaos, to a better social order cannot form the
foundation for prudent action. The time to prevent Nazi Germany is thus during the Weimar
period, when the social institutions of all sorts are in decay, not when the Nazis' "remedies" for this
decay are being administered.
The moral reasoning of an individual begins with a set of fairly simple rules, of the Ten
Commandments variety. But he encounters situations that make these rules seem too simple: they
are then modified and adapted in various ways, leading to a far more complex set of rules and
principles. But then he encounters a "check" -- a realization that, if one continues to loosen one's
moral rules, chaos is a likely result. And so he attempts to restore one's moral rules to their pristine
simplicity, and the dialectic goes on.
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It is therefore irresponsible, even from a strictly worldly point of view, to hold with Donald
Evans that "the history of allegedly revealed and allegedly exceptionless rules seems to me to be a
history of empirical error and moral evil." xxi Rigorous moralists, even those who in the final
reckoning are unduly so, are like a canary in a mine; they warn others of dangers that will prove
lethal unless action is taken. To be sure, excessive rigor about some issues may blind us to other,
equally important, dangers, and may drive those unable to live up to the rigorists' burdensome
standards to despair. And rigorists may lose credibility by spreading the alarm prematurely. But a
moralist, for all that, needs to pay careful attention to those more rigorous as well as to those laxer
than himself.
In an ideal world everyone would share the same (true) moral judgments -- not because he
was coerced or manipulated into doing so, but because the truth of these judgments was evident to
him upon reflection. But, as things are, when some people are too lax it is well that others are too
rigorous, and when some people are too rigorous it is well that others are too lax. Or rather this is
the case so long as the extremes do not reinforce one another, as they often do.
In technical terms, I am concerned with the acceptance-utility of moral rules (and of moral attitudes
generally) -- the consequences, that is to say, of their being adopted by individuals and groups in
real time. But I do not evaluate these consequences in hedonist/welfarist terms alone; moreover the
problem of incommensurability reappears in a particularly troublesome way when we evaluate the
consequences of our customary standards, or of proposed changes in these standards.
My argument diverges significantly from the philosophy of Kant and his followers, which is
also invoked to support moral absolutes. xxii Appeal to principled consistency requires a
specification of what characteristics of a situation are morally relevant, in order to avoid moral
principles adroitly crafted to favor the interests of the moralist or his friends. And the idea of
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humanity as an end-in-itself requires an empirical content difficult to find in Kant's moral
philosophy. We must somehow avoid the conclusion that, since Soul is immortal, it does not
matter whom we kill (or what sort of other damage we inflict). It is necessary to appeal to the
needs of human beings as natural and social, as well as rational, creatures, including their need for
the protection of stable social formations during their periods of special vulnerability.
A pagan would speak here of the gods, whose favor lavishes benefits on human beings but
whose wrath is very terrible. And the bad consequences that flow from the neglect or erosion of
elementary moral restraints a pagan would describe as the wrath of Athena, Hera, and Aphrodite.
In a modern philosophical context we can speak of a convergence of deontological and
consequentialist considerations. We are especially concerned with acts that, in addition to
whatever direct harm they do, also may release powerful and dangerous forces our moral rules
strive to contain. Moral rules protecting us from such dangers also carry with them a powerful
symbolic charge (§ 2.5).
Rationalistic moralists have written of a morality of inherited taboos, which is an
enlightened morality of rational principles is destined to supersede. A plausible example of such a
taboo is the idea that there is something particularly abominable about anal intercourse, even over
and above any objection we might have to other deviant sexual practices. But it turns out that anal
intercourse carries with it a special risk of infection with AIDS, and that its prevalence among
homosexuals contributed to the AIDS epidemic. It does not follow that our ancestors had an
insight into the causes of disease unknown to us. But this sort of surprising result does counsel a
humbler attitude toward inherited ideas than many philosophers have been prepared to adopt. On
the other hand, some taboos are just irrational, such as a prohibition on interracial intercourse,
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especially where the male partner is black and the female white. How the two sorts of taboos are to
be distinguished in practice is a difficult question.
Part of the argument is rule-consequentialist in a familiar way: by accepting, teaching, and
upholding certain non-consequentialist standards we avoid bad consequences and secure good
ones. xxiii And the rule-consequentialist move is often enough neglected in the literature, as when
Nielsen writes that "A consequentialist maintains that actions, rules, policies and practices are
ultimately to be judged by certain consequences,” xxiv ignoring the fact that rules as well as actions
have morally important outcomes.
Nonetheless, without some sort of non-consequentialist backing for our norms, ruleconsequentialism would lead to indeterminacy. For the range of possible rules is indefinitely large,
and much of the utility of rules consists in their being shared. (Without shared rules and principles
we could not, for example, discuss moral issues with one another.) More broadly, ruleconsequentialists suppose that people can be brought to converge on some set of moral rules;
otherwise his position would be utterly utopian. And the consequentialist considerations that
support moral rules are not themselves morally neutral: life without friendship would be
intolerable, and friendship includes an internal morality forbidding betrayal.
In any event, rule-consequentialism as a general moral system is not acceptable, since no
human being could apply it. (Perhaps God is a rule-consequentialist, but then we would have to
rely on revelation for His conclusions.) In practice we avoid such difficulties by starting with
existing morality and considering large or small revisions in it, designed to remedy the difficulties
its adherents experience in attempting to life their lives according to its tenets.
For suppose we are to choose between two moral codes, with differing results concerning a case we
find difficult anyway (say when to cease attempts to prolong a dying child's life). On rule-
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consequentialist premises, we need to ask what the effects of the adoption of these codes, either by
ourselves as a society or each of us as an individual might be. It is not enough to ask about the
consequences of accepting R1, requiring us to continue life support, and R2, requiring us to cease it.
This move would collapse into act-consequentialism, since one could always fashion a rule valid
"for this day and this train only." Moreover the consequences of one rule depend on the other rules
in the system. (A rule prohibiting direct euthanasia will have different consequences if we are fairly
lax about prolonging life, than if we are required to prolong each and every life, whatever the cost.)
They also depend on the moral and semi-moral attitudes that surround the code aspect of one's
morality, (A stringent moral code will have different consequences if the surrounding culture
contains efficient means for dealing with guilt, than if each person is forced to bear the burden of
transgression in lonely silence.) Indeed to talk about the consequences of a moral code is to talk
about the consequences of an entire way of life.
If I am right in my argument so far, we can now make a bit more progress in our search for
moral absolutes. They are to be found in those areas of life centrally important for human beings in
society, where powers capable of doing both great good and great ill are at work.
1. The first of these is the domain of human life and its protection -- as well as prohibitions
on violence of all sorts. The goods of human life require living human beings to sustain them, and
a license to kill leaves few if any moral constraints intact. For if someone is causing me trouble,
and I may kill him to free myself of his demands, I have a quick and easy way of escaping
whatever claims he may make. (In many cases, extortion will also get me whatever I may demand
of him.) The extreme possibility, that the human race should destroy itself by warfare, is not at all
impossible, though it is less likely than it was just a short time ago.
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Moreover, the use of violence invites retaliatory and pre-emptive violence, whether justified by our
moral codes or not. Even when the objects of violence are too weak to defend themselves or to
retaliate, and are lacking in powerful protectors, the lesson that the weak exist at the sufferance of
the strong has immeasurable costs. The "bloody instructions argument" -- that those who defend
violence create a world in which violence, including violence against themselves, is increasingly
legitimate, remains sound. On the other hand human aggressiveness cannot be condemned as an
absolute evil: if constrained it contributes to the good life in important ways. Hence it is
appropriate to speak of human life as sacred. xxv Even if we reject pacifism as unduly restrictive, it
is reasonable to look for absolute standards constraining the human propensity to violence. But I
do not see how a philosopher could claim anything more than to have approximated these
absolutes, especially when one remembers that a moral absolute must be valid for persons of all
times, places, and social situations. (This remark applies to my own efforts as much to anyone
else's.)
The moral prohibition against taking human life is often expressed in terms of our right to
live. And one of the appeals of rights theories is that they attempt to give us moral and political
guidance without opening up the endless controversies about the good life for human beings that
other approaches to ethics invite. But it turns out that such theories are undermined by the vices
latent in these virtues. Alasdair MacIntyre's dismissal of belief in rights as "at one with belief in
witches and in unicorns" xxvi goes well beyond his argument. But we may agree with him that, as
Jenny Teichman has well put it, "The concept of a right isn't separate from, or above or below, the
other moral concepts." xxvii Hence it is not sufficient to appeal to a right to life, whose contours are
discovered in intuition, to settle moral issues about killing, xxviii though one ought not express this
conclusion in terms of a denial of the right to live.
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2. A second area in which we might find moral absolutes might is that of honesty and
deceit. Communication is a centrally important in human life; imagine yourself in a society where
no one speaks your language, and in which you are unable to learn a single word of the language
others speak. And ingenuity in the use of language is both harmless and necessary. It is not a lie to
begin a letter to an enemy or stranger "Dear Mr. Smith," nor does it make an insincere letter worse
to conclude it "Sincerely yours." And nearly all moralists allow one to reply to a question,
requesting information one is not at liberty to disclose, "I don't know."
But if one could never trust another person to tell the truth, where it differed from what it was
advantageous for him to say; or to keep a promise when so doing entailed any cost, then cooperation among human beings would be impossible. No more for lying than for homicide,
however, can one, by philosophical reasoning alone, state the prohibition in such a way as to
include all and only legitimate exceptions.
3. In is difficult to state the third zone of absolutes for all societies. But in America it has
to do with our Constitution, especially those parts of it designed to protect the individual from
governmental tyranny. Few Americans -- whatever their political coloration -- are prepared to
attack the Constitution; on the contrary political disputes get transformed into questions of
interpretation of a document written to provide maximum scope for disagreement on constitutional
issues. xxix Those discontented with the prevailing interpretation can always hope that a future
Supreme Court will favor their views.
The line between civil disobedience and terrorism, however unclear it may be in some
cases, distinguishes those who remain in dialogue with their fellow citizens, from those who have
withdrawn from the constitutional process in bitterness and despair. Americans, we may say,
regard their constitutional order as sacred, even though they hold themselves at liberty to dispute its
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meaning. Nonetheless, we cannot treat the American Constitution, or any other merely human
institution, as of perpetual validity (see

1.4). One is forced to speak here of conditional sanctity.

The rules of all societies are in constant flux, as these societies attempt to deal with issues ranging
from labor unrest to national and ethnic minorities to competition with foreign business. But there
are also background understandings that contain (they never abolish) political and social conflicts,
and when they collapse lead to civil war. To these understandings -- which may or may not be
expressed in a written constitution -- the members of a functioning society accord a certain
sacredness.
We have not yet reached a moral absolute. Revolution is sometimes justified, and the duty
of loyalty to a society's institutions does not bear on everyone with equal stringency. But
somewhere here there are absolute obligations, whose assertion is necessary to the vitality of
human social life. But there seems no prospect of formulating them with accuracy with the help of
philosophical reason alone.
4. The fourth arena of absolutes is the one in which intuitions vary most widely. It includes
that long and complex process by which generation succeeds generation, ranging from the sexual
maturity of the parents to the sexual and social maturity of the offspring: in other words, the whole
contested area of marriage, sex, childbearing, child rearing, and family life. xxx Friendship in the
ordinary sense, as well as Platonic relationships (whatever the sex of the parties) also partakes, to
some degree, of the emotional complexities that are generated by sexual and reproductive life.
Camile Paglia has powerfully -- if not with complete coherence -- challenged the popular view of
sexual activity as no more than a way of expressing affection, and has reminded us of the deep and
powerful psychological forces at work in the sexual impulse.
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The most extreme bad consequence possible here, that the human race should cease to
reproduce itself and thus die out, seems unlikely. xxxi But the other evils chaos in this area produces
are evident enough: epidemic disease, bitterness between the sexes and the generations, abuse and
neglect of both the old and of the young, and the exploitation of persons who are economically,
emotionally, and physically vulnerable. Hence we should accept the commonsense understanding
that the sexual and reproductive aspect of human life requires firm, possibly even exceptionless,
rules to sustain it. xxxii What these rules exactly are is another matter, and one that the argument so
far does little to resolve. Nor is there much hope that philosophy will resolve it.
Affecting all the areas where absolutes are to be sought is the following consideration.
Some people are able to take part in deliberations concerning the rules of social life, and if these
interests are neglected can make their displeasure felt. But infants and small children must rely on
the rest of us to represent their interests. Absolutes constraining the sorts of injury that may be
inflicted on them are therefore especially appropriate.
I have not here suggested actual exceptionless moral rules, only provided a partial list of
danger zones, xxxiii where both agents and moralists are well advised to proceed with caution in
making exceptions to moral rules accepted ordinarily and for the most part. For human beings are
notorious for taking every possible opportunity to exploit whatever loopholes may exist in moral
rules that obstruct their passions or the pursuit of their self-interest.
We can, at least, hope to be able to formulate virtual absolutes. Virtual absolutes are rules
having three features: (1) they are stated, in moral education (and self-education), as exceptionless;
(2) those proposing the rules have not admitted any exceptions so far -- or else have included any
exceptions in their formulation of the rules; xxxiv and (3) when someone raises the possibility of an
exception -- whether in theory or in practice, whether as a general matter or in a particular case --
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the burden of proof rests with him. xxxv For only such rules are strong enough to withstand the
rationalizing tendencies of the human mind. And we have no reason to suppose that the
formulation of virtual absolutes is impossible; prohibitions on genocide, rape, and torture are
plausible examples with which to begin (see § 6.2).
The cultural relativist is right on one issue. Granted that some sets of moral standards are
better than others, and that some are so atrocious that no conscientious person can accept them.
Nonetheless, there is a wide range within which any moral code, however unsatisfactory, is better
than no code at all. And there are important utilities in sharing a moral code with one's neighbors -or at least in having one that is not so different from theirs as to create obstacles to communication
and co-operation. Hence one ought, in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, to support
the conventions of one's society. And those who believe themselves to have such reasons for
criticizing the conventions on one point ought not to widen their criticism into a general rejection of
all inherited ideas; for example those who would criticize American institutions on the grounds that
they authorize economic exploitation have a reason to address the rules of family life with some
gentleness.
7.4. The Limits of Philosophical Argument
Philosophers have distinguished ethics, or reflection upon the principles of conduct, from
morals, or the principles themselves, as first inculcated by parents and others, and subsequently
developed by agents as they grapple with moral challenges. One implication of my discussion is
that morals are independent of ethics. Theoretical reflection is only one of the influences on our
moral consciousness, and not the most important one at that. Nor is the impact of philosophical
ethics on day-to-day morals always benign: there is some reason to fear that the conventions of
academic philosophy favor moral laxity or worse.
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Literature can tell us about the complexity of human situations, and make us aware of
claims that we have been neglecting. But it can do very little to help resolve moral conflicts. An
author can punish a character for breaching a moral norm -- as Tolstoy pushes Anna Karenina
under a train -- but novelists have no authority to impose their value judgments outside the four
corners of their own works. And awareness of moral complexity, unless somehow balanced, tends
to paralyze moral (and political) judgment.
Theology in the wide sense examines the common moral consciousness of a group of
people -- be it Americans, feminists, Baptists, or professional philosophers -- and articulates,
interprets, and applies the norms found there. So long as one adheres to a group, its norms will
have binding force, but no merely human community can assert an absolute claim on persons in
varying degrees alienated from it. Secession remains as a loophole to any moral standard, so long
as it is sustained only by the consensus of a certain community.
Every human community has an implicit picture of the world and the place of human beings
within it, in terms of which its members understand their life together and resolve disputes. In
some cases, a community claims intimacy with the Author of the universe, Who has disclosed to it
some part of His plans. But even such communities exist in history, and for that reason their ruling
ideas are vulnerable to distortion. Even their most loyal members must deal with elements in their
doctrines and practices that conflict with their reasons for adherence to them.
"For her committed members," Germain Grisez responds,
the Church is not a society from which they are more or less alienated. For such people, to
accept the Church's teaching is to be self-consistent. To wish to be a Catholic while
refusing to accept the Church's teaching would be rather like wishing to have a friend
without being a friend. xxxvi «
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But this observation is at best only part of the truth, at least so long as Roman Catholics hold with
Vatican II that "Christ summons the Church, as she goes on her pilgrim way, to that continual
reformation of which she always has need, insofar as she is an institution of men here on
earth.” xxxvii
The most important obstacle to theological understanding is the gap between the
experienced world of contemporary people and that of the people among whom the classical
expressions of Christianity arose. The attempt to reflect on contemporary experience in the light of
the Gospel constantly threatens to collapse in the face of whatever secular ideology is most
pressing at the time. In Protestantism the constraint on dissolution is popular disaffection, as
reflected in shrinking church membership; in Catholicism it is Vatican pressure; in both cases it is
external to the structure of theological discourse. Theology has become a form of politics, and
orthodoxy a form of political correctness rather than a form of truth. And the concepts of
accommodation, dissimulation, repression, secession, and submission threaten to drive out both
faith and reason. xxxviii To require of oneself or others that they become first Century or medieval
people (or early Nineteenth Century Americans) is to impose a burden that those who lived during
the periods did not bear. Possible ways of changing this situation lie outside the scope of this
essay, but now as always the highest court of appeal on Earth is the informed conscience.
An adequate account of the judgments of an informed conscience is one of the most
difficult tasks of moral theory. Information about the relevant facts, including the official positions
of communities of which one is a member, carries one only so far. Every moral code contains
ambiguous, conflicted, and doubtful elements that make its mechanical application impossible.
But act-intuitionism, which expects the conscientious person somehow to know what is right in
every situation, without the help of rules and principles, cuts away the possibility of reason and
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communal reflection in moral judgment. One can seek the counsel of a trusted adviser, and those
who believe in God naturally pray to Him for guidance. But knowing whom to ask, and knowing
when one has received appropriate counsel from God or man, also requires a judgment of
conscience.
Nonetheless, it sometimes clear what one ought to do, even in a situation others find
difficult. We can adduce reasons for our judgments in such cases, though the force of these
reasons, and their capacity to cut short reflection and demand action, goes beyond their
argumentative force. And those who find support for their consciences in moral rules taught as
absolute cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. When conscience does speak, Socrates puts the
result to Crito, "these are the words that I seem to hear, as the Corybants hear the music of the
flutes, and the echo of these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear anything
else." xxxix
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E.g., Thomas Pynchon, Vineland (New York: Penguin, 1991), pp. 134-5: "So that when they

came and kidnapped her in the Pizza Hut parking lot and took her back to Japan, she wasn't sure
right away that being sold into white slavery would turn out to be at all beneficial as a career step."
vi
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Many neoconservative writers, for example, propose to abandon the concept of social justice as

opposed to justice among individual human beings. See Irving Kristol, "A Capitalist Conception of
Justice," Ethics, Free Enterprise, and Public Policy, Richard T. De George and Joseph Pichler eds.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), ch. 4; and Roger Scruton, The Meaning of
Conservatism (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1980).
viii
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See my Relativism, Nihilism, and God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
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xi

Modernity on Endless Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 71-2.
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Ibid., p. 70.
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xiv
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xv
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this word are less pertinent to the issue of moral absolutes than those of sacredness.
xvi
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Providence: Studies in Western Civilization, 2 (Fall, 1993), 27-34. I am grateful to Leonard
Hindsley, O.P. for letting me see a copy of this article before publication. See also Teichman's
articles, "What is Sacred?" New Criterion, Nov. 1993, pp. 8-15; and "The False Philosophy of Peter
Singer," New Criterion, April 1993, pp. 25-30.
xvii

New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1987.

xviii

Kai Nielsen, "Against Moral Conservatism," Haber ed., 172.

xix

"The Authority of the Moral Agent," in Samuel D. Scheffler ed., Consequentialism and its

Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 270. I do not ascribe the argument in the text
to Johnson.
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On minimalism and its relationship to the extremism implied by consequentialism, see Shelly

Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 5-6, 386-90.

xxi

"Love, Situations, and Rules," Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, Gene H. Outka and Paul
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"Cases of Necessity," and Alan Gewirth, "Are There Any Absolute Rights?" all in Haber ed., chs.
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xxiii

Frances Howard-Snyder, "Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck," American Philosophical

Quarterly, 30 (July, 1993), 271-77, argues that rule consequentialism is in fact a form of
deontology, since its principle makes essential reference to what the agent does. We may classify
the theory as we wish, so long as we remember that rule consequentialists consider consequences of
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xxiv
xxv

“Against Moral Conservatism," p. 161.

Here I depart from The Ethics of Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) (paperback

ed.; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 206; but see p. 209.
xxvi

After Virtue, p. 69.

xxvii
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xxviii

As Baruch Brody does; see his "The Problem of Exceptions in Medical Ethics," Doing Evil to

Achieve Good, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey, eds. (Chicago: Loyola University
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interpretation as morally corrupt. But they neglect the important political advantages that result
from the document's flexibility.
xxx

For detailed discussion, see my anthology with Celia Wolf-Devine, Sex and Gender (Australia:

Wadsworth Thompson, 2003).
xxxi

Schopenhauer welcomed this possibility, but views such as his can be safely neglected in real

life moral discourse.
xxxii

For possible ways of developing this line of thought, see Christopher Derrick, Sex and

Sacredness (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1982).
xxxiii

Other possible danger zones include the use of psychoactive drugs and damage to the natural

environment. Some people would separate private property from the rest of the civil order that
defines and protects it, but I am very dubious about this approach.
xxxiv

These two possibilities differ only verbally. It does not matter whether we say, "Thou shalt not

kill," and admit an exception for self-defense, or "Thou shalt do no murder," where murder is
understood as excluding self-defense.
xxxv

Many moralists have converged on such a conclusion. I.M. Crombie expresses roughly the

point made here, though he makes too many concessions to consequentialism, when he writes: "I
cannot dispute that in principle even a definite action rule may on some occasion enjoin the wrong
action, but I can nevertheless decide that I will uphold certain of such rules without qualification on
the grounds that it is better to do so." ("Moral Principles," Christian Ethics and Contemporary
Philosophy, Ian T. Ramsey ed. [New York: Macmillan, 1966], p. 258.) John Finnis, on the other
hand, rejects virtual absolutes as insufficient to the demands of the Tradition. (Moral Absolutes
[Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991], p. 5.)
xxxvi

The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 1 (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), p. 85.
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Unitatis Redintegratio (1964), §6. Tr. in Walter M. Abbot and Joseph Gallagher eds., The

Documents of Vatican II (New York: Guild/America/Association, 1966), p. 350. Men here is of
course generic
xxxviii

I am here indebted to conversations with Augustine Thomson, O.P., of the University of

Virginia. For an Evangelical perspective see David F. Wells, No Place for Truth (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1993).
xxxix

Crito, 54e, G.M.A. Grube tr. The Trial and Death of Socrates (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1975),
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APPENDIX
A NOTE ON JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR (1993)
The Encyclical is primarily a theological document, addressed to the Pope's fellow Roman
Catholics rather than to men and women of good will generally. But the Pope makes no claim to be
teaching infallibly, nor any attempt to cut off dialogue. He expresses the obligation of the faithful
in moral matters in the language of the Second Vatican Council, to "give careful attention to the
sacred and certain teaching of the church" (§ 64, citing Vatican Council II, Dignitatis Humanae, §
14). i I hope that these notes will be of interest, not only to Catholic theologians, but also to readers
of whatever religious persuasion who believe that the working out of the implications of ethical
ideas within concrete communities is of importance for morality.ii I consider the issue posed by
the Encyclical as a philosopher, iii engaged in discussion with reasonable men and women of all
sorts rather than as a theologian elaborating the standards of a community. iv The Encyclical is best
understood as a critique of certain schools of moral theology, which, in the Pope's view, represent
"an overall and systematic calling into question of traditional moral doctrine on the basis of certain
anthropological and ethical presuppositions" (§ 4), rather than as advancing either concrete moral
norms or some philosophical-theological system (see §29). Hence, for example, when he criticizes
proportionalism (§ 75), he must be understood as rejecting it as the sole or sovereign method of
moral reasoning, not as giving official approval to a moral system, such as that of Finnis and
Grisez, that rejects proportionalist reasoning altogether.
The central teaching of the Encyclical is that moral questions are questions of truth and not
mere individual or collective decision. A secondary teaching -- more to the point of the present
book -- is the defense of the negative commandments (such as those prohibiting murder and
adultery). They are "meant to safeguard the good of the person, the image of God, by protecting ...

human life, the communion of persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness, and people's
good name" (§ 13).
Much of the Encyclical is devoted to a polemic against the belief -- common among those
who think of themselves as modern -- that freedom means freedom from moral obligation, or from
the claims of truth; in other words in the power of individuals or groups to create their own
"values." The Pope endorses the "heightened sense of the dignity of the human person and his or
her uniqueness, of the respect due to the journey of conscience [as] one of the positive
achievements of modern culture" (§ 31). But he also affirms, with Newman, that "conscience has
rights because it has duties," chief among them the duty "to seek the truth and adhere to it once
known" (§ 34). The Pope's view of conscience reflects conclusions he first reached as a private
philosopher. v Conscience on this view is "not exempt from the possibility of error" (§ 62), but even
when in error derives its dignity from truth, "if only what man subjectively considers to be true"
(§60). vi Evil done as a result of invincible ignorance is excusable, "but does not cease to be evil, a
disorder in relation to the truth about the good" (§63). Moral teachings that at first appear harsh
and external will, or so he hopes, point the way to an autonomous judgment, by following which an
individual affirms his own understanding of how a human being should live (see § 64).
The key question is the relationship between human freedom and concrete acts. The Pope
agrees with theorists of fundamental option that
Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that
choice, a decision about oneself and setting of one's life for or against the good, for or
against the truth and ultimately for or against God (§ 65).
But he points out that "to separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior means
to violate the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and his soul" (§
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67). It makes no sense to say that a person is good "deep down inside" when his every action
evinces moral depravity.
At this point in the Pope reiterates some traditional Catholic doctrines:
Man does not suffer perdition only by being unfaithful to that fundamental option whereby
he has made a "free self-commitment to God." With every freely committed mortal sin, he
offends God as the giver of the law and as a result becomes guilty with regard to the entire
law (cf. Jas. 2:8-11), even if he perseveres in faith, he loses "sanctifying grace," "charity,"
and "eternal happiness." As the Council of Trent teaches, "the grace of justification once
received is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by another mortal
sin." (§ 68)
But the distinction between apostasy (betrayal of the faith) and other sins seems to
disappear on this assumption. Hence some moral theologians
insist that the opposition to God's law which causes the loss of sanctifying grace -- and
eternal damnation, when one dies in such a state of sin -- could only be the result of an act
which engages the person in his totality, in other words, an act of fundamental option.
(§69)
But the Pope responds to these theologians:
The statement of the Council of Trent does not only consider the "grave matter" of mortal
sin; it also recalls that the its necessary condition is "full awareness and deliberate consent."
... "For mortal sin exists also when a person knowingly and wittingly, for whatever reason
chooses something gravely disordered." (§ 70)
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But it remains hard to understand how one can make such a choice, with full awareness and
deliberate consent on Friday, and then sincerely repent of it on Saturday, as some forms of
penitential practice appear to suppose.
The Pope then turns to the question, how particular moral issues are to be resolved within a
Catholic framework. He rejects the claim that "in the moral life prohibitions are more important
than the obligation to do good." Nonetheless, he insists the negative commandments "oblige
everyone, regardless of the cost, never to offend in anyone, beginning with oneself, the personal
dignity common to all" (§ 52). The answer to the question, what sorts of behavior offend the
dignity of the human person, is found in "the moral commandments expressed in negative form in
the Old and New Testaments" (§52). (He also cites Councils and Popes, as well as his earlier self.)
These commandments are always binding, but their precise application
must be specified and determined ... in the light of historical circumstances by the church's
magisterium, whose decision is preceded and accompanied by the work of interpretation
and formation characteristic of the reason of individual believers and of theological
reflection. (§ 53)
How much latitude of interpretation the magisterium, and the individual believers whose reflection
informs it, may recognize is left unsettled.
The Pope rejects
Certain ethical theories, called teleological, [which] claim to be concerned for the
conformity of human acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with the values intended
by him. The criteria for evaluating the moral rightness of an action are drawn from the
weighing of the nonmoral or premoral goods to be gained and the corresponding nonmoral
and premoral values to be respected. (§ 74)
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He criticizes such theories on two grounds:
[First,] some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is
involved in the concrete choices that it makes. ... [Second,] others are inspired by a notion
of freedom which prescinds from the actual conditions of its exercise, from its objective
reference to the truth about the good, and from its determination through choices of
concrete kinds of behavior. (§ 75)
But the Pope's own approach to ethics is, in a broad sense, teleological: it affirms that the
"true good of the person in view of his ultimate end" (§ 82) settles moral issues. And even a
radically proportionalist theory of ethics can regard the rightness of actions as a question of truth,
and include in its reckoning the fact that a person shapes himself through his choices.
At this point the Pope's argument becomes very difficult to follow. The consideration of
consequences and intentions, he tells us, "is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a
concrete choice" (§ 77). There is also something further: "the 'object' rationally chosen by the
deliberate will, [namely] a freely chosen kind of behavior" (§ 78). Perhaps there are dimensions
other than murderous intentions and lethal results, to which one might appeal to warrant describing
an act as one of murder. But we still need to know what these are, and how they contribute to the
resolution of moral issues.
The Pope observes in conclusion,
Acts whose objects are "not capable of being ordered to God" and "unworthy of the human
person" are always in every case in conflict with that good. Consequently, respect for
norms which prohibit such acts and oblige semper and pro semper, that is, without any
exception, not only does not inhibit a good intention, but actually represents its basic
expression. (§ 82)
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Once it is granted that a certain act is "not capable of being ordered to God" all believers
must avoid it. And all men and women, believers or not, who attempt to live with dignity must
avoid acts "unworthy of the human person." But the question, how one is to ascertain, in theory or
in practice, what acts fall into these classes, continues to present many perplexities.
Moral issues are questions of truth, not to be settled by public opinion or the private
fantasies of philosophers. Freedom properly understood is the freedom to search for truth and
conduct one's life in accordance with what one believes to be true. That the relationship between
truth and freedom in moral matters is left something of a mystery is not, in a theological context, an
objection, however much philosophers may crave greater clarity. But the notion of an object of
action, distinct from both its intentions and its consequences, needs much more explication if we
are to have a persuasive way of linking these important truths to the resolution of hard cases in
morals. We need further discussion of these points, especially among Catholics and others who are
neither relativists nor believers in the project of founding moral discourse anew.
Hence the Pope's treatment of dissent in moral theology requires further development and
refinement. "Moral teaching" we may agree, "certainly cannot depend simply on respect for a
process; indeed it is in no way established by following the rules and deliberative procedures
characteristic of a democracy," let alone by "carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on
in the media" (§ 113). But it is not established by top-down hierarchical methods either, however
much a centralized authority may contribute to the health of a community in which it is present.
The Pope appeals to reason and tradition rather than his own brute judgments. But insofar as he
does so, the reason of all people, and the judgments of other persons formed in the Catholic
tradition, cannot be just dismissed.
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NOTES

i

All citations are to the text of Veritatis Splendor published in Origins 23 (Oct. 14, 1993), 297-336.

ii

For commentaries, see the contributions of Richard John Neuhaus and Russell Hittinger to the

symposium, "The Splendor of Truth," First Things, 39 (January 1994), 14-18; and, in a more
critical vein, Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., "Veritatis Splendor: The Issues," The Month, 265 (Nov. 1993),
483-487; and John Finnis, "Beyond the Encyclical," The Tablet, 8 Jan. 1994, 9-10. A steeply
theological commentary is Angelo Scola, "Following Christ," Communio, 20 (Winter 1993), 719722.
iii

Alasdair MacIntyre’s commentary, "How Can We Learn what Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach?"

Thomist, 58 (2) (April, 1994), 177-195, is chiefly of interest for its explanation of why its author is
not a relativist (pp. 187-8), and for forging closer links between virtue and rule-observance than he
has hitherto done (passim). But it also includes an attempt -- I am afraid a question-begging
attempt -- to explain how one can make consequentialist arguments in some contexts while
excluding them in others (pp. 192-3).
iv

At least as a private person, Karol Wojtyla holds that the distinctive Christian element in ethics

arises from the acceptance of God's revealed plan for human beings rather than any special
normative or evaluative premise. See his Person and Community, Theresa Sandok, OSM, tr. (New
York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 105-6.
v

Ibid., p. 234.

vi

Man here (translating the Latin homo) is of course to be understood as including women.
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